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The aim of this thesis is to develop an approach to presentism that is 
compatible with physical theory. Central to the achievement of this aim is the 
development of a suitable ontology for presentism, one that succeeds in 
internalising the objectively dynamic features of reality. This requires a radical 
approach to certain entrenched assumptions concerning time, persistence and 
change that are embedded in the standard metaphysical paradigms within 
which current debates within the philosophy of time take place. 
The principal premise of the thesis is that presentism is primarily an ontological 
thesis concerning the nature of existence, rather than a thesis about the nature 
of time per se. In particular, I take ‘serious’ presentism to involve a combination 
of the thesis that only present things exist, with the thesis that reality is 
objectively dynamic. A secondary premise of the thesis is a denial that time is 
substantival. I garner support for this latter premise from consideration of the 
‘problem of time’ within quantum gravity and the role played by the concept of 
time in both general relativity and quantum mechanics. This provides a route 
towards an account of presentism compatible with physical theory, namely one 
that equates time with the structure of an objectively dynamic reality. 
If time is derivative of an objectively dynamic reality, then this has implications 
for the standard accounts of both change and persistence. The key to developing 
an adequate ontology for presentism requires that both change and persistence 
are formulated independently of (B-series) time. The path to achieving this 
requires a determination of the objective correlates of tense; on this basis I 
argue for a reformulation of persistence as ‘continuing existence’ and for real, 
metaphysical change to be defined in terms of objective creation and 
annihilation. I further argue that, for the ‘serious’ presentist, real change and 
persistence are metaphysically primitive, and so need to be reflected within the 
category structure of an appropriate ontology. 
I propose an ontological model based on the categories of pure process (which 
exemplifies persistence) and interaction event. Interaction events are defined as 
interactions of pure processes that result in the creation or annihilation of pure 
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processes; events thereby reflect real, metaphysical change. I utilise a functional 
alignment of the categories of the proposed ontology with the primitive 
elements of Belkind’s (2012) Primitive Motion Relationism to argue for the 
compatibility of the proposed presentist ontology with relativistic spacetime. In 
the final chapters I seek to show how the proposed ontological model might 
assist the presentist in tackling particular problems, such as formulating a 
successful account of objective becoming, accounting for cross-temporal causal 
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The overarching aim of this thesis is to establish the groundwork for an account 
of presentism that is compatible with physical theory. In pursuing this aim the 
principal argument of the thesis is that a process model of presentism is the 
best option.  
I believe that presentism is true. I also believe that our best theories of physics 
indicate important truths about reality at the fundamental level. Given this, a 
successful account of presentism must be compatible with those theories. A 
core argument of this thesis is that the route to achieving compatibility requires 
a model of presentism that succeeds in internalising the objectively dynamic 
aspects of reality. By ‘internalising’ I mean modelling the dynamic aspects of 
reality independently of B-series time. The principal motivation for the 
approach taken is the belief that a suitably constructed process ontology 
permits the presentist to achieve precisely this. 
To my knowledge a process account of presentism has not been previously 
attempted. Indeed, at first glance a process ontology appears incompatible with 
presentism. The reason for this is that processes are generally considered to be 
temporally extended. As Rescher (1996) states, ‘it is of the very essence of an 
ongoing process that it combines existence in the present with tentacles 
reaching into the past and the future’ (p.39). The incompatibility is clear. 
Presentism is the view that ‘only present things exist’ (Ingram and Tallant, 
2018, Introduction). If processes have ‘tentacles’ reaching into the past and 
future, the present existence of the process brings with it a commitment to the 
existence of its past and future components, contrary to presentism. 
The challenges presented by this apparent incompatibility require one to 
question certain entrenched assumptions that underpin the standard 
metaphysical paradigms within which current debates in the philosophy of time 
take place. It also demands a radical approach that critically examines our 
intuitions about, and concepts of, time, persistence and change. A key 
assumption to be questioned is that a dynamically evolving reality has to be 
xi 
 
formulated in 3+1 dimensional terms,1 such models imply a commitment to 
absolute simultaneity, in opposition to the results provided by the Special 
Theory of Relativity. 
In approaching this thesis, I ‘hang my hat’ on a species of naturalism. I consider 
this as subscribing to a commitment to ontological realism (i.e. that objective 
reality is independent of human conception and representation) and to the idea 
that concrete2 reality is physical and, more or less, successfully modelled by our 
best scientific theories. As such I consider that the primary role of the 
metaphysics of time is to describe the de facto nature of concrete reality, how it 
is in this universe, rather than how it might be in other possible universes. In 
addition, the arguments within this thesis are intended to appeal to those 
presentists who subscribe to the view that tense reflects a fundamental truth 
about reality, namely that reality exemplifies objective passage, or becoming.3 I 
describe this view as ‘serious presentism’. 
I begin the thesis by arguing that the establishment of a ‘compatibilist’4 account 
of presentism is severely disadvantaged by the terms of the debate within the 
philosophy of time, the historical roots of which can be traced back to pre-
Socratic philosophy (Chapter 1). Key to understanding the root cause of the 
difficulties is to recognise that the opposing theories of time (principally 
presentism and eternalism) should be critically evaluated with reference to the 
wider metaphysical paradigms within which these theories sit; I describe these 
as the ‘static’ and ‘dynamic’ models of reality. The theories of time associated 
with each model bring with them implicit assumptions concerning change and 
persistence, and the metaphysical dependencies that hold between them. 
Nonetheless, I argue that both the opposing metaphysical models share a 
common false presupposition; this is the presupposition that time is 
                                                        
1 A ‘3+1 dimensional’ ontology of spacetime is one that asserts an absolute, objective division of 
spacetime into separate spatial (3) and temporal (1) dimensions, in contradiction to the Special 
Theory of Relativity. The assumption that the presentist is committed to this stance is made, for 
example, in Craig (2008), Nasmith (2011), Hawley (2006, p.451), Monton (2006, p.2). 
2 By ‘concrete’ I mean existing spatiotemporally. 
3 I accept that presentism (the view that ‘only present things exist’) is compatible with a denial 
that reality exemplifies objective passage.  
4 When used to describe an account of presentism, the term ‘compatibilist’ is shorthand for 
‘compatible with our best physical theories’. 
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substantival and metaphysically independent from the existence of entities. 
This has the consequence that change and persistence are assumed to be 
metaphysically dependent on, or derivative of, substantival time. 
This common false presupposition seriously disadvantages the presentist (and 
indeed any dynamic theorist) in two ways. First, it engenders the assumption 
that objective becoming can only be formulated as temporal becoming; 
objective becoming is in time or of time. And temporal becoming, conceived 
either as the flow of time itself or as the possession of transitory tensed 
properties, leads to McTaggartian problems of contradiction or infinite regress. 
It also obstructs the formulation of an account compatible with physical theory. 
Where temporal becoming requires a unique, universal time, with respect to 
which reality evolves, this commits the dynamic theorist to a 3+1 dimensional 
conception of reality, in direct opposition to our best physical theories. 
The solution to these problems is for the presentist to establish a mechanism by 
which the dynamic aspects of reality are internalised and made independent of 
time. The ‘serious’ presentist, the presentist for whom reality is objectively 
dynamic, should therefore subscribe to a reversal of the order of metaphysical 
priority between time, on the one hand, and both change and persistence, on 
the other. 
Although presentism is primarily regarded as a theory of time its principal 
thesis is that ‘only present things exist’ and, for the serious presentist, this 
thesis is combined with a commitment that tense reflects a fundamental, 
objective feature of reality. Neither claim, as such, makes ostensive reference to 
time. This leads to the thought that presentism is primarily an ontological thesis 
concerning the nature of existence, rather than a thesis about the nature of time 
per se. Consequently, Chapter 1 concludes that a compatibilist theory of 
presentism, and one able to achieve an internalisation of the dynamic aspects of 
reality, should be constructed on two foundational premises. The first premise 
is the ‘thesis of objective passage’ (P1). This is the thesis that tense reflects the 
fact that reality exhibits objective passage that is grounded, in some manner, in 
its intrinsically dynamic nature. The second premise (P2) is the premise that 
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time reduces to the structure of an objectively dynamic reality. The presentist 
should therefore subscribe to a reductionist, or relational, account of time. The 
task of Chapter 2 is to provide arguments in support of both these foundational 
premises. In Chapter 3 I address, head-on, the charge that it is eternalism, 
rather than presentism, that is better supported by our best theories of physics. 
The subsequent chapters are concerned with constructing the main body of a 
compatibilist account of presentism. 
In Chapter 2 I justify a reductionist account of time (premise P2) by garnering 
support from physical theory; in particular, with reference to the ‘problem of 
time’ within emerging theories of quantum gravity.  In assessing the role played 
by the concept of time within both general relativity theory (GTR) and quantum 
mechanics, I argue that a ‘reductionist structuralism’ with respect to the 
spacetime of GTR provides the best way of understanding this role.  Further, a 
consensus of opinion suggests that such a view of time provides the key to 
resolving certain conceptual issues that obstruct the development of a 
successful account of quantum gravity. A review of how time is defined, both 
historically and within current physical theories, lends support for the premise 
that time is derivative of objective change in reality; there is nothing within 
physics to support a denial, of premise P1, that reality is objectively dynamic. I 
conclude that it is beneficial for the presentist to equate (B-series) time with the 
structure of an intrinsically dynamic reality, as this provides the best route 
towards developing a compatibilist account. 
Presentism implies a rejection of ontological parity. Since eternalism, with its 
commitment to ontological parity, is generally considered to be well-supported 
by the Special Theory of Relativity (STR), it needs to be shown that the 
ontological commitments of presentism are compatible with relativistic physics 
and this is the task of Chapter 3. This chapter reviews the ‘Rietdijk-Putnam-
Penrose’ arguments to eternalism, from the relativity of simultaneity, and 
critically assesses a more recent formulation from Peterson and Silberstein 
(2010). I argue that this reformulation fails on the grounds that it begs the 
question in support of eternalism. I then consider an alternative argument that 
eternalism stands as inference to the best explanation of relativistic effects. I 
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reject this argument on the grounds that it relies upon an erroneous 
assumption of an absolute coincidence between spatiotemporal coordinates in 
different observers’ reference frames, an assumption only made plausible by 
confounding the concepts of coordinate points and spatiotemporal events. I 
suggest a better explanation of relativistic effects aligned with the commitments 
of presentism. Key to this is understanding that there is nothing within the 
meaning of ‘existing four dimensionally’, within the STR, that is incompatible 
with presentism. As such, relativistic kinematic effects are compatible with a 
presentist position that regards four dimensional spacetime as the structure of 
an objectively dynamic reality. 
In developing a compatibilist model of presentism, that regards spacetime as 
the structure of reality, a potential objection rears its head. A structuralist 
account of time is equally open to the eternalist, and this leads into a recent, 
sceptical debate that questions whether there is any metaphysical substance to 
the disagreement between the presentist and the eternalist (e.g. Dorato, 
2006b).  This debate is important, and critical analysis (Chapter 4) reveals that 
the terms within which it is conducted serve to disadvantage the presentist’s 
case. In particular, the sceptical claim relies upon semantics and formulates the 
debate in terms of tensed and tenseless existence claims. This conceals the 
ontological heart of the disagreement and generates the ‘presentist’s dilemma’ 
(Meyer, 2013, p.69): attempts at a formulation of presentism are rendered 
either ‘trivially true or obviously false’.  
I argue that the ontological substance of the debate between the presentist and 
eternalist turns on the nature of what it is that makes the relevant existence 
claims true. Specifically, for the eternalist occurrence at a particular 
spatiotemporal location is a sufficient determinant of concrete existence; this is 
not the case for the presentist. For the presentist, the truthmaker for the 
relevant existence claim is the fact that the entity exists now. This supports the 
position that presentism needs to be formulated on a more fundamental, 
ontological level, independently from reference to any present ‘time’. Tallant’s 
(2014) Existence Presentism achieves this. In asserting an identity between 
presence and existence, it removes any metaphysical dependence between the 
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present and a unique B-series time. In doing so it appears to be the only recent 
formulation of presentism able to circumvent successfully the ‘presentist’s 
dilemma’ and thereby establish that the debate between the eternalist and the 
presentist is not only an ontologically significant one, it is one that concerns the 
nature of existence.  
In separating existence from B-series time, Existence Presentism provides 
scope for developing a reductionist-structuralist model of spacetime, aligned 
with presentism, where spacetime is metaphysically derivative of an objectively 
dynamic reality. Nonetheless, significant challenges arise in relation to 
modelling an objectively dynamic reality independently from (B-series) time 
and this requires development of suitable accounts of both persistence and 
change for the serious presentist.   
In Chapter 5 I consider the suitability and utility of the standard accounts of 
persistence and change for the compatibilist model of Existence Presentism 
being developed. I argue that the separate commitments of Existence 
Presentism and compatibility with physical theory imply two criteria for 
suitable accounts of persistence and change: first, that change and persistence 
are formulated independently of B-series time and, second, that any definition 
of change is consistent with real, ‘metaphysical change’ (after Pezet, 2017, 
p.1824). The latter is the notion that ‘the whole of what exists is changing’, and I 
argue that this position is implied if reality is ‘objectively tensed’.5 I argue that 
the standard accounts of persistence (endurance and perdurance) fail to meet 
either of these criteria and so are unsuitable for the compatibilist Existence 
Presentist. The source of the problems is that, under both models, persistence is 
grounded in transtemporal identity (Lowe, 1998, Tallant, 2018). The standard 
account of change, as the possession of incompatible intrinsic properties at 
different times, is also unsuitable, for two reasons. First, for the Existence 
Presentist, the present is metaphysically independent of (B-series) time. 
Second, a commitment to the thesis of metaphysical change means that the 
                                                        
5 It is accepted that this is a poor use of language, since ‘tense’ is a linguistic category. Whenever 
I refer to ‘reality being objectively tensed’ I am using shorthand for ‘how reality is such that 
tense reflects something metaphysically fundamental about it’. 
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whole of what there is, is changing. If the whole of what exists is changing 
independently of B-series time, then change cannot be defined in terms of B-
series time. 
In locating an alternative to transtemporal identity as the ground for 
persistence, I pursue the idea that this needs to be informed by how it is that 
reality is objectively tensed, and therefore arrived at by consideration of the 
objective correlates of tense. I suggest that the concept of objective passage 
encompasses two different aspects of reality: transience and continuity and this 
indicates an intuitive alignment between persistence and continuity, on the one 
hand, and real change and transience, on the other. 
I proceed to develop suitable accounts of both persistence and change along 
these lines. I use Lowe’s (1998, pp. 110-114) argument that transtemporal 
identity cannot be grounded without circularity and, on this basis, I adopt a 
strictly tensed approach to reformulating persistence as ‘continuity of 
existence’. In relation to change, reality appears to exhibit two types of change: 
substantial and qualitative. Considering examples of both types indicates a 
fundamental commonality; both involve something new coming into existence, 
or something existing going out of existence. This leads to a formulation of real 
(metaphysical) change as ‘something coming into existence and/or something 
going out of existence’. Of relevance here is Deasy’s (2017) formulation of 
presentism in terms of ‘transientism’; though, as a formulation of presentism, 
this account seems to fail (Tallant, 2019, § 2) it embodies an important intuition 
that the present is transient and continually changing. The proposed 
reformulation of change aligns change as it applies to an objectively dynamic 
present with change as it applies to existing entities (entities that are present).  
The suggested reformulations of both persistence and real change succeed in 
internalising the dynamic aspects of reality, and formulating them 
independently of B-series time. They also allow the presentist to positively 
characterise the nature of the present in response to several critics.6 As defined, 
                                                        
6 For example, Williamson (2013, pp. 24-25), Correia and Rosenkranz (2015), Deasy (2017) and 
Pezet (2017, p. 1835). 
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real, metaphysical change and persistence are opposing, or orthogonal, features 
of reality, but it is by encompassing these opposing features that the present 
exemplifies objective passage, or flow. The present exhibits real, metaphysical 
change (or transience) in the sense that all that exists comes into existence (in 
the present) and goes out of existence (in the present), but the present itself 
also continues on (and so exemplifies persistence). The present is not dynamic 
by being a movement in, or of, time; the present is dynamic in virtue of a 
continuing process of creation and annihilation. 
I argue that, as the objective correlates of tense, real change and persistence are 
metaphysically primitive. Concepts that are metaphysically primitive need to be 
represented in the categories of an appropriate ontology, and this forms the 
ground for establishing an ontological framework for presentism that can 
demonstrate compatibility with physical theory. It is the task of Chapter 6 to 
develop this framework. I consider the potential for a process ontology to 
capture the primitive nature of both persistence and real change by reviewing 
the models of both Seibt (1997) and Rescher (1996). I argue that, as formulated, 
the category of process, although exemplifying persistence (as continuity 
through functional recurrence), is unable to reflect real change; change is 
construed as merely functional variation. Underlying this failure is the fact that 
real change (as objective creation and annihilation) has an ontological profile 
that is opposed, or orthogonal, to that of persistence (as continuing existence). I 
conclude that it is impossible for a single-category ontology to reflect such 
opposing features of reality.  
I note the role played by the interaction of processes in Seibt’s (2009) account 
of emergence, and the scope that this provides for representing real change 
within a modified process-ontological framework. I make the argument for 
interaction to be regarded as a separate ontological category from process, one 
that aligns with the essential features of events. This leads to the formulation of 
two, mutually-dependent ontological categories (pure process and interaction 
event) which reflect the equally primitive nature of persistence and real change. 
A third ontological category (concrete substance) is introduced which sits above 
the categories of pure process and interaction event. At the fundamental level 
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this substance exists as the quantum field which is characterised by a wave-
particle duality. This duality is reflected in the mutual dependence, and equally 
primitive status, of the categories in the second tier of the ontological hierarchy 
(pure process and interaction event). A fourth category, that of powerful 
property, completes the ontological model; powerful properties have a role to 
play in accounting for causation in a presentist-friendly manner (Chapter 7). 
I argue that the proposed model has explanatory worth in accounting for the 
complex connection between the terms ‘process’ and ‘event’ in ordinary 
language; it also provides a better understanding of the fact that complex 
entities can both persist and change. However, the principal benefit of the 
model is that it will be seen to provide a mechanism for achieving the 
compatibility of presentism with relativistic spacetime. 
A notion of existential boundedness is introduced, as an additional category 
feature, to distinguish interaction event from pure process. The notion of 
boundedness permits an understanding of the origin of duration; the duration 
of a pure process is the interval that elapses between the interaction event that 
marks (or bounds) the point at which it comes into existence and the 
interaction event at which it goes out of existence. 
I argue that the categories of the proposed ontological model align, in a 
functionally relevant manner, with the primitive elements in Belkind’s (2012) 
Primitive Motion Relationism. The latter derives the relativistic spacetime of 
STR from an axiomatic system under which both uniform, unidirectional motion 
and the intersection of those motions are primitive. Although Belkind’s model is 
equally compatible with an eternalist ontology (one that also regards spacetime 
as the structure of reality), a uniquely presentist model is secured through the 
boundedness of interaction events. In this way Minkowski spacetime is 
regarded as the structure of an objectively dynamic reality, one that exemplifies 
both real change and persistence.  
These arguments support the compatibility of the proposed ontological model 
for presentism with, at least, the four dimensional spacetime of STR. There is 
some reason to consider, at least tentatively, that such an ontology might also 
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prove compatible with both GTR and emerging theories of quantum gravity. The 
need for a new ontology for spacetime is recognised by many commentators7 as 
implied by the problems of time within quantum gravity, discussed in Chapter 
2. It is suggested that an ontology under which time is derivative of an 
objectively dynamic reality might present a potential route towards resolving 
some of these conceptual issues. 
One of the principal criticisms levelled against presentism is the difficulty faced 
in accounting for cross-time relations (CTR), such as spatiotemporal and causal 
relations. To the extent that relations imply the existence of their relata, the 
non-existence of both the past and the future suggests that the presentist is 
unable to provide an obvious ground for such relations. In Chapter 7, I employ 
the ontological model developed in Chapter 6 to provide an appropriate account 
of causation to address problematic causal CTR. I suggest that the most suitable 
approach for the presentist is to adopt a realist, productive account of causation 
under which causation is not fundamentally a relation between entities, at the 
metaphysical level. This strategy permits the presentist to assert the truth of 
causal cross-time relational claims in a manner that is not existence-entailing. 
However, I concede that under the ontology developed in the thesis cross-time 
spatiotemporal relations remain problematic, and I refer to alternative 
presentist strategies for dealing with these. 
In formulating a productive account of causation, two approaches are available. 
Those advocating causal dispositionalism (such as Ellis, 2001; Molnar, 2003; 
Groff, 2008; Mumford and Anjum, 2011; Heil, 2012) see causation as grounded 
in dispositional properties, construed as real (causally effective) powers to 
bring about certain effects. Alternatively, causal process theories (e.g. Salmon, 
1984, 1994, 1997, and Dowe, 1992, 2000) regard causation as a process of 
bringing about. The ontology suggested in Chapter 6 ostensibly points towards 
a process account of causation. However, a critical analysis of causal process 
theories concludes that the key ontological component, under these models, is 
that of the interaction of processes, and that the notion of causal process is, in 
                                                        




fact, ontologically redundant. This facilitates the formulation of a process-
dispositional account of causation which recruits elements from both species of 
theory and is aligned with the proposed presentist ontology. 
In the final chapter (Chapter 8), I consider whether the account of presentism 
provided might alleviate an additional problem. The asymmetry of fixity8 that 
ostensibly obtains between past and future is problematic for the presentist, for 
whom past and future are unreal. Attempts to ground this asymmetry in either 
temporal continuing or causation (e.g. Craig, 2001b) risk the charge that the 
asymmetry of fixity is presupposed by any A-theoretic account of temporal 
continuing or causation (Diekemper, 2005).  
I concur with Diekemper that the asymmetry of fixity demands an ontological 
basis and I follow Craig’s (2001b) suggestion that this should be grounded in 
the nature of objective becoming. I outline an account of objective becoming in 
line with the proposed ontological model. Objective becoming arises because 
the present exemplifies the opposing features of real, metaphysical change and 
persistence. I argue that this gives rise to an asymmetry of ontological 
dependence between past and present, one that does not obtain between the 
present and the future, and this is the origin of the asymmetry of fixity. 
I close with a postscript that revisits the enduring legacy of McTaggart and the 
relevance of his arguments to the conclusions of this thesis. 
                                                        
8 The ‘asymmetry of fixity’ refers to the fact that was has been is fixed, or settled, whilst what 
has yet to be is open. 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 - STATIC AND DYNAMIC MODELS OF REALITY 
1.1 Introduction 
Frank Ramsey counselled that when a philosophical dispute presents 
itself as an irresolvable oscillation between two alternatives, the 
likelihood is that both alternatives are false and share a common false 
presupposition. (Campbell, 1990, p. xii) 
I begin this thesis by reflecting on the historical roots from which the current 
debates within the philosophy of time arise, and highlight the wider 
metaphysical paradigms within which the opposing theories of presentism and 
eternalism reside. I refer to these as the ‘static’ and ‘dynamic’ models of reality. 
The purpose of this excursion is to uncover the source of the problems in 
reconciling presentism with physical theory.  
In section 1.3 I describe how the metaphysical commitments of the static model 
align well with current physical theory, and in 1.4 I analyse the source of the 
difficulties for the dynamic theorist in achieving compatibility with those 
physical theories. In the remainder of the chapter I identify a ‘common false 
presupposition’, through an analysis of the approaches to persistence and 
change within each of the metaphysical models. Though common to both sides 
of the debate this presupposition particularly obstructs the presentist’s 
endeavours. 
1.2 The Static – Dynamic Debate 
The polarisation between presentism and eternalism, within the philosophy of 
time, can be viewed in terms of a wider metaphysical debate concerning the 
nature of reality, the provenance of which stretches back to (at least) the 
debates of the pre-Socratic philosophers.  
The position that reality exemplifies objective becoming aligns with a view that 
reality is essentially dynamic, rather than static. This approach sees change as 
fundamental and objectively real; change is considered part of the furniture of 
reality, rather than merely an illusion. This view of reality has a long and 
venerable history which can be traced back to Heraclitus of Ephesus (circa 500 
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BCE). Heraclitus espoused a philosophy of radical universal flux or dynamic 
transition and saw change as ubiquitous. Rather than seeing the dynamic nature 
of reality as a feature which required explanation, Heraclitus was the first to 
suggest that dynamicity stands in ‘the role of an explanatory feature’ (Seibt, 
2018, § 1).  
The converse view has an equally long and venerable history. According to 
Graham (2015), Heraclitus influenced Parmenides of Elea in developing an 
opposing philosophy based on universal stasis.9 Parmenides thought that 
reason and sensation result in contradictory models of reality. To be sure, our 
sensations provide us with an impression of flux, or constant change, but reason 
indicates that change is contradictory. His reasoning runs as follows. 
Parmenides rejected the possibility of reference to ‘not-being’ since there is 
nothing objectively (in reality) to ground such a reference. Consequently, any 
account of change ultimately comes down to being able to point to differences 
between one thing, X, and another thing, Y, and this, in turn, is to state that ‘X is 
not (yet) Y’. Yet we cannot state that ‘X is not (yet) Y’ since to do so is to refer to 
the not-being of Y. Therefore, reason supports the view that motion and change 
are impossible. Assuming that the dictates of reason are elevated over evidence 
from the senses, we should believe that reality exists as a unified and 
unchanging whole. 
The debate has continued, in various guises, and these two contrasting views of 
reality have become entrenched within metaphysical discourse, most notably in 
the philosophy of time. Each side is associated with the adoption of a collection 
of metaphysical positions that are naturally aligned and underpinned by a 
common approach to the concept of time. I refer to these metaphysical 
paradigms as the static and dynamic models of reality respectively. 
I employ the term ‘static model of reality’ to refer to a combination of the 
following three positions: 
                                                        
9 A majority of commentators interpret Parmenides’ poem to imply a strict monism under 
which the single entity’s being is unchanging and undifferentiated, though others disagree: e.g., 
Russell interpreted Parmenides as motivated by strictly logical considerations (Palmer, 2016). 
3 
 
1. Eternalism, or the ‘block universe’ view. This is the view that all times, 
objects and events are equally actual, or real, and ontologically on a 
par.10 
2. The tenseless, or B-theory view of time.11 This denies the objective 
reality of tense; all tensed sentences are reducible to a reference to B-
relations between objects (namely, ‘earlier than’, ‘later than’ and 
‘simultaneous with’).  
3. The perdurance view of persistence.12 Following Lewis (1986a, p. 202) 
this is the view that ‘something perdures iff it persists by having 
different temporal parts, or stages, at different times, though no part of it 
is wholly present at more than one time’. 
These three, aligned positions together provide a model of reality under which 
reality is essentially static. It is static in so far as time does not pass or flow. This 
is because all times are equally real and tense has no objective correlate. There 
is, therefore, no objective distinction between past, present and future. 
In contrast, by ‘dynamic model of reality’ I refer to the combination of the 
following positions: 
1. A rejection of eternalism; in other words, that it is not the case that there 
are present, past and future times, objects and events, all of which are 
                                                        
10 For example, Hales and Johnson (2003) state ‘Eternalists are temporal egalitarians, holding 
that all times are equally real, with no particular time enjoying ontological privilege’ (p.528). 
Similarly, Rea (2003) provides ‘Eternalists believe that all past and future objects exist (i.e. 
there are some past objects, there are some future objects, and there neither were nor will be 
objects that do not exist)’ (p.247). Note, though, that the generalisation of eternalism provided 
above is not intended to be definitive since it would also encompass those, such as Prior, who 
believe that times or instants are logical fictions, but who are, nonetheless, not eternalists. 
11 The distinction originates from McTaggart’s (1908) argument for the unreality of time where 
he distinguishes two ways of ordering positions in time. The ‘A-Series’ orders times and events 
according to their possession of tensed properties whereas the ‘B-Series’ orders them according 
to two-placed relations (‘earlier than’, ‘later than’ and ‘simultaneous with’). It was Gale (1968) 
who first coined the terms ‘A-theory’ and ‘B-theory’ after McTaggart’s distinction between the 
two series. 
12 Although perdurance is exemplified here by Lewis’ renowned definition, since the debate in 
this area has subsequently shifted I include, under the banner of ‘perdurance’, positions 
currently falling under both the term ‘perdurance’ (which posit temporal parts) and ‘exdurance’ 
(which posit temporal stages). 
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equally actual, or real. This includes presentism (the view that ‘only 
present objects exist’13), possibilism (the view that ‘the future is still 
merely possible rather than actual […] the past has become and is fully 
actual’ (Savitt, 2014, § 2.1)), and other dynamic approaches such as 
McCall’s (1994) ‘shrinking future’ model.  
2. An A-theory or tensed view of time. This considers tense a primitive and 
unanalysable feature of reality. The terms ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ 
indicate that reality exemplifies objective passage, or objective 
becoming. 
3. The endurance view of persistence. Something endures ‘iff it persists by 
being wholly present at more than one time’ (Lewis, ibid.). 
These three positions together provide a model of reality that is objectively 
dynamic. It is dynamic in so far as time passes, or flows, and it is this that 
underpins objective passage. 
In constructing the debate in terms of these contrasting models I do not imply 
that the adoption of any one of the positions (within a given model) necessitates 
a commitment to any of the others.14 The point is rather that, within each 
model, the positions described are frequently held together since they possess a 
natural alignment with respect to the features that are attributed to time. 
1.3 Dominance of the Static Model 
The static model of reality, as described, has come to be the dominant position 
within metaphysics and the philosophy of time. This owes much to the view that 
it is motivated by science and, in particular, by our current theories of physics. 
                                                        
13 For example, Markosian (2004). However, as Ingram and Tallant (2018) note the term fails to 
designate a single, unequivocal view and definitions can vary depending upon whether they 
range over objects or times. Thus Merricks (2006, p. 103) describes presentism as the view that 
‘only the present time is real’. 
14 For example, Maudlin (2002) argues that the objective passage of time is compatible with 
eternalism; similarly, Skow (2009) advocates a version of the ‘Moving Spotlight Theory’ which 
combines both a moving present and eternalism. Dorato (2006a) also wishes to claim that the 
successive occurring of time-like related events is sufficient for a mind-independent and 
tenseless becoming since he sees it as an a priori matter that time-like related events within 
Minkowski spacetime occur or happen. Mellor (1998) and Simons (2000) both subscribe to a 
tenseless view of time but deny that this is incompatible with endurantism. 
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In this section I briefly outline the arguments to support the view that each of 
the three elements comprising the static model aligns well with current physical 
theory. 
1.3.1 Eternalism 
Eternalism entails the ontological parity of all objects, events and times, past, 
present and future. The argument to eternalism from the relativity of 
simultaneity within the Special Theory of Relativity (STR) marks the point at 
which the static model of reality comes to be seen as the dominant metaphysical 
interpretation of our best physical theories. The original argument was 
provided by Rietdijk in 1966, followed by Putnam (1967) and subsequently 
reinforced by Penrose (1990).15 
The argument is famously criticised by Stein (1968, 1991) who argues that it is 
reliant for its conclusion on the relativistically incompatible concept of distant 
present events. This objection is held to be justified by a majority of 
commentators.16 Nonetheless, irrespective of the merits of more recent 
formulations of the argument,17 it is generally considered that eternalism 
provides the best (metaphysical) explanation of relativistic kinematic effects, 
such as time dilation and length contraction.18 The core of the various 
arguments is that relativistic kinematic effects provide empirical support for the 
assertion that spacetime is intrinsically four-dimensional, and the latter can 
only be explained on the basis of a metaphysical assumption as to the 
ontological parity of all times and events (i.e. eternalism). An analysis of the 
arguments involved, and the extent to which physical theories motivate the 
metaphysical commitments of eternalism, will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 3. 
  
                                                        
15 This argument will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
16 For example, Saunders (2002), Petkov (2006). 
17 Such as provided by Petkov (2006) and Peterson and Silberstein (2010). 
18 See, for example, Balashov and Janssen (2003), Petkov (2006) and Norton (2008). 
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1.3.2 The B-theory (or tenseless view) of time 
The B-theory of time naturally (though not necessarily) aligns with eternalism 
and similarly gains support from science. As Dieks (2012, p.104) notes: 
In theoretical physics, both classical and relativistic, time is used in the 
spirit of the B-theory. The four-dimensional Minkowski diagrams of 
special relativity are typical: they represent (parts of) the history of the 
universe, extended both in time and space, by specifying all events at 
their dates and locations, together with their spatial and temporal 
interrelations. The important point is that there is no preferred Now in 
these diagrams, let alone a flowing Now. 
The B-theory, as a model of time, is supported by physics in that it suffices to 
explain all physical phenomena. Physics has no explanatory requirement for 
tense, or for a privileged present, in its modelling of reality. On the basis of 
Ockham’s razor, there is no naturalistic reason to posit an objective, privileged 
present. 
1.3.3 Perdurantism 
The third element within the static model of reality is a perdurance account of 
persistence. I discuss the compatibility of both endurance and perdurance with 
presentism, in greater detail, within Chapter 5. The purpose here is to outline 
how perdurance supports the compatibility of the static model with physical 
theory. 
Perdurance aims to address the problem of persistence through change. This 
arises from a conflict between change, viewed as the possession of incompatible 
properties by objects at different times, and Leibniz’s Law.19 Under Leibniz’s 
Law, the preservation of numerical identity between A at t1 and A at t2 requires 
both entities to have all their properties in common. Yet for an entity, A, where 
it is the case that ‘A is red (all over)’, at one time, and ‘A is blue (all over)’, at 
                                                        
19 Leibniz’s Law of Identity states that A is identical with B iff every property of A is a property 
of B and vice versa. This is similar to, but distinct from, the ‘Principle of the Identity of 
Indiscernibles’: A and B are absolutely indiscernible, iff they are identical. 
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some other time, this is clearly not the case. Since being red (all over) and being 
blue (all over) are incompatible properties a contradiction ensues. The 
preferred solution to this (e.g. Lewis, 1986a) is provided by the perdurance 
model of persistence. Persistence and change are reconciled by positing 
temporal parts (e.g., A-at-t1) as the basic existents, where different temporal 
parts bear the relevant incompatible properties. Since the incompatible 
properties are possessed by different entities (the temporal parts), conflict with 
Leibniz’s Law is circumvented. Persistence is also accommodated; persistence is 
only attributable to the whole entity, which is seen as the mereological sum of 
its temporal parts. 
The perdurance view of persistence and the concept of temporal parts also gain 
support from the STR. The relativity of simultaneity within the STR implies 
there is no objective fact of the matter as to whether two events happen 
simultaneously, or whether one occurs before the other: what an observer 
judges will depend on the reference frame adopted. The corollary of this is that 
there is no absolute division of spacetime into three spatial and one uniquely 
temporal dimension. Instead, within the spacetime of the STR (‘Minkowski 
spacetime’), spatial and temporal dimensions are entangled into a unified four-
dimensional manifold; objects thereby exist as four-dimensional entities. There 
are therefore multiple ways of dividing four-dimensional objects into separate 
three-dimensional temporal parts. This aligns with the perdurance model of 
persistence under which an object persists as a four-dimensional whole of 
temporal parts, none of which is unique or ontologically privileged. 
In conclusion, each of the different positions characterising the static model of 
reality gains support from science. In addition, the coherence and consistency of 
the separate elements of the model provide good reason for its continued 
dominance.  
1.4 The Problems Encountered by the Dynamic Model 
Proponents of the dynamic model commit to a tensed view of time. This is 
associated with the belief that tense reflects a fundamental truth about reality, 
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namely that reality exemplifies objective passage. However, serious problems 
arise in explaining the nature of this. 
There are two main ways in which objective passage might be understood. First, 
by the idea that time itself passes; there is an objective temporal flow which 
governs the transition of reality between that which has yet to exist and that 
which has existed. The alternative option is to assert that events or objects 
move through time by successively possessing transitory tensed properties 
(pastness, presentness and futurity). Both these approaches suffer problems 
arising from McTaggart’s (1908) argument. The notion of temporal flow faces 
additional issues in relation to coherence, and its incompatibility with 
relativistic physics. It is these three problems that will now be discussed.  
1.4.1 McTaggart-Style Problems – Passage as the acquisition of 
temporal properties 
McTaggart famously argued for the unreality of time on the basis of an analysis 
of the concept of time. He highlighted the fact that this concept includes two 
distinct elements, which he referred to as the ‘A-series’ and the ‘B-series’, and 
noted that ‘we never observe time except as forming both these series’ (1908, p. 
458). These two series serve to order the positions of events occurring in time 
in two distinct ways. Under the A-series, events are ordered in terms of whether 
they are past, present or future; further, all events eventually move successively 
along this series. Events can also be ordered in terms of the B-series: this 
positions events in terms of whether they are earlier than, later than, or 
simultaneous with other events. Whereas the position of an event in the A-
series is continually changing, the position of the same event in the B-series is 
forever fixed and permanent. 
The overall form of McTaggart’s argument is first to argue that without change 
there would be no time and second, that change requires the A-series. Since the 
A-series is, in his eyes, incoherent it follows that time cannot exist. For 
McTaggart there must be more to (real) change than simply having 
incompatible properties at different times. Under the B-series change is simply 
the possession by an object of different properties at different temporal 
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locations; however, since all these locations co-exist this cannot be ‘real’ change, 
as this is no different from spatial variation. Real change therefore requires 
there to be changing facts about how things are now and so requires that the 
present time keeps changing; in other words, that there is a flow of time, or 
passage. The B-series therefore needs to be supplemented with the A-series in 
order to represent real change. So, for McTaggart, real change requires time to 
flow. As is well known, McTaggart subsequently argues that the notion of time 
flowing leads to contradiction; for McTaggart, if time cannot flow, there can be 
no change in reality and therefore time is unreal. 
Any account of objective passage formulated in terms of transitory tensed 
properties also falls foul of McTaggart’s argument and engenders a vicious 
infinite regress. Pastness, presentness and futurity are incompatible properties: 
if an object or event is past, it cannot also be present. Yet these properties must 
be possessed by all events which move from the future, into the present and 
from then to the past, so a contradiction ensues. The A-theorist might object 
that these are held successively, not simultaneously, and introduce second-
order tensed predicates to indicate this (Dainton, 2010). This means that for a 
given present event (A) at present time (t0):  
‘Event A is present in the present (t0), past in the future (t3) and future in the 
past (t-3)’  
 
There is no incompatibility here, argues the A-theorist. However, though this is 
true of the present time (t0), the problem is that event A doesn’t stay in the 
present: it is continually moving and changing its tensed status. So there will 
always be times for which we can assert a conjunction such as: 
Event A is past in the present (t3), present in the present (t0) and future in the 
present (t-3)  
t0 
Present 




This is contradictory. Further, introducing second-order or even infinitely 
higher order tensed properties fails to eliminate the paradox of incompatible 
properties. It is generally felt that, despite its shortcomings, McTaggart’s 
argument succeeds against any dynamic theory of time underpinned by either 
transitory or intrinsic tensed properties.20 
1.4.2 The Coherence of Temporal Flow 
There are also intractable problems associated with conceiving the flow, or 
passage, of time in terms of some form of motion. Arguments have been 
provided by several commentators21 but most famously by J.J.C. Smart (1949) 
who draws the analogy with a ‘flowing river’. Any notion of time’s flowing given 
in terms of motion requires reference to a second temporal dimension or meta-
time, since all motion is defined in terms of a rate with respect to time. Yet the 
posited meta-time, if truly temporal, must similarly flow or pass, and this kick-
starts an infinite regress of meta-times. On the other hand, employing a static 
background meta-time also fails (Dainton, 2010), since each moment of 
ordinary time (permanently) possesses presentness, albeit at different meta-
times. Consequently, any sense of a unique and flowing present is lost. 
Price (2011) objects that the notion of temporal flow is actually incoherent, 
since its coherence would require us to be able to state at what rate time passes. 
In response, Maudlin considers it ‘a priori that if time passes at all, it passes at 
one second per second’ (2007, p. 112). Price counters that this is no more 
informative than saying that a journey from Sydney to Melbourne passes at a 
rate of one mile per mile. 
For van Inwagen (2002, p. 59) the real issue in formulating the passage of time 
using Maudlin’s rate (of one second per second) is that this does not provide a 
rate of change; dividing one second by one second just gives one, and unity 
cannot be a rate of change. Olson (2009) also views Maudlin’s suggestion as odd 
since all other changes can conceivably occur at different rates. We cannot 
                                                        
20 There is an extensive literature on this and only cursory reference is made here. Dainton 
(2010), for example, provides a review of the problems associated with transitory tensed 
properties. 
21 Such as Dorato (2002), Olson (2009), Price (2011). 
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measure the rate of time’s passage using a clock since clocks measure the 
amount of time (i.e., the interval) between any two events. As Olson notes, in 
order to measure the rate of time’s passage we should need a ‘chronological 
instrument analogous to a speedometer’ and concludes that ‘time’s passage 
would have to be radically different from any other sort of change’ (2009, 
p.447).  So the present cannot be ‘moving’ or ‘changing’ in any standard 
meaning of the terms, nor can we be moving in time. 
In defence of passage, Markosian (1993) argues against the requirement for a 
meta-time with respect to which time passes; for him, time passes but not at 
any rate. Those who assume that the passage of time requires a rate at which it 
passes make a ‘category mistake’ since:  
the answer would have to involve a comparison between the pure 
passage of time and the pure passage of time, but such an answer would 
not make sense because the pure passage of time has a unique status 
among changes – it is the one to which other, normal changes are to be 
compared. (Markosian, 1993, p.843) 
A last-ditch option, for the dynamic theorist, as Zinkernagel (2011) notes, is 
simply to hold that the passage of time is primitive and unanalysable. 
In summary, in asserting that reality exemplifies objective passage one option 
open to the dynamic theorist is to underpin this with the passing of time itself. 
This section has summarised the main difficulties encountered in formulating a 
sufficiently rigorous notion of temporal flow upon which to base such accounts. 
1.4.3 Incompatibility with Relativity Theory – the Need for 
Absolute Simultaneity22 
A third problem faced by the dynamic theorist is incompatibility with relativity 
theory. Dynamic theorists, of whatever species, share a commitment to the 
                                                        
22 ‘Absolute simultaneity’ means that the temporal interval between two events, so related, is 
zero, in all frames of reference. This is denied by the STR. 
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rejection of the ontological parity of all times, objects and events (i.e. a rejection 
of eternalism).  In particular, the present is considered ontologically privileged. 
A widely held assumption is that the present is privileged in the sense that it 
represents a unique, global time.23 In the arena of spacetime theories, this 
assumption, in turn, requires an absolute, or universal, simultaneity. Objective 
passage would thereby require the movement, or flow, of this privileged global 
time. The notion that the dynamic theorist must be committed to absolute 
simultaneity goes back to Gödel, who used this to argue against the reality of 
time. As Zinkernagel (2011) describes: 
Gödel effectively argued that time is real only if change is real, and that 
change is real only if there is an objective and universal lapse (or flow) of 
time. Moreover, Gödel took such an objective lapse to be equivalent to 
the fact “that reality consists of an infinity of layers of `now' which come 
into existence successively" (Gödel 1949, 558); and this picture of reality 
is only possible, according to Gödel, if a distinguished global time can be 
found. (p.13) 
This presents the most significant problem for any dynamic theory aiming to be 
compatible with physical theory. Within the relativistic spacetime of the STR 
the ontologically privileged status of the present can no longer be identified 
with a unique global time. There are no unique hyperplanes of simultaneity and 
there is no frame-independent notion of absolute simultaneity. 
                                                        
23 For example, Craig (2008), in championing the ‘Lorentzian’ interpretation of STR assumes 
that absolute simultaneity is required by any theory accepting the reality of tense and objective 
becoming. Nasmith (2011) assumes ‘the validity of presentism is tied to the existence of the 
absolute simultaneity relation’ (§ 2.2). Hawley (2006, p. 451) remarks: ‘Presentists claim that 
only what is present exists, which is to say only those events simultaneous with now exist’. 
Similarly, Saunders (2002, p. 3): ‘According to presentism, all that is physically real is the 
present – a system of physical events all of which are simultaneous with each other’, Monton 
(2006, p. 2): ‘The presentist […], believes that the universe is three-dimensional’ and 
Zimmerman (2011, p. 166): ‘If, as A-theorists believe, there is an objective fact about what is 




The dynamic theorist who wishes to identify the present with either a 
privileged frame of reference24 or a universal hyperplane of simultaneity either 
needs to reject outright the key principles of the STR (this might be justified, for 
example, on the grounds that the STR represents incomplete physics) or look to 
other empirically equivalent theories that permit a privileged reference frame 
(for example, quantum mechanics and general relativity both permit this). I 
provide an overview of these attempts in what follows. 
Despite its incompatibility with the spacetime of STR, relativistic physics does 
not, as such, prohibit the possibility of absolute simultaneity. Given this, 
Tooley’s (1997) approach is to develop a comprehensive and systematic 
reworking of the Special Theory of Relativity under which absolute simultaneity 
can be provided for. Similarly, within the General Theory of Relativity (GTR) 
certain solutions to Einstein’s Field Equations (such as the Friedmann-
Robertson-Walker model) permit the partitioning of the universe into preferred 
divisions (or ‘foliations’) of three-dimensional spatial surfaces that allow for a 
global time (or absolute simultaneity) to apply to all events on such a surface. 
This fact has facilitated strategies which define an absolute cosmic time with 
reference to the expansion of the universe. Bourne (2004) provides an 
overview of these approaches but finds them wanting. The notion of cosmic 
time is both epistemologically and phenomenologically inaccessible to 
individuals, and so is unlikely to connect with either our concepts of, or our 
experience of, simultaneity and temporal passage. More importantly, since the 
expansion of the universe is a contingent matter it renders objective temporal 
passage equally contingent. Bourne questions whether it is ‘plausible that the 
metaphysical notion of temporal becoming can be equated with a physical 
process that is contingent on the particular distribution of matter in the 
universe’ (2004, p. 116). Such a contingent relation appears unable to hit the 
‘metaphysical mark’; why should expansion of the universe (and so the 
distribution of its matter) have anything to do with the nature of time per se?  
                                                        
24 A ‘frame of reference’ is a coordinate system centred on a given point in spacetime and 




although it defines what it is for events to be simultaneous […], it says 
nothing about what it is for us to be located in the present, […] and it 
doesn't explain our belief that the past is fixed and the future is open. 
(ibid p.117) 
Alternative strategies look for support from quantum mechanics, in particular, 
an experimentally verified feature of quantum reality known as ‘non-locality’. 
Particles, such as electrons, can be prepared to be in a certain (‘entangled’) state 
such that their measurement variables (e.g., spin) act in a correlated manner 
across vast spatial distances.  The particles violate locality since they act as 
though there were no distance between them. The argument proceeds as 
follows: if the measurement of one particle instantaneously ‘affects’ the 
outcome of the measurement of the other particle (regardless of spatial 
separation), then the particles must act simultaneously. And simultaneity 
across, in theory, an infinite spatial separation implies the existence of an 
absolute, or universal time. 
Callender (2008) assesses the claims25 that quantum non-locality requires 
absolute simultaneity, and thereby supports a preferred foliation of spacetime 
into separate spatial and temporal dimensions. He notes that it was Popper 
(1982) who first suggested that the correlations, indicated in the EPR26 
experiments (as described in Bell, 1987), suggested action-at-a-distance and 
thus the existence of absolute space. However, this interpretation of quantum 
non-locality is not clear cut, since it depends upon assumptions regarding both 
causality27 and the correct interpretation given to the concept of measurement 
within quantum theory. 
Looking further forward, Monton (2006) considers that developing theories of 
quantum gravity might potentially provide a privileged reference frame but, 
                                                        
25 For example, those argued for by Popper (1982) and Lucas (1998). Maudlin (1994) also 
discusses the morals to be drawn from this. 
26 The EPR paradox (after Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, 1935) is a thought experiment which 
aims to reveal an inherent paradox in quantum theory such that either quantum theory 
provides an incomplete description of reality or action is non-local. 




given that these theories are still very much under development, the 
metaphysical implications are difficult to ascertain.  
Even so, the main problem with all these approaches is that even if it were 
possible to identify a unique plane of simultaneity (within a future, unified 
physical theory) a fatal blow to such accounts is dealt by Callender’s (2008) 
‘coordination problem’. The argument here is that there is no way of knowing 
that the physically preferred foliation of spacetime dictated by that theory 
coincides with the metaphysically preferred foliation of objective passage. The 
dynamic theorist still needs to offer additional arguments to support the 
preferred ontological status of the foliation designated as ‘the present’, as well 
as some form of dynamic process of generation and annihilation. This criticism 
is brutally general and can be targeted at any physically preferred foliation and 
is, he suggests, ‘in principle irresolvable’ (2008, p.63). It does indeed seem 
difficult to see how this might be overcome. 
As Callender is at pains to point out, there is no physical relevance to the notion 
of absolute simultaneity (viz. two events objectively happening at the same 
time); physics just has no requirement for this notion. Callender himself 
considers that the best route available to the dynamic theorist, in responding to 
the argument to eternalism from the relativity of simultaneity, is to adopt a 
Lorentzian interpretation of the STR with its 3+1 spacetime ontology (also 
supported by Craig, 2008). This permits absolute simultaneity as an invariant 
feature of the spacetime. The downside to this approach is that it requires 
positing additional structure (viz. the ether) that is, in principle, unobservable. 
Positing additional, unobservable entities goes against the principle of 
parsimony (Ockham’s Razor): the methodological principle which favours 
simplicity as the criterion of choice amongst competing scientific theories. This 
might therefore be considered an ontological extravagance too far. 
1.4.4 A Compatible Account of Objective Passage? 
Given the difficulties associated with the notion of absolute simultaneity, this 
section will consider the two main approaches to objective passage that appear 
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compatible with relativistic spacetime. I argue that each incurs problems which 
makes it unsuitable for the dynamic theorist to pursue. 
1.4.4.1 A Relativistic Relation of Becoming - Stein (1991) and Bigaj 
(2008) 
Stein (1991, p.148), in a famous response to the Rietdijk-Putnam argument 
(§1.3.1), proposes a model of objective becoming in terms of a two-place 
relation, R, between spacetime points within Minkowski spacetime. R is a 
relation of ‘already definite’ or ‘having become’ such that Rab provides that 
‘spacetime point a is definite with respect to b’. This relation is both transitive 
and reflexive  and has the condition that ‘for any point a there is a point b such 
that Rab’. So, for any spacetime point a there is a point b that is not already 
definite with respect to it. The relation only applies between a point a and any 
point in or on a’s past light cone28 in the Minkowski spacetime diagram. 
Equivalently, Rab iff b lies in the causal past of a. The relation, R, thereby 
represents, for Stein, a notion of becoming that is Lorentz-invariant,29 and so 
compatible with relativistic spacetime, yet one that permits a division between 
a definite past and an open future. 
Several commentators30 agree that Stein has shown that objective becoming is 
not ruled out as a possibility by the Rietdijk-Putnam argument to eternalism, 
and that the latter only succeeds against dynamic models of time that require a 
universe-wide spatially extended present. However, the principal criticism 
against Stein’s argument is that its success means that it unacceptably 
relativizes reality to a single spacetime point, the ‘here-now’; there is no longer 
a universe-wide becoming. Stein’s model does not permit there to be an 
extended present and this follows from the transitivity of the R relation. If a 
given spacetime point, a, were R related (‘definite with respect to’) to another 
point, b, (where b is neither a itself nor a point in a’s causal past) then the 
                                                        
28 The ‘past light cone’ for any spacetime point, a, is that portion of spacetime containing points 
(and potential events) that can be causally related to a. It is bounded by a light cone since the 
velocity of light, c, represents an upper limit to the transmission of causal influence. 
29 By ‘Lorentz-invariant’ I mean that the notion of becoming would be agreed upon by all 
observers moving at constant relative velocities. In general, Lorentz-invariance expresses the 
notion that the laws of physics are the same in all inertial reference frames.  
30 For example, Dorato (1995, Ch. 11), Clifton and Hogarth (1995) and Tooley (1997, p. 337). 
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transitivity of R would have the result that a is definite with respect to all other 
spacetime points. Unless R is restricted to hold only between either a, or points 
in the causal past of a, the conclusion of eternalism follows: all events are 
definite with respect to one other. 
Petkov (2006, p. 212) refers to this implication of Stein’s model as ‘event 
solipsism – for every observer the world would be reduced to a single event 
(the event ‘here-now’)’. Under such a ‘point presentism’ reality is reduced to a 
single (and therefore zero-dimensional) point, yet the universe, according to 
science, exhibits four-dimensionality. This, Petkov argues, entails that such 
presentism is unable to account for length contraction and time dilation, 
phenomena for which we have plenty of empirical evidence.31 Stein’s notion of 
becoming is described by Dorato (1995) as ‘an uncorrelated, non-denumerable 
set of narrow creeks’ (p.184), rather than a universal ‘tide’ of becoming. There 
is no one privileged perspective on reality, rather, numerous equivalent points 
for which certain things are real. Here we might concur with Callender (2000) 
that the minimum acceptable construal of objective becoming surely requires 
that the present of any given event contains at least one other event (the ‘non-
uniqueness condition’). 
Stein’s model was subsequently supplemented by Bigaj (2008) to include a 
complementary relation, S, of ‘indefiniteness’32 which provides for an ‘open 
sphere of future possibilities’ (p. 231). For Bigaj, any complete notion of 
becoming requires both a determinate set of things that have already come to 
be and an indeterminate set of things that have yet to become, or, future 
possibilities. Bigaj considers his method provides a more ‘dynamic’ model than 
Stein’s since it provides for a cumulative becoming along a given world-line 
(rather than a single spacetime point). Nonetheless the principal objection 
remains that the model localises the present to the world-line of a single object, 
and so unacceptably relativizes reality. 
  
                                                        
31 Petkov’s arguments are analysed in detail within Chapter 3. 
32 Where Sab ≡ ‘the state at b is indefinite (open, unsettled) as of a’ (Bigaj, 2008, p. 231). 
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1.4.4.2 Becoming as the Successive ‘Happening’ of Events 
Here I briefly describe the second approach to objective becoming available 
within the confines of relativistic spacetime. However, this approach is not one 
that is open to the dynamic theorist since it is predicated on an eternalist theory 
of time. 
Dorato (2002, 2006a) and Dieks (2006) reject the idea that objective becoming 
requires a successive coming into existence of global nows (or indeed any 
notion of a moving now). Instead, they consider that a concept of mind-
independent and tenseless becoming is available if becoming is construed 
simply as the successive ‘happening’ of events in spacetime. For Dorato it is an a 
priori matter that events within Minkowski spacetime ‘occur’ or ‘happen’. 
Because of this the eternalist is not committed to a position where all events are 
simultaneous since events occur in temporal succession. So, although all actual 
events (past, present and future) exist ontologically on a par, at their respective 
spatiotemporal locations, their existence at those locations is sufficient for 
objective becoming. As a consequence, becoming does not involve any 
ontological asymmetry: it does not provide for an open future or, indeed, any 
ontological distinction between past, present and future. Becoming reduces to, 
essentially, a structural feature of spacetime.  
Although the approach avoids the solipsism of Stein’s ‘here-now’ model, it 
denies the present a privileged ontological status and, for this reason, is an 
unsuitable mechanism for a compatibilist approach to presentism. Maudlin 
(2007, p. 116) and Price (2011) also object to the localised approach that is 
common to both the Stein and Dorato models, since it fails to ground an 
objective, non-contingent distinction between past and future. 
1.4.5 Summary of Issues Presented by the Dynamic Model 
The dynamic theorist faces a challenge in explicating objective passage and 
thereby accounting for the fact that tense reflects an objective feature of reality. 
Accounts that rely upon either the positing of transitory tensed properties or 
the concept of temporal flow face intractable problems. Both approaches are 
susceptible to McTaggart-style problems. In addition, establishing a 
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compatibilist account of objective passage faces the further difficulty of locating 
a unique and universal plane of simultaneity, with respect to which the universe 
can be said to evolve in time. If the pursuit of absolute simultaneity is 
abandoned the only alternative appears to be to model objective passage within 
the arena of four-dimensional spacetime. Although Stein shows this can be 
achieved, it unacceptably relativizes reality to a single spacetime point. 
It appears, therefore, that the theorist who aims for an account compatible with 
physical theory is wedged between a rock and a hard place: either accept the 
conclusion of eternalism (and ontological parity) or relativize existence to a 
single reference frame. This binary viewpoint is one that is frequently 
encountered within the literature.33 Conversely, a dynamic theorist who rejects 
the STR and looks to alternative physical theories to provide a notion of 
absolute simultaneity will still fall foul of Callender’s (2008) coordination 
problem. 
1.5 A ‘Common False Presupposition’? 
The first half of this chapter highlights that the current debate between 
presentism and eternalism can be viewed within the wider context: that of an 
historical debate between alternative, metaphysical views of reality. Within one 
camp reality is regarded as fundamentally static, while the other sees it as 
essentially dynamic. Each of these views of reality is underpinned by a 
corresponding view of time. Reality is dynamic in so far as time is dynamic; 
whereas a static reality is grounded in a static view of time. 
In the following section I argue that, although the concept of time has disparate 
features under each of the models of reality described, within both it plays a 
similar, and metaphysically fundamental, role. This is brought out by 
considering the role played by time in the accounts of change and persistence 
under each model, and it is for this reason that the debate between presentism 
                                                        
33 For example, Nasmith (2011, § 2.1) notes that the arguments to eternalism attempt to reduce 
the presentist position to ‘absurdity’ by ‘compelling the presentist to either reject presentism or 
accept that the existence of distant reality is observer dependent’. Saunders (2002) similarly 
notes the dilemma: for the presentist committed to absolute simultaneity, there are only two 
compatible relations (R) definable within STR. One leads to the result that all events are real; 
the other to the conclusion that only one (the ‘here-now’) event is real. 
20 
 
and eternalism needs to be considered within the wider metaphysical context. I 
argue that the role played by time is underpinned by a ‘common false 
presupposition’ (hence the quotation from Campbell (1990) at the head of this 
chapter). The presupposition at work is that time is prior to, or metaphysically 
independent from, the existence of entities. I subsequently argue that it is this 
shared presupposition that severely obstructs attempts to formulate a 
compatibilist account of presentism. 
1.5.1 The Role of Time within the Opposing Metaphysical Models 
1.5.1.1 The Static Model 
The tenseless view of time denies that tense indicates any metaphysically 
fundamental feature of reality. Any sense that time passes can be explained in 
terms of human perception of the world and any talk of, or reference to, time 
passing can be reduced to B-relations34 in a token-reflexive manner. Since the 
B-series relations are permanent and unchanging this implies that time is 
essentially static. As such it forms a static background compatible with the four-
dimensional manifold of Minkowski spacetime. This manifold specifies the 
spatial and temporal relations existing between all objects and events that 
reside at their respective locations on the manifold. The manifold of tenseless 
time also serves to underpin the models of both persistence and change under 
the static model. 
Change is standardly defined in terms of incompatible properties at different 
times. For persisting object, A, and incompatible properties, F and G, a temporal 
change in A is given by: 
 A (temporally) changes35 = def A is F at t1 and A is G at t2.  
Under perdurance entities persist by having different temporal parts, or stages, 
at different times. As noted above, any potential conflict with Leibniz’s Law is 
circumvented by temporally indexing the subject term so that the incompatible 
                                                        
34 I.e., the relations of being earlier than, of being later than, and of being simultaneous with. 
35 From here on, the term ‘change’ is used (unless otherwise indicated) to mean solely temporal 




predicates are true of different entities: the different temporal parts. If the 
different temporal parts are signified by ‘A-at-t1’, ‘A-at-t2’, and so on, change is 
formulated under the static model (SM) as follows: 
(i.i) A changes (SM) = def A-at-t1 is F and A-at-t2 is G 
This means, though, that the different temporal parts are themselves 
unchanging. 
Persistence, as perdurance, is given as the sum of these temporal parts.  
(i.ii)  A persists (SM) from t1-tn = def at each time tx, in the interval t1-tn, 
there exists a temporal part of A, A-at-tx 
Claims about identity over time (persistence) apply only to the four-
dimensional whole, namely, the mereological sum of the individual temporal 
parts.  
To conclude: the manifold of tenseless time within the static model provides the 
background with respect to which objects both persist and change; persistence 
and change are both defined in terms of time. 
1.5.1.2 The Dynamic Model 
In contrast to the unchanging background of the static model, time objectively 
passes under the dynamic model: time is essentially dynamic and continually 
changing. Although time has this very different nature, it also functions as an 
external background, with respect to which objects both persist and change. As 
a dynamic background time is continually changing or moving forward and in 
doing so it functions to lend reality a dynamic aspect. 
Under the dynamic model (DM) change is also defined, in the standard manner, 
by reference to property incompatibility at different times, though the 
endurantist employs an alternative mechanism to avoid the difficulties 
presented by Leibniz’s Law. The solution here is to employ a temporal 
indexation of the incompatible properties in one of several ways. Seibt (1997, p. 
153) distinguishes five methods that endurantist accounts use to model change:   
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(ii.i)  A changes (DM) = def:  
A is F-at-t1 and A is G-at-t2   or, 
A is-at-t1 F and A is-at-t2 G   or, 
at t1: A is F and at t2: A is G   or, 
F(A, t1) and G (A, t2)  or, 
A ((is F) at t1) and A ((is G) at t2)  
In terms of persistence, under endurance the whole entity (A) persists by 
moving through time. Time, as a dynamic background, provides for the 
persistence of objects: 
(ii.ii) A persists (DM) from t1-tn = def at each time tx, in the interval t1-tn, 
there exists an object A 
To conclude, though time possesses very different features under the dynamic 
model nonetheless it provides the background with respect to which objects 
both persist and change. As is the case under the static model, persistence and 
change are both defined with reference to separate temporal instants. 
1.5.2 The Metaphysical Status of Time Under the Static and 
Dynamic Models 
I argue above that within both opposing metaphysical paradigms there is a 
conceptual dependence of both persistence and change on time: persistence is 
persistence over time and change occurs in time. This does not, in itself, permit 
conclusions to be drawn as to the relations of metaphysical dependence 
between time, persistence and change. In what follows I suggest that there is an 
implicit assumption at work, common to both models, and this is the 
assumption that time is substantival: it is external to, and independent from, the 
existence of entities. Entities exist in time or at a time. This leads onto the 
further assumption that both change and persistence are metaphysically 
dependent on, or derivative of, substantival time. I argue that it is this 
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metaphysical assumption that hinders presentist attempts at formulating a 
model compatible with physical theory. 
Hawley (2020, § 2) makes the following observation:  
In the past few years […] some have suggested that debates about 
persistence are better understood as debates about location – how are 
material objects located in (or extended through) time, and how does 
this compare with the way(s) in which material objects are located in (or 
extended through) space?  
This notion of location in time, or existence-at a time is also brought out in the 
exemplary definition of persistence from Lewis (1986a, p. 202):  
Let us say that something persists iff, somehow or other, it exists at 
various times; this is the neutral word: Something perdures iff it persists 
by having different temporal parts, or stages, at different times […] 
whereas it endures iff it persists by being wholly present at more than 
one time. 
The terminology of locations is employed by both sides in the perdurance-
endurance debate and, as Parsons (2007) notes, the locative explication of 
persistence as ‘existing at’ various times brings with it a ‘prima facie ontological 
commitment’ to substantivalism. I propose, in what follows, that the assumption 
that times are substantival and locative fits more naturally with both endurance 
and perdurance than does a relationist model of time.  
As previously noted, under endurance property instantiation is indexed to 
times. Under a substantival account the indexing of properties is easily 
understood. A given property, F, occurs, or is located at, the relevant instant, 
and a different, incompatible property is located, or occurs, at a separate instant 
of substantival time. In other words, there is some thing, an independently 
existing, substantival time, to which different properties are indexed. As 
Hawthorne and Sider (2002, p.68) suggest ‘this talk of instantiation at times 
presupposes the existence of times’. This is not so intuitive in the case of a 
relationist model of time. Under a relationist model there are no independently 
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existing, substantial times, there are just propertied enduring entities and 
certain, primitive relations that exist between them, relations such as 
simultaneous with and being n units after.  
Sider (2001) maintains that endurance cannot work satisfactorily under a 
relationalist model, and the situation where enduring objects temporally 
overlap is particularly complicated. Sider (p.114) describes an example where 
he creates and then destroys a statue; in this case, the period of time that the 
statue persists through partially overlaps his own time span. Where an external 
(and so, substantival) time is posited, the period during which Sider and the 
statue co-exist (and so temporally overlap) can be modelled by reference to a 
fixed time span in substantival time. Unless there is this external (substantival) 
time, within which both Sider and the statue can be said to co-exist (and 
temporally overlap), it is difficult to see exactly what else might constitute the 
required relation between two, wholly existing, entities. Sider suggests the best 
option for the endurantist is to resort to a complex conjunction of relational 
facts. For example, assume Sider to be represented by object, x, instantiating 
property, F, over an interval t0 to t3, and the statue he creates is object, y, that 
exists between t1 and t2, and instantiates property, G throughout. A relationist 
model of endurance might describe the situation as follows: 
x is F one unit after x is F (informally, this holds in virtue of t 0 and t 1, for 
example, as well as t 1 and t 2, and t 2 and t 3); x is F two units after x is F 
(in virtue of t 0 and t 2, or t 1 and t 3); x is F three units after x is F; y is G 
one unit after y is G; y is G one unit after x is F (in virtue of e.g. x at t0 and 
y at t1); y is G two units after x is F; x is F one unit after y is G (in virtue of 
e.g. x at t2 and y at t1); and so on; it is not the case that x is F four units 
after x is F; and so on. (2001, p.115) 
Nonetheless, Sider views this approach as ultimately unsatisfactory since 
certain, distinct possibilities cannot be distinguished, such as that of an 
unchanging object in an infinite linear time, and the same object persisting in 
circular time.  
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There are further objections to a relationist model of endurance. Rendering an 
object’s properties (such as shape) relative to other objects in the universe, 
rather than relative to (external) times, appears ‘objectionably relational’ 
(p.117) according to Sider. This echoes an objection from Lewis: contrary to 
intuition it appears that ‘nothing just has a shape simpliciter’ (Lewis, 1988, 
p.65). This objection could be mitigated by relating an object’s property to its 
own properties at other times (for example, being cold one unit after one is hot); 
however, if this line is taken it is then not possible to specify temporal facts 
relating different objects: 
Given only sentences like ‘x is hot n units after x is hot’ and ‘y is hot m 
units after y is hot’, one cannot specify which of x or y is hot first, or 
whether they are hot at the same time. (Sider, 2001, p.118) 
The endurance model of persistence seems more naturally explicated under a 
substantival model of time: objects persist by moving through an external, 
substantial time, and they change in so far as incompatible properties are 
located at different instants of that external time. Perdurance is also more 
appropriately modelled on the assumption of a substantival time. 
Under perdurance an object persists by possessing different temporal parts at 
different times, and essential to the nature of a temporal part is that, qua 
temporal, it involves existence at a particular time. Temporal parts are more 
explicitly temporally locative than enduring entities.  As Parsons (2007, p.215) 
explains, perdurance involves a three-place relation: ‘a relation between an 
object, a time, and its temporal part at that time’. On the principle that relations 
imply the existence of their relata, this, at first glance, seems to suggest the 
separate existence of both times and temporal parts.  
However, this is too hasty. The temporal parts theorist might also pursue a 
relational model in a manner analogous to the endurantist. As such, temporal 
parts could stand in primitive relations of being simultaneous with, being after 
and being before. For example, temporal part x-at-t3 bears a primitive two units 
after relation to temporal part x-at-t1. In fact, under perdurance, a relational 
model is made slightly easier. The temporal parts theorist is better able to 
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accommodate the situation of temporally overlapping objects (such as in the 
example of Sider and his statue). Here, temporal overlapping is described by a 
relation of simultaneity between each temporal part of the statue and the 
corresponding temporal parts of Sider. Nonetheless, Sider’s objection against a 
relationist model of endurantism carries across to a relationist perdurantism. 
The temporal parts theorist is similarly unable to distinguish an unchanging 
object in an infinite linear time from the same object in circular time. 
Attempts to account for both endurance and perdurance under a relational 
model of time encounter problems that do not occur under an assumption of 
substantivalism, and this appears to arise from the locative explication of 
persistence which is common to each side in the debate. This suggestion is 
reinforced by Parsons (2007) who attempts to provide a mutually acceptable, 
logical framework for the debate between perdurance and endurance. Parsons 
offers a theory of location that aims to prevent both sides from talking at cross-
purposes. However, in doing so, he concludes that formulating a relationist 
theory of location (irrespective of the model of persistence adopted) ‘would be 
a difficult task’ (p.226). The locative nature of persistence, as existence through 
time, or in time, appears to require a substantival notion of time. 
In a similar vein, Hawthorne and Sider (2002) argue that models under which 
locations are not reified (i.e. by adopting a relationist rather than substantival 
approach to spacetime locations) exclude certain possibilities, unless 
metaphysically unacceptable notions are employed. For example, the relationist 
cannot distinguish between the following two scenarios:  
[…] in one world a certain light comes into existence at some time, and 
flashes red and blue every minute forever after, whereas in a second 
world it has existed forever and will continue to exist forever, flashing 
red and blue as before. (p.73) 
The first world could be described in relationist-friendly terms by using 
statements such as ‘the light is red one minute before it is blue, then is red one 
minute after that, then blue one minute after that’ etc. However, this is 
insufficient to distinguish it from the second world unless an ‘infinitary 
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sentence’ is used, for example, ‘... the light is red one minute after that, then blue 
one minute after that, then red one minute after that, then blue one minute after 
that…’ (p.74). Hawthorne and Sider maintain that it is not possible for such 
sentences to be reduced to finite sentences, and they deem ‘infinitary sentences’ 
to be metaphysically unacceptable. This argument seems equally valid for both 
perdurance and endurance. 
Although it is clearly possible to conceptualise times as existing without being 
committed to a substantival time (or times), both models of persistence, 
endurance and perdurance, sit more easily and naturally with a substantivalist 
model of time: persistence is the existence of an entity through time or in time. 
The substantival-relational debate (which concerns the nature of time) is 
inconsequential in relation to the debate between the endurantist and 
perdurantist over the nature of persistence. Given this, I suggest that if both 
models of persistence sit more naturally within the arena of a substantival time 
then it seems likely that this would remain an unquestioned assumption on 
both sides. There would be no reason to question an assumption that has no 
material effect on the debate. Nonetheless, there are two metaphysical 
implications that follow from such an assumption, and I argue in the following 
section that it is one of these, in particular, that is the source of the problems 
encountered by the dynamic theorist. 
The first implication is this: if persistence is existence through, or in, 
substantival time, this implies that persistence is metaphysically derivative of 
time. In the absence of (substantival) time there would be no persistence, and 
no persisting entities. 
Second, as has been noted, each theory of persistence also engenders a 
corresponding account of change. If a substantival model of time underpins 
persistence then this also determines the nature of change: change is change 
over time, or in time. In the absence of (substantival) time there would be no 
change, and no changing entities. The second implication is that change is also 
metaphysically derivative of time, and of existence in time. 
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The position that change is metaphysically derivative of time accords with the 
static view of change that arises under perdurance. Change is the possession of 
incompatible properties by different temporal parts, all of which exist 
ontologically on a par; change is static because time is static. Consequently, 
becoming is rendered a structural feature of spacetime.  
Analogously, under endurance, the metaphysical dependency of change upon 
time provides for the dynamic quality of change. Although change is given (as it 
is under perdurance) by incompatible properties at different times, change 
depends upon a time that flows, or is dynamic, consequently change itself is also 
dynamic. It is the dynamic, or flowing, nature of time that also permits a model 
of objective becoming that sees it in terms of a constantly changing reality, 
rather than as a merely structural feature, as is the case under the static model. 
To conclude, although time possesses very different features under the two 
opposing metaphysical models, the argument here is that both models involve 
the implicit assumption that time is metaphysically independent of the 
existence of entities (it is substantival) and that, qua substantial, it provides a 
background that metaphysically underpins both change and persistence. It 
thereby determines the nature of both change and objective becoming under 
each model. 
1.5.3 The Need to Internalise the Dynamic Aspects of Reality 
In this section I argue that it is the assumption that time is external to, and 
metaphysically independent of, the existence of entities that is the source of the 
problems for the presentist, as a dynamic theorist. In particular, it renders any 
dynamic account vulnerable to McTaggart’s argument; it also leads to 
incompatibility with physical theory.  
The presentist’s commitment to the fundamentality of tense requires a model of 
objective becoming under which the sum total of what exists is in constant 
transition; this entails that there is constant change with respect to what is 
present. An adequate account of change is therefore vital in underpinning 
objective becoming. I argued above that the presupposition of substantival time 
implies that change is metaphysically derivative of time; entities exist in, and 
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change with respect to, time. This has the consequence that objective becoming 
has to be formulated in some manner with respect to time, or in time. In other 
words, objective becoming has to be explicated as ‘temporal becoming’. Further, 
this assumption is common to both sides in the static-dynamic debate. The 
implicit assumption, under both metaphysical models, is that, in so far as reality 
possesses dynamic features, it is time that endows reality with those features. A 
dynamic reality needs to be underpinned by a dynamic time, and, as argued in § 
1.4, a dynamic time is explicated either by time itself flowing, or by reality 
evolving with respect to a unique, universal time; yet both these approaches 
lead to intractable problems for the dynamic theorist. A flowing time falls foul of 
both McTaggart’s argument (§ 1.4.1) and issues related to coherence (§ 1.4.2); 
whereas the search for a privileged, universal time, with respect to which 
reality evolves, places the dynamic theorist in direct opposition to the results of 
relativity theory, and so incompatible with physical theory (§ 1.4.3). 
Maintaining the presumption of substantival time brings with it the implication 
that reality evolves in time and that objective becoming is necessarily temporal 
becoming. This traps the presentist, as a dynamic theorist, between 
unacceptable alternatives. To this extent the presentist has good reason to 
reject this assumption. In Chapter 2 I also argue that this presupposition is 
unsupported by our current best physical theories. In rejecting this assumption, 
the presentist needs to establish some means of internalising the dynamic 
aspects of reality that are indicated by tense. This requires a method of 
formulating those aspects independently of (substantival) time. 
1.6 The Next Steps 
In order to pursue an account of presentism that is compatible with physical 
theory I believe the presentist should reject the ‘common false presupposition’ 
that time is substantival, and that entities exist in time. At first glance this 
rejection might appear counter-intuitive since presentism is generally regarded 
as a theory of time. Nonetheless, the principal thesis of presentism is a 
statement of what exists, namely, that only present things exist, and this is 
(generally) combined with a commitment that reality exhibits objective 
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passage. Presentism is therefore primarily an ontological thesis concerning the 
nature of existence, rather than a thesis about the nature of time per se. This 
leads me to propose two premises as the starting point for establishing an 
account of presentism that is compatible with physical theory, and I provide 
support for each in the following chapter. 
The first premise is the ‘thesis of objective passage’ (P1). This is the thesis that:  
P1: tense reflects the following fundamental fact about reality: reality 
exhibits objective passage (or objective becoming) and this is grounded 
in its intrinsically dynamic nature.  
P1 implies that reality is objectively dynamic; in Chapter 2 I argue that this 
premise is compatible with physical theory. In Chapter 5 I consider the 
objective correlates of tense and argue that an account of objective passage, 
sufficient to achieve compatibility with physical theory, requires that the 
presentist reformulates the standard accounts of persistence and change, to 
provide a mechanism to internalise the dynamic aspects of reality. 
The second premise (P2) concerns the nature of time. It follows from the first 
premise (that reality is intrinsically dynamic) and a rejection that time is 
substantival (the ‘common false presupposition’).  
P2: time reduces to the structure of an objectively dynamic reality.  
P2 implies that the presentist should subscribe to a reductionist, or relational, 
account of time. Support for this premise needs to be garnered from our current 
best theories of physics; this will also be argued for in Chapter 2. Since this 
thesis aims to provide an approach to presentism compatible with physical 
theory, an additional preliminary I need to address head-on is the charge that it 
is eternalism, with its commitment to ontological parity, that is better 
supported by relativistic physics. This is the task of Chapter 3. 
The remainder of the thesis is concerned with the detail of constructing the 
account, which I shall refer to as ‘compatibilist presentism’. A core argument is 
that modelling reality as intrinsically dynamic requires the development of an 
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appropriate ontological model. Specifically, it requires an ontological model 
within which it is existence, rather than time, that is dynamic.  
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CHAPTER 2 – LESSONS FROM QUANTUM GRAVITY: TIME AS THE 
STRUCTURE OF AN OBJECTIVELY DYNAMIC REALITY 
It’s the things that we most take for granted that have the tendency to come 
back and bite us when it really matters. The nature of space and time is 
generally taken for granted. But our assumptions about them seem to be 
inconsistent and as a result, if we are honest, theoretical physics is derailed 
at its very core. (Majid, 2008b, p. 58) 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide arguments to justify the two foundational 
premises, P1 and P2, introduced at the end of Chapter 1. P1 implies that reality 
is objectively dynamic and P2 states that time reduces to the structure of that 
objectively dynamic reality. It was argued in Chapter 1 that a ‘common false 
presupposition’, that time is substantival and metaphysically independent of 
the existence of entities, obstructs the presentist in formulating an account that 
is compatible with physical theory. I believe the presentist should therefore 
subscribe to a reductionist account of time.   
I first argue that none of our current best theories of physics countenance the 
position that time is metaphysically prior to the existence of entities and, in fact, 
the conceptual difficulties associated with formulating a successful theory of 
quantum gravity (QG) appear to suggest that the converse is the case. The 
metaphysical implication of these conceptual difficulties leads to one of two 
conclusions: either reality is fundamentally static and unchanging, or, our 
notions of change, and accordingly of what it is for reality to be dynamic, need 
to be reformulated. In the second half of the chapter I argue that physics can 
countenance a fundamentally dynamic reality (P1) and that the concept of time 
employed within physical theory is derivative of objective change (P2). This 
requires a revision to our standard metaphysical models of change and 
persistence which rely upon a substantival interpretation of spacetime; I argue 
that this interpretation is unsupported. I close with the conclusion that a 
reductionist account of time, in particular one that sees time as the structure of 
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an intrinsically dynamic reality, is the most suitable position for the 
compatibilist presentist to adopt. 
2.2 Time is Now ‘Spacetime’ 
A key result of the Special Theory of Relativity (STR) is the intrinsic 
entanglement of space and time into one four-dimensional, spatiotemporal 
reality. It would appear, at first glance, then that the ‘common false 
presupposition’, that time is metaphysically independent (something 
metaphysically separate from the existence of entities), is already undermined 
from the mere fact that STR is unable to countenance the notion of unique 
‘times’ that can ground change or persistence. In the now, legendary words of 
Minkowski: 
Henceforth space by itself, and time by itself, are doomed to fade away 
into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will preserve an 
independent reality. (Minkowski, 1976, p. 339) 
If there are no unique times, then the standard construal of change, as 
incompatible properties at different times,36 already appears vulnerable. Under 
STR change cannot be seen as different properties at (uniquely) different times. 
Nonetheless, perhaps this is simply a matter of terminology – talk of time is, 
more accurately, talk of spacetime. The suggestion might be that the standard 
accounts of change and persistence hold, but simply need to be grounded in the 
concept of spacetime: change is more accurately incompatible properties at 
uniquely different spacetime points, and it is spacetime, rather than time per se, 
that is metaphysically independent, and serves to ground persistence and 
change. 
It will be seen, in what follows, however, that the notion that spacetime is 
metaphysically primitive37 is severely undermined in the move to unify both 
quantum theory and general relativity theory into a complete theory of 
                                                        
36 More formally, as defined in Chapter 1 (§ 1.5.1): A (temporally changes) = def A is F at t1 and A 
is G at t2. 
37 From now on I use the term ‘metaphysically primitive’ as shorthand for ‘metaphysically 
independent of the existence of entities’, and so ‘substantival’. 
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quantum gravity. This relates directly to problems that arise in reconciling the 
nature of time within the two ‘ingredient’ theories. This is referred to as the 
‘problem of time’.  
2.3 Quantum Gravity and The Problem of Time 
In what follows, I argue that all current approaches to formulating a theory of 
quantum gravity (QG) appear to suggest that neither time, nor spacetime, is 
metaphysically primitive. Time is either rendered emergent or a reductionist 
position is implied, one under which time is reduced to the change of one 
physical variable with respect to others. This section will conclude with a 
discussion of the metaphysical implications of this. 
2.3.1 What is Quantum Gravity? 
‘Quantum gravity’ (QG) refers to a diverse and incipient body of theories which 
aim to combine quantum field theory (QFT)38 with the general theory of 
relativity (GTR) into one, unified theory, encompassing both the gravitational 
and quantum aspects of matter. There is an obvious interface between the two 
theories: all matter consists of particles, and so is described quantum 
mechanically; in addition, all particles (as matter) interact gravitationally.  Both 
‘ingredient’ theories have a significant degree of empirical evidence to support 
them in their respective realms of applicability: QFT applies to matter at the 
sub-atomic level,39 whereas GTR describes matter at cosmological scales. 
However, a theory of quantum gravity is required since GTR is unable to 
describe ‘singularities’ adequately; these are points of infinite curvature and 
energy density associated with the extreme conditions of temperature and 
density present in the early universe, and within black holes. This indicates the 
need to include quantum effects within GTR at these scales.  
Currently there is no single, universally-accepted approach to a theory of 
quantum gravity. This is due in large part to the significant conceptual 
                                                        
38 Quantum Field Theory represents the successful unification of STR and quantum mechanics 
(QM) into a relativistic quantum theory. 
39 Referred to as ‘Planck scales’ where the Planck constant, h, becomes dominant; specifically, 
lengths ~10-35m and time ~ 10-44s. From here on reference to matter at the ‘fundamental level’ 
will refer to Planck scales. 
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difficulties in reconciling the two ingredient theories. In addition, the extreme 
conditions associated with the applicability of a quantum gravity theory mean 
that the empirical discernibility of competing theories is currently out of reach: 
it is difficult to formulate concrete, testable predictions. 
2.3.2 Theoretical Approaches to Quantum Gravity and the 
Disappearance of Time 
The so-called ‘problem of time’ within quantum gravity arose from the original 
approach to quantising gravity (‘quantum geometrodynamics’) established in 
the 1960s. This attempt involved the construction of a wave equation40 for the 
whole universe, referred to as the Wheeler-DeWitt equation (after Wheeler, 
1962 and DeWitt, 1967). The problem of time refers to the fact that this central 
equation lacks a fundamental time parameter and so describes an essentially 
static wave. Yet this represents the key dynamical equation of quantum gravity. 
Quantum gravity thus appears to be describing a universe with no time-
evolution.  
The quantum geometrodynamics programme is now considered to be 
superseded by mathematically superior approaches. The two main contenders 
are Loop Quantum Gravity (LQG) and String Theory, which differ in terms of 
their conceptual starting point. In particular, whether unification should be 
approached from the standpoint of QFT or from that of GTR.  
2.3.2.1 Covariant Approaches – String Theory 
Approaches that proceed from the conceptual apparatus of QFT are termed 
‘covariant’ and have given rise to string and superstring theory. String theory 
starts from a modified quantum field theory approach (replacing point particles 
with one-dimensional extended ‘strings’) and assumes a background four-
dimensional spacetime through which the gravitational field41 propagates. 
Despite many different attempts, to date no successful formulation of string 
                                                        
40 Within the formalism of quantum mechanics physical systems are represented dynamically 
by a wave equation, i.e., the Schrödinger equation. 
41 The gravitational field is represented by the massless spin-two field of the graviton. 
36 
 
theory has emerged. One suggestion to come from the multitude of different 
string theories proposed is the idea that the spacetime of GTR is theoretically 
emergent 42 in a low-energy limit (e.g. Vistarini, 2013). As such, there is no 
problem of time associated with the covariant approaches precisely because 
they assume at the outset a classical, background spacetime, which relativistic 
physics has forced us to reject: this stands as the main criticism of the string 
theory approach. 
Since the covariant approach to QG, exemplified by string theory, relies upon 
the absolute background spacetime of classical physics in its formulation, any 
metaphysical interpretation arising from this can be challenged with the move 
to relativistic physics. Further, the absolute spacetime of string theory functions 
merely as a theoretical construct in the formalism of the theory. Although the 
spacetime of GTR can be reconciled within the theory, it is only emergent in the 
low temperature limit and is not identified at the fundamental level. In 
conclusion, the covariant approach to QG suggests that spacetime is at best 
emergent, rather than metaphysically primitive. 
2.3.2.2 Canonical Approaches – Loop Quantum Gravity 
The main alternative approach to formulating QG is described as ‘canonical’.43 
This begins from the conceptual commitments of GTR and attempts to quantise 
the gravitational field directly. Canonical approaches, among which Loop 
Quantum Gravity (LQG) is the dominant program, continue to suffer from the 
problem of time identified in the early approach; there is no external 
background time parameter against which a system can be said to evolve and to 
which observables can be assigned. This is connected with the fact that the 
canonical approaches maintain the core conceptual commitment of GTR to 
background independence.44 
                                                        
42 ‘Theoretically emergent’ means that it is not part of the structure of the more fundamental 
theory that it is emergent from. 
43 ‘Canonical’ refers to a method, or formalism, for describing the equations of GTR in a manner 
that emphasises the dynamical content of the gravitational field, rather than its geometric 
content; this allows for subsequent quantisation of the field. 
44Background independence will be discussed in more detail in section 2.4.3. Here it is sufficient 
to interpret it simply as coordinate, or reference frame, independence. 
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Two methods are employed to circumvent the problem of time (Isham, 1992). 
The first approach re-establishes some sense of an evolving reality by extracting 
an internal time parameter from within the theory (either before or after 
quantisation). The second approach simply concedes that reality at the 
fundamental level is timeless; the Wheeler-DeWitt equation is interpreted at 
‘face-value’.  
In the first approach the lack of an external background time parameter 
requires that time is identified with some internal property of the whole system 
(matter plus gravitational field). A global time parameter is established such 
that, overall, the system can be said to evolve ‘in time’ with respect to this 
parameter. Consequently, time is re-defined, in physical terms, as the value of 
physical entities with respect to which other physical quantities are correlated. 
This equates with a reductionist approach: time is seen in terms of, or reduced 
to, physical ‘clocks’. However, such approaches suffer from a whole host of 
potentially intractable problems, as Isham notes.45 
Under the second approach the ‘timeless’ interpretation of reality is simply 
accepted. The concept of time is assigned a secondary status and described as 
‘phenomenological’46 or ‘emergent’47 (e.g. Rovelli, 1990). Nonetheless, for 
Rovelli the absence of a time parameter in the fundamental equations does not 
imply that change does not occur. For him ‘change is ubiquitous’ (Rovelli, 2016, 
p. 154) but this position is achieved by modelling change, not with respect to 
some global time parameter, but in terms of relations, or correlations, between 
physical systems or physical parameters that are time-independent (referred to 
                                                        
45 For example: 1. disentangling the physical modes of the gravitational field from the internal 
spacetime coordinates; 2. the arbitrary nature of the choice of internal time coordinates 
conflicts with the fact that the probabilities associated with the Schrödinger equation depend on 
the time coordinates, this leads to difficulties identifying which of the possible resultant 
Schrödinger equations is the ‘correct’ one; 3. in order to be consistent with GTR, any internal 
spacetime coordinates need to be background independent and not depend on any particular 
foliation of the manifold; 4. such approaches suffer problems in achieving any sense of a 
classical evolution of the system. 
46 The term ‘phenomenological’ is used in the literature to mean that time is not fundamental 
but is reducible to something more fundamental such as the ‘history’ of a system, a ‘process’ or 
an ‘ordering structure’. 
47 It should be noted that here ‘emergent’ is used in the reductionist sense and not in the same 
sense as when describing time (in a non-reductionist, classical sense) as being recovered from 




as ‘evolving constants’). Though the universe may be timeless when considered 
as a whole, individual sub-systems can serve as the time parameter (or clock) to 
measure change in other sub-systems. Rickles (2006) describes Rovelli’s 
‘evolving constants of motion’ approach as an attempt to reconcile a 
fundamentally timeless reality with our observations of dynamics and change. 
The approach essentially replaces ‘the mass of the rocket at t’ (which is a 
background dependent quantity) with ‘the mass of the rocket when it entered 
the asteroid belt’, m(0), and ‘the mass of the rocket when it reached Venus’, 
m(1), and so on up until m(n)’ (2006, p. 43-4). In such a way change can be 
described in terms of a sequence of background independent quantities, or 
‘evolving constants of motion’. 
An alternative timeless approach, in the sense of asserting that time itself has 
no ontological significance, is that of Barbour (1999). Barbour considers the 
timeless interpretation of QG to imply not only that time is illusory but, unlike 
Rovelli, that therefore there is no change. Although Barbour himself sees his 
approach as denying time, Rickles (2006) argues that, rather than denying time, 
Barbour reduces it to points in a relative configuration space. For Barbour 
change has no objective reality; rather, the whole universe (past, present and 
future) is modelled by a set of ‘instantaneous’, three-dimensional relational 
configurations.48 All that exists is a vast collection of frozen moments, each 
being a (spatial) configuration of the universe. 
In summary, the canonical approaches to QG all suffer from the problem of time, 
in that there is a lack of an external background time parameter against which a 
system can be said to evolve. The responses to this vary depending upon the 
approach. Either some form of internal time parameter is extracted from the 
theory (as described in Isham, 1992) or a timeless interpretation of reality, at 
the fundamental level, is accepted (e.g. Rovelli, 1990 and Barbour, 1999). 
However, in both these cases (apart from Barbour, for whom reality is a static, 
                                                        
48 Barbour elaborates a Machian (relational) derivation of the classical dynamics of the universe 
using minimal assumptions about the structure of space, a specification of the initial data to 
determine dynamical evolution, and the mechanism of this evolution which he describes as ‘best 
matching’. ‘Best matching’ refers to the tendency for the ‘intrinsic difference’ between two 
matter distributions in a dynamical evolution to be minimised. (‘Intrinsic difference’ is based 
solely on the masses of the bodies involved and the relative distances between them.) 
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changeless whole), although the formalism may vary, the notion of evolution ‘in 
time’ is recovered by taking a reductionist approach to time. Time is reduced to 
some physical variable, whether physical ‘clocks’ or ‘evolving constants of 
motion’. In all canonical approaches to QG the concept of time is reduced to 
something more fundamental, and so none provide support for the idea that 
time is metaphysically primitive.  
2.3.2.3 Alternative Approaches 
Although quantum gravity is often represented in terms of these two main rival 
approaches there are other, lesser-known, programs and it is worth briefly 
mentioning these here. Nonetheless, as with the canonical and covariant 
approaches, time is reduced to, or replaced by, something more fundamental. 
‘Causal set theory’ (e.g. Markopoulou, 1998 and Bombelli et al, 1987) is an 
approach to quantum gravity that models only the causal structure of spacetime 
in terms of the causal priority of events with respect to one another.49 This 
results in spacetime assuming a discrete structure. Continuous spacetime is 
seen as an artifice inappropriate at the Planck level; as such, the causal set is 
defined prior to the spacetime manifold. This approach considers the causal 
structure of events as prior to, and so more fundamental than, spacetime. 
Spin Network theory (championed by Penrose, 1971) replaces spacetime points 
with basic elements comprising units of quantum angular momentum (which is 
already quantised), without reference to any spatial dimension. This approach 
evolved into ‘twistor theory’ (also developed by Penrose) which preserves the 
causal, or light cone, structure of spacetime whilst demoting spacetime points. 
The latter are merely ‘secondary constructs’, with the paths of light rays 
comprising the more ‘primitive element’ in the theory. 
2.3.3 Summary: The Problem of Time and its Metaphysical 
Implications 
An admittedly cursory review of the main approaches to quantum gravity 
theory has been given above. Though there is no consensus on what the final 
                                                        
49 ‘Causal dynamical triangulation’ is another similar approach (e.g. Ambjørn et al, 2008). 
40 
 
theory may look like, all approaches appear to indicate that a successful theory 
will significantly change our conception of time. 
Under covariant theories, such as string theory, the spacetime of GTR emerges 
only in the low temperature limit of the theory and is not identified at the 
fundamental level. In the case of the canonical theories, the lack of a 
fundamental time parameter (the problem of time) gives rise to two alternative 
approaches. The first identifies an internal time parameter by defining time in 
terms of physical clocks, and so is reductionist. The second approach accedes to 
the denial of time at the fundamental level, as overtly implied by the Wheeler-
DeWitt equation. Theories of the third type, considered above, also all abandon 
the fundamentality of spacetime in favour of defining the fundamental elements 
of the theory in terms of causal structures. 
The interpretation put on these results varies. Callender (2010) sums it up thus:  
Some physicists argue that there is no such thing as time. Others think 
time ought to be promoted rather than demoted. In between these two 
positions is the fascinating idea that time exists but is not fundamental. A 
static world somehow gives rise to the time we perceive. (p. 59) 
Both Rovelli (2016) and Barbour (1999) take the results at face value and hold 
that time has no ontological significance: time is ‘unreal’. Similarly, Callender 
considers time ‘a convenient fiction that no more exists fundamentally in the 
natural world than money does’ (ibid., p. 65). Contrary to our best intuitions 
Heller (2008) also concurs that ‘many approaches to quantum gravity suggest 
[… that] on the fundamental level time either does not exist, or has drastically 
different properties from what we are accustomed to in the macroscopic world’ 
(p. 264). Others50 argue that QG implies that time is emergent rather than an 
illusion. 
If, as the contender theories indicate, spacetime is not present at the 
fundamental level of reality, then none of the proposed models of quantum 
gravity provide support for the premise that time, or spacetime, is 
                                                        
50 For example, Butterfield and Isham (1999) and Butterfield (2002) 
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metaphysically primitive (i.e., independent of the existence of entities). At best, 
time appears ‘emergent’, in both senses in which the term is used: either in the 
reductionist sense, where time is re-defined in physical terms as the value of 
physical entities with respect to which other physical quantities are correlated, 
or, in the sense of only appearing in a low energy limit of the theory. 
One metaphysical implication that appears to follow from this is that the notion 
that existence is necessarily existence in time (or spacetime) is undermined. 
Although spacetime might disappear at the fundamental level there is still an 
existent something (for example, the quantum vacuum or zero-point energy) to 
which our fundamental theories apply. Existence must be prior to spacetime. 
This leads to a second implication: contrary to the interpretation that reality 
lacks objective change, the disappearance of time provides the possibility that 
the time that emerges is the structure of, or derivative of, an objectively 
dynamic reality.  
Given the disputes around the nature of time arising from quantum gravity it 
would appear, as Saunders (2002, p. 291) concludes, that ‘there is everything to 
play for’ in terms of metaphysical interpretation. Quantum gravity theories are, 
however, nascent, and as such it is too early to predict which of the various 
approaches might succeed; consequently, it is too early to judge their full 
metaphysical implications. Nonetheless, in what follows I describe how the 
conceptual core of the problem of time is already lurking within GTR and I 
argue that, whichever theory of QG ultimately succeeds, the notion of time as 
metaphysically primitive is already unsupported within our best theories of 
physics. Consequently, those theories do not undermine premise P2: the 
premise that time reduces to the structure of an objectively dynamic reality. 
2.4 The Conceptual Core of the Problem of Time 
Many commentators would agree with Isham’s (1992) intuition that obstructive 
foundational metaphysical assumptions are, at least partially, responsible for 
the difficulties encountered in reconciling GTR with QFT, since the foundational 
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axioms of the two theories treat time in radically different ways.51 This 
represents the key conceptual challenge that needs to be overcome in unifying 
these two ingredient theories into a successful theory of QG. 
I feel it is correct to say that the problems encountered in unravelling the 
concept of time in quantum gravity are grounded in a fundamental 
inconsistency between the basic conceptual frameworks of quantum 
theory and general relativity (Isham, 1992, p. 108).  
In what follows, I contrast the concept of time under both QFT and GTR. I 
proceed to highlight that the conceptual core of the problem of time lies with 
the commitment to background independence within GTR. This leads to the 
unavoidable result that objective change has to be denied or reformulated.  
Further, the need to combine two core commitments of the separate theories 
suggests that, irrespective of the exact theory of QG arrived at, the notion of 
time (spacetime) as metaphysically primitive is inevitably undermined. 
2.4.1 The Concept of Time Within Quantum Theory 
Quantum systems are described by the deterministic evolution, in time, of a 
wave function described by the Schrodinger equation. Within QFT time thereby 
retains the theoretical role it possesses within classical, Newtonian physics, in 
that it comprises an absolute background against which the quantum fields (for 
example, the electromagnetic fields) propagate and evolve. Here time is an 
abstract concept, it is external to the system being modelled and is non-
dynamical.52 As Unruh and Wald (1989) have shown, time under quantum 
theory is truly abstract in the sense that no physical clock can actually measure 
it, in the sense of exactly corresponding with it.53 By rendering time a 
                                                        
51 For example, Crowther and Rickles (2014) argue that the successful development of a 
definitive theory of quantum gravity crucially hinges upon a thorough reassessment of our 
fundamental metaphysical principles, especially with regard to our models of time and change. 
Others adopting a similar viewpoint include Smolin (2015), Rovelli (2016) and Butterfield and 
Isham (2001). 
52 Where ‘non-dynamical’ is used in the sense of ‘not interacting with the system being 
modelled’. 
53 Unruh and Wald (1989) show that such a condition is incompatible with such a clock, as a 
physical system, having a positive energy. According to QM, any physical clock always has a 
finite probability of running backwards with respect to Newtonian time. 
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background parameter, both quantum theory and Newtonian classical 
mechanics can be considered theories par excellence for modelling isolated sub-
systems of the universe. The evolution of any system is referenced to a clock 
sitting outside the system being modelled.54 
There are two problems that arise from this concept of time, which imply that 
such a view will invariably have to be abandoned in any successful theory of 
quantum gravity. In the first case, as noted, the classical spacetime of 
Newtonian mechanics has been replaced by relativistic spacetime, under which 
space and time are intrinsically entangled into one four-dimensional reality. 
Secondly, any proposed theory of quantum gravity would, by necessity, aim to 
model the whole universe (as does GTR). Since it is not possible to situate a 
clock ‘outside’ the universe (as the universe is a completely closed system) 
there is no external time parameter, or fixed background, against which the 
universe might evolve. The notion of time as an external background, with 
respect to which the universe evolves, will need to be surrendered. As Smolin 
(2001, p. 7) notes ‘any clock, and any measuring instruments referred to in the 
interpretation of the theory, must be part of the dynamical system which is 
modelled’. It is generally accepted, therefore, that any successful theory of 
quantum gravity would need to take on board the key conceptual commitment 
of GTR to background independence; this is why approaches to QG seek to 
identify some form of internal time parameter within the variables of the 
theory. 
2.4.2 The Concept of Time Within GTR 
In order to understand the very different nature of time, and the concept of 
background independence, within GTR, it is first useful to outline the basic 
elements of the theory. 
                                                        
54 It should be noted that in STR, also, time can be rendered a background parameter within the 
formalism of the theory. Simply, the fixed background time of classical physics is replaced with 
the set of possible relativistic inertial reference frames, defined by the Lorentz transformations 
of STR. It is because of this that the unification of STR with QT into relativistic quantum 
mechanics (or ‘quantum field theory’, QFT) has been achievable. 
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GTR is the most comprehensive theory of gravitation in physics and, as with 
quantum theory, benefits from significant empirical support. The dynamics of 
GTR are encoded in the Einstein Field Equations (EFE) which unify gravitational 
phenomena with the geometry of spacetime. 




The left-hand side of the equation represents the geometry of spacetime, 
indicated by the Einstein tensor, 𝐺𝜇𝜈. The right-hand side describes the total 
mass-energy present in the universe, encoded in the stress-energy tensor, 𝑇𝜇𝜈. A 
given solution of the equations55 describes the physical situation where the 
gravitational field (as the geometry of spacetime) interacts with the matter 
fields distributed over it. In the now famous words of Misner et al (1973, p. 5) 
‘Space acts on matter, telling it how to move. In turn, matter reacts back on 
space, telling it how to curve’. 
Under GTR spacetime is identified with the gravitational field56 and this identity 
represents a revolution in the concept of spacetime from all previous theories.  
Spacetime is no longer seen as an inert, external background against which 
change and evolution are modelled: it is to this extent that GTR is seen as 
demanding a ‘background-independent’ approach, and it is this that 
differentiates the theory from preceding spacetime theories.57 Since both GTR 
and QG aim to model the whole universe, the background independence of GTR 
is seen as a key commitment to be maintained under any successful approach to 
QG. As will be seen in the next section, this commitment has significant 
consequences for the standard notion of change and indicates that this concept 
needs to be reformulated. 
                                                        
55 A given solution of the EFE is described in terms of a triple < M, g, T > consisting of a four-
dimensional manifold, M, of coordinate points (or a configuration space), the metric tensor, g, 
which defines the distances and geometrical relations between the points, and the stress-energy 
tensor, T, which describes the distribution of mass-energy. 
56 This is referred to as Einstein’s ‘principle of equivalence’. 
57 STR is not fully background-independent due to fact that there is no reciprocity between the 
Minkowski metric and matter; Minkowski spacetime dictates the inertial behaviour of matter 
but the latter has no reciprocal effect back on spacetime. 
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2.4.3 The Conceptual Core of the Problem – Background 
Independence 
The ‘background independence’ of GTR (also referred to as ‘diffeomorphism 
invariance’) differs from, and is a stronger requirement than, the ‘general 
covariance’ of previous spacetime theories.58 In simple terms, ‘diffeomorphism 
invariance’ means that any solution of Einstein’s equations (as the metric and 
matter fields) can be ‘dragged’ over the spacetime manifold to provide a 
physically equivalent solution. A diffeomorphism is in essence a mathematical 
transformation that maps one spacetime point onto another. This entails that 
the physical observables (or physically meaningful quantities)59 of the 
equations of GTR are independent of spacetime coordinates and, as Weinstein 
(2001, p.92) notes this means that the gravitational field ‘defines its own 
background – it is both “stage” and “actor”’. 
This requirement for background independence has a significant consequence. 
If the physically meaningful quantities are independent of spacetime 
coordinates, then a difficulty arises in defining the evolution of a system: there 
is no background against which that evolution can be defined. This results in 
what is referred to as the ‘frozen formalism’ of GTR: the states of the system 
(e.g. the universe) which were previously taken to represent different physical 
conditions at different times are now equivalent. Thus, the notion of a static 
picture of reality is already lurking within classical GTR,60 even before attempts 
are made to quantise the theory within quantum gravity. It is the requirement 
                                                        
58 General covariance refers to the invariance of the dynamical equations under an arbitrary 
coordinate transformation between inertial reference frames: any dynamical theory, including 
Newtonian mechanics, can be written in a generally covariant form. It is accepted that the 
equivalence implied here between background independence and diffeomorphism invariance is 
strictly inaccurate.  There are subtle and extremely technical differences between the terms 
‘background independence’, ‘general covariance’ and ‘diffeomorphism invariance’ as they 
function within the formalism.  Both Vassallo (2015) and Pooley (2015) provide a useful 
discussion of the differences in the uses of these three terms. These differences are not 
pertinent to the discussions here. 
59 For example, momentum. 
60 Although the roots of the problem of time lie within GTR, this does not present such a 
fundamental problem as occurs with the move to QG.  This is because it is possible for a global 
time parameter to be defined within GTR by slicing the manifold preferentially to produce 
space-like hypersurfaces of equal time. A global time parameter can be arbitrarily assigned and, 
once the Einstein Field Equations have been solved, some sense of evolution with respect to this 
parameter can be achieved. 
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under GTR for background independence, with its absence of an external time 
parameter, that leads directly to the timeless aspect of formulations of QG and 
motivates the conclusion that reality is fundamentally changeless. 
The problem of time becomes even more acute when attempts are made to 
quantise the spacetime of GTR, and establish a theory of quantum gravity. The 
equivalence of the physical (gravitational) field with the spacetime of GTR 
means that the entity to be quantised already contains both time and space. 
Further, preserving the background independence of GTR means that the 
resultant, quantised system cannot evolve with respect to time (since time is 
already present in the quantised state). Weinstein and Rickles (2018) describe 
the situation thus: 
[…] the problem is roughly that in quantizing the structure of spacetime 
itself, the notion of a quantum state, representing the structure of 
spacetime at some instant, and the notion of the evolution of the state, do 
not get any traction, since there are no real ‘instants’ (§ 5.1). 
This represents the very core of the problem in reconciling the two ‘ingredient’ 
theories. Majid (2008) succinctly describes the dichotomy: the postulated 
quantised particles for gravity (gravitons) must, in effect, both move within 
spacetime and be spacetime. This is the sense in which spacetime (as 
gravitational field) is both ‘actor’ and ‘stage’, and this is a direct consequence of 
the background independence of GTR. Majid takes this to mean that our current 
concepts of space and time are fundamentally flawed and successful 
implementation of quantum gravity ‘would likely entail a completely new 
concept of space and time’ (p. 69). Similarly, many commentators61 believe that 
resolving the core conceptual issues underpinning the problem of time in 
quantum gravity relies upon a correct interpretation of the meaning of 
background independence within GTR. I shall return to this in section 2.6.4. 
In summary, the problem of time arising in QG has its roots in the commitment 
to background independence within GTR. This has the result that the system 
                                                        
61 For example, Belot and Earman (2001), Maudlin (2002) and Rickles (2006). 
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modelled does not evolve with respect to time, and if there is no evolution with 
respect to time, the existence of objective change is undermined. 
2.4.4 The Metaphysical Implications Revisited 
Despite the lack of consensus over the correct approach to QG, any successful 
theory will need to incorporate the key conceptual commitments of the two 
ingredient theories. From these two metaphysical conclusions seem to follow. 
The first commitment proceeds from GTR and this is the requirement for 
background independence. As described in § 2.4.3, this means that no genuine 
physical observable can assume different values at different times. This has 
implications for our notions of change and evolution. The idea of objective 
change as different intrinsic properties at uniquely different times has to be 
surrendered as incompatible with our existing best physical theories. Spacetime 
can no longer be considered as providing an external background against which 
change and evolution occur. The lack of a unique time parameter, and the 
consequent picture of a static reality that emerges from QG, arise directly from 
this commitment of GTR. The formalism is ‘frozen’ on the assumption that 
change is given as different physical observables at (uniquely) different times. 
None of this should be surprising, however, since the notion of a uniquely 
definable time parameter is already rejected with the unification of space and 
time under STR. The metaphysical conclusion that follows from this is: 
M1: either reality is, at the fundamental level, static and unchanging or 
our notion of change, as it is metaphysically speaking, has to be 
reformulated. 
The second metaphysical conclusion follows from the need to combine the 
requirement (from QFT) to quantise the gravitational field with the equivalence 
between the gravitational field and spacetime (from GTR). As described above, 
the resultant quantum state (which contains spacetime) cannot exist within 
spacetime, rather the continuous, classical spacetime able to support evolution 
and change, somehow emerges from the, more fundamental, quantum state in 
the limit of low energy conditions. If spacetime is derivative of a more 
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fundamental entity (the quantum state of the gravitational field) this has the 
following metaphysical implication: 
M2: Spacetime is not metaphysically primitive.  
M1 and M2 are two metaphysical conclusions that arise from the problem of 
time. Taken together they present two alternative interpretations of reality.  
The first alternative presented in M1assumes that change can only be construed 
as different intrinsic properties at uniquely different times. Under this 
assumption reality is, at the fundamental level, static. There is no objective 
change or evolution since (from M2) spacetime is not metaphysically primitive 
and so it cannot underpin objective change at the fundamental level.  In this 
case, since spacetime is emergent, an explanation needs to be given as to how it 
emerges from what is a fundamentally static reality.  
The second interpretation (of M1) suggests that it is our concept of change that 
requires revision, rather than abandonment. In the absence of spacetime at the 
fundamental level (M2) there is nothing to ground a concept of change regarded 
in terms of different intrinsic properties at different times. Instead, this 
presents the option that reality is intrinsically and fundamentally dynamic, and 
that spacetime emerges, in some manner, from this dynamic reality. 
In the following, I argue that support from physical theory can be gained for the 
second interpretation. I argue that the concept of time in physical theory is 
derivative of objective change in reality, contrary to our standard metaphysical 
models. I also argue that though time (as spacetime) may not exist at the 
fundamental level, physics can countenance the view that reality is 
fundamentally dynamic. In the remainder of this chapter I support the premise 
that our concept of change needs to be reformulated. In Chapter 1 I argued that 
the standard metaphysical models of change rely upon a substantival 
interpretation of time; here I argue that such an interpretation of the spacetime 
of GTR is unsupported. An alternative, structuralist model of spacetime not only 
aligns better with the conceptual requirements of QG but it also provides a 
route to modelling spacetime as the structure (and so, derivative) of an 
49 
 
objectively dynamic reality, to the advantage of a compatibilist model of 
presentism. 
2.5 Physics is Consistent with an Objectively Dynamic Reality 
In this section I argue that, despite the problem of time, our fundamental 
physical theories are compatible with the objective reality of change and, 
indeed, that the meaning of time as it functions within those theories supports 
the view that time is derivative of objective change.  
2.5.1 Time: a ‘Glorious Non-Entity’?62 
The problem of time within quantum gravity provides good reason to question 
the view that time is metaphysically primitive. However, a cursory historical 
review of the way in which time is defined within physical theory also appears 
to suggest that, contrary to our dominant metaphysical models, time is, in fact, 
derivative of objective change. 
Since the very beginnings of scientific theory, time has been defined 
operationally, in terms of the objective motion of bodies. As Aristotle noted, 
‘Time is neither identical with movement nor capable of being separated from 
it’ (Physics, IV. 11). Reflection on the different historical methods used to 
measure time shows that it always requires a comparison in the change or 
evolution in one system (designated the ‘clock’) with respect to another physical 
system. For example, ‘solar time’ is given by the relative motion of the sun; 
‘sidereal time’ refers to the distance moved by the stars. This continues through 
to the present day, where the second is defined in terms of an oscillation 
between two energy levels of the caesium atom.63  
Though we speak (inaccurately) of measuring time, Peres (1980) and Rovelli 
(2016) both highlight that we never actually measure time itself: time is not an 
observable or a dynamical variable, unlike position, energy and momentum. All 
                                                        
62 This description derives from Brown and Pooley (2006). 
63 The 13th meeting of the International Committee of Weights and Measures, in 1967, adopted 
the following definition: ‘The second is the duration of 9,192,631,770 periods of the radiation 




so-called ‘properties of time’ must therefore ‘be abstractions from relative 
motions and their empirical laws’ (Zeh, 2007, p. 12). Any measurement of time, 
or more accurately duration, is just a comparison in the evolution of one 
physical system with respect to another, which allows us to assign an ordering 
variable to the physical system being considered. Any measurement of time 
therefore presupposes objective change in the sense of the evolution of a 
physical system. 
All physical theories rely upon such an instrumentalist definition of time. 
Within STR simultaneity is defined by way of a synchronisation procedure 
involving the physical transmission and reception of light signals. Clocks within 
STR are ‘spatially-localised physical clocks’ (Isham, 1992) and time is ‘proper 
time’ along the world-line of such a clock, rather than coordinate time. STR can 
thus be considered to be a theory ‘about observable luminal relations among 
physical events’ (Rea, 2003, p. 274) rather than a theory about time per se. In a 
similar vein, Brown (2005, p. 136, p. 142) refers to the Minkowski metric as a 
‘codification’ of the behaviour of rods and clocks. 
Under GTR, Einstein showed that the rate of clocks must depend on their 
position in a gravitational field: clocks closer to gravitating bodies run slow 
relative to clocks farther away. But relativity makes statements about actual 
clocks, not time in the abstract. In other words, it is not that time, as such, 
passes more slowly.  
An interesting contribution to the debate is reviewed by Zyga (2012) who 
describes the work of Sorli and Fiscaletti (2012). The latter argue that the 
relativistic kinematic effects of STR can better be described by moving away 
from seeing time as the fourth dimension of Minkowski spacetime and instead 
seeing time as a quantity measuring change (or the ‘numerical order of 
motion’), in particular, the motion of photons. Their idea is that time should no 
longer be seen as a dimension through which entities move. 
In conclusion, time, as it functions within our fundamental physical theories, is 
defined in terms of physical clocks (whether light clocks, body clocks or atomic 
clocks). Such systems involve motion of one form or another. Indeed, physicists 
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define a clock as follows: ‘any clock is a dynamical system which passes through 
a succession of states’ (Peres, 1980, p. 552). So, far from being fundamental, the 
concept of time (as used in science) is derivative of objective change. 
The problem of time (in the sense of the lack of a time parameter at the 
fundamental level of reality) should therefore come as no surprise. Time, as it 
functions within physical theories, is reduced to, or defined in terms of, physical 
clocks, yet no physical clock can ‘sit outside’ the universe and so provide the 
time parameter required for modelling its evolution. This is precisely why GTR, 
and emerging theories of QG demand a background-independent approach. This 
simple fact is consistent with the view that our theories are currently 
inadequately modelling a dynamically evolving universe, rather than suggesting 
that those theories are accurately describing a static universe. As Rovelli 
emphasises, the absence of a time parameter from the fundamental equations 
does not imply that change does not occur, it just has to be modelled differently 
within the mathematical formalism.  
2.5.2 Physical Reality is Fundamentally Dynamic 
In this subsection I argue that the disappearance of time (spacetime) at the 
fundamental level does not imply a reality that is objectively static at this level, 
in fact there is good reason to suggest that reality is fundamentally dynamic. 
It was argued above that time, as it figures within physical theory, is defined in 
terms of, and so derivative of, physical systems or matter in motion. That matter 
(or mass-energy) is intrinsically dynamic, and so can function as a physical 
‘clock’, can be understood by combining two fundamental equations: Einstein’s 
equation (i), stating the equivalence between mass, m, and energy, E, and 
Planck’s equation (ii) which describes the discrete, or quantum, nature of 




(iii) ∴ υ=mc2/h    
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Equation (iii) expresses the fact that any mass provides for an intrinsic ‘clock’, 
ticking with a frequency, υ, proportional to its mass-energy. This dynamic 
aspect of mass-energy is also suggested by the fact that it is momentum, rather 
than mass-energy that is the more fundamental, physical quantity. The Einstein 
Field Equations (of GTR) represent a complicated combination of momentum 
and energy and it is these quantities (rather than mass) that are primary; 
momentum is an intrinsically dynamic quantity, whereas mass is intrinsically 
static. It is for this reason that gravity deflects light; even though photons are 
massless they do possess momentum (given by h/). 
The fundamental equations of physical theory therefore provide some support 
to regard matter (mass-energy) as intrinsically dynamic. Nonetheless, in the 
absence of matter, the formalism of QFT also suggests that reality, at the 
fundamental level, exhibits a dynamic nature, as the following describes. 
The realm of applicability of any successful QG theory represents extremes of 
temperature and energy density where quantum effects (described by QFT) are 
dominant. It was noted earlier that, though time may be absent at the 
fundamental level, there is still something (the quantum gravitational field) to 
which our fundamental theories apply. Under QFT, even in the vacuum state 
(i.e., in the absence of matter) the quantum field has a non-zero energy; it can be 
characterised by positive values of energy and momentum. Not only is this field 
not empty, it is also not static. As a consequence of the Heisenberg Uncertainty 
Relations,64 the quantum field is constantly fluctuating through the creation and 
annihilation of particles and anti-particles (Kuhlmann et al, 2002 and Redhead, 
1982, pp. 86-88). Though time may be absent, reality at the fundamental level 
is, nonetheless, objectively dynamic.  
At this point the following concern might arise: if reality is fundamentally 
dynamic, in the way described, how might concepts such as frequency and 
momentum be applicable and understood without a notion of time? This 
                                                        
64 These relations express an imprecision in the simultaneous definition of paired measurement 
variables, paradigmatically those for position and momentum, and energy and time. This has 
the consequence that no experiment, in principle, permits a precise determination of the values 
of e.g. both position and momentum. It is the relation between energy and time that gives rise to 
the non-zero energy of the quantum vacuum state. 
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question leads directly into the discussions in Chapter 6, which propose an 
ontology capable of reconciling presentism (and any theory committed to an 
objectively dynamic reality) with physical theory. The ontology is constructed 
on the premise that motion is (metaphysically) primitive and time derivative. 
As a consequence, momentum and frequency are derivative of mass in motion, 
rather than mass in time. Further, this is reinforced in the three fundamental 
equations given above, none of which include a reference to time. 
2.6 Time for Change? 
Consideration of our current physical theories supports the conclusion that 
time is not metaphysically primitive, yet reality is objectively dynamic. This is at 
odds with our dominant metaphysical models which assume the metaphysical 
priority of time over change and persistence. I argued in Chapter 1 that those 
metaphysical models rely upon a substantival interpretation of spacetime. I 
argue in this section that the terms of the debate between substantival and 
relational interpretations depend on a misguided reading of the equivalence 
between spacetime and gravitational field within GTR. An alternative, 
structuralist, interpretation permits a better understanding of the background 
independence of GTR and points towards the development of an alternative 
ontological scheme better aligned to the conceptual foundations required by 
quantum gravity. This scheme is developed in Chapter 6. 
2.6.1 The Assumption of Substantivalism 
In Chapter 1 I argued that under our predominant metaphysical models (the 
‘static’ and ‘dynamic’ models) substantival time provides the background with 
respect to which objects both persist and change: objects both persist and 
change in time. 
The substantival view of time (or spacetime) has its origins in the absolute 
space and time which served as the arena of classical Newtonian dynamics. 
Nonetheless, such a view of spacetime is also considered to be motivated by the 
identification of spacetime with the gravitational field under GTR. In the 
following I review the extent to which the spacetime of GTR supports a 
substantivalist reading, and conclude that it is by no means clearly supported. 
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2.6.2 Interpreting the Spacetime of GTR - Is Substantivalism 
Supported? 
The identification of spacetime with the gravitational field under GTR 
reinvigorated the long-standing debate between absolute (or substantival) and 
relational conceptions of spacetime. Substantivalism is the view that spacetime 
‘can be said to exist and to have specified features independently of the 
existence of ordinary material objects’ (Sklar, 1977, p. 161). Spacetime as a 
‘substantival’ entity is ontologically separate from matter and its relations. If 
spacetime is ontologically separate from matter and its relations, this supports 
a position which sees spacetime as metaphysically primitive. Such a view is also 
associated with a kind of realism about spacetime that characterizes spacetime 
as a container, or a pervasive medium, within which things both exist and 
evolve. Such an interpretation of spacetime supports the role that time plays 
within our dominant metaphysical models. 
The converse view, relationism, rejects the ontological elevation of spacetime to 
a separately existing entity: rather, spacetime just is the existence of 
spatiotemporal relations holding between material entities. Under this view, 
spacetime is ontologically derivative of the objects and matter comprising the 
universe; a universe with no matter would have no spatiotemporal relations.  
In referring to Einstein’s gravitational field equations (§2.4.2), Heller (2008, p. 
254) suggests that ‘although the two sides are connected by an equality sign, 
the question arises: what is “physically prior” spacetime geometry or matter 
distribution?’. Certainly, for Einstein, in implementing ‘Mach’s Principle’,65 the 
physical priority is the distribution of matter; it is this that gives rise to the 
curvature of spacetime. If spatiotemporal relations are derivative of the 
distribution of matter, then this provides a case for relationism. Nonetheless, 
                                                        
65 Einstein was heavily influenced by Mach’s positivist and relationist programme.  Mach sought 
to eliminate absolute Newtonian spacetime in his ‘Science of Mechanics’ (1883) by asserting 
that the inertial mass and inertial motion of a body arose solely from the influence of all other 
matter in the universe. Einstein referred to as ‘Mach’s Principle’ his principle that the metric of 
spacetime (which describes the gravitational-inertial behaviour of matter) is solely determined 
by the mass-energy of the universe.  
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the case for substantivalism can also be made and the following assesses the 
extent of the support for this interpretation. 
2.6.2.1 The Argument for Substantivalism 
Substantivalists ostensibly gain support from the identification of spacetime 
with the (substantival) gravitational field. Further support is gleaned from the 
discovery of a solution to the Einstein field equations by de Sitter (in 1917) 
which permits a universe devoid of matter to have a determinate spacetime 
structure, contrary to Mach’s Principle.66 Such solutions, known as ‘vacuum 
solutions’, represent the case where the energy-momentum tensor, 𝑇𝜇𝜈, 
vanishes. If spacetime has structure in the absence of matter, and its relations, 
this lends support to the view that spacetime is metaphysically prior to matter, 
and so substantival.  
It is not clear, however, that metaphysical conclusions favouring the 
substantivalist automatically follow from the existence of vacuum solutions. 
Heller (2008) argues that this is simply explained by the formalism of the 
geometry used, with no necessary ontological implications. Within (ordinary) 
geometry, any curved surface, or space, can always be approximated locally by a 
flat surface. As such any physical theory, described in terms of ordinary 
geometry, will always have such structural features and so fail to implement 
Mach’s Principle fully. Indeed, the flat, Minkowski spacetime of STR (which is 
devoid of matter) represents one such solution and is incorporated into the 
spacetime of GTR as a limit. Since the metric of Minkowski spacetime arises in 
virtue of the causal structure of the relations between possible events, the 
existence of vacuum solutions of the EFE provides no reason to adopt an 
extreme realism with regard to the spacetime of GTR. 
In considering whether GTR commits one to the physical existence of spacetime, 
Butterfield and Isham (2001) urge caution in reifying spacetime and adopting 
the sort of scientific realism about spacetime that became popular in the 1960s. 
                                                        
66 It should be noted, though, that in the Friedman-Robertson-Walker-Lemâitre Big Bang 
models, which represent solutions of the EFE best matched to our universe, the Minkowski 
background spacetime structure does disappear and there is complete determination of inertia 
by global matter distribution, in support of Einstein’s Mach Principle. 
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They argue that both QFT and GTR rely on modelling spacetime in terms of 
mathematical points but that this does not require the adoption of realism 
about those points. They refer to Whitehead’s ‘fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness’ in ‘positing a one-to-one correspondence between what is 
undeniably real in the Platonic realm of mathematical form, and what is, more 
problematically, “real” in the world of physical “stuff”’ (p. 53). In addition, the 
existence of translation invariance67 within Minkowski (and indeed, 
Newtonian) spacetime counts against an interpretation that spacetime points 
have any physical reality. 
2.6.2.2 The Hole Argument 
The position that spacetime points are physically real is referred to as ‘manifold 
substantivalism’. GTR, as a spacetime theory, can be described in terms of a 
manifold of events, a metrical structure and matter fields; this provides 
alternative options for formulating substantivalism. Aside from the objections 
outlined above, by far the strongest argument against manifold substantivalism 
is Einstein’s ‘hole argument’. 68 The argument claims that the background 
independence of GTR implies a radical indeterminism if GTR is combined with a 
view that spacetime points are physically real.  
The background independence of GTR (which permits matter and metrical 
fields to be spread over the manifold in different ways) allows the same 
physical processes to be located differently in spacetime. For the manifold 
substantivalist since the manifold, as spacetime substance, is ontologically 
separate from matter, any two distributions of metrical fields over the manifold, 
                                                        
67 This arises from the general covariance of all dynamical theories as explained in footnote 58 
above. 
68 The manifold is a set of spacetime events organised into a four dimensional coordinate space, 
or system. The metric (or metric field gμν) specifies the structure of those spacetime events (e.g., 
the direction of past and future, the intervals between events and relations of simultaneity). The 
matter fields represent the total mass-energy of the universe. The background independence of 
GTR implies that the metric and matter fields can be distributed over the manifold in different 
ways and yet be physically equivalent (they are ‘independent’ of the background manifold). The 
different ways in which the metric and matter fields can be so distributed are related 
mathematically by a ‘transformation’, or ‘mapping’ from one to the other. The hole argument 
considers the scenario where part of the manifold contains a ‘hole’. The associated 
transformation is the ‘hole transformation’. A comprehensive discussion of the issues involved 




related by the hole transformation, represent physically distinct systems. Yet, 
the argument shows that it is impossible to distinguish such physically distinct 
systems, either through observational verification or via the determining power 
(e.g., the laws) of the theory. It appears that determinism fails under such an 
interpretation of GTR. Consequently, Belot and Earman (2001, p. 228) argue 
that ‘one must be a relationist in order to give a deterministic interpretation of 
general relativity’. 
2.6.2.3 A Possible Alternative – Metric Essentialism 
The substantivalist is not, however, committed to manifold substantivalism and 
might alternatively subscribe to a ‘metric essentialism’ (Dainton, 2010). Under 
this, the postulated substantival spacetime field includes the metric field (gμν).69  
The problem that arises here is that the metric field also includes energy and 
momentum; this means that the question arises as to how the spacetime field 
can now be said to be independent of, or prior to, matter in the manner 
required by the substantivalist. Further, since gμν and 𝑇𝜇𝜈 (total mass-energy) 
are interdependent, different matter fields result in different metrics (metrical 
structure is dynamic) and so metrical structure varies from model to model. As 
such it cannot be said to be ‘essential’ in the sense of being an invariant feature 
of spacetime. Belot and Earman (2001) suggest that such ‘sophisticated’ 
substantivalism ‘is in fact a pallid imitation of relationalism’ which serves 
merely to circumvent the ‘challenges posed by contemporary physics’ (p. 249). 
2.6.3 Conclusion - The Need for Revision to Our Metaphysical 
Models 
Subsection 2.4.4 suggested that the problem of time within quantum gravity 
indicates that our standard metaphysical models of time and change require 
revision. These models rely upon a substantival reading of the spacetime of 
GTR, yet the arguments given above indicate that the case for a substantival 
reading is not unambiguously supported. It is also noted (section 2.4.3) that 
                                                        




many believe the conceptual difficulties in formulating quantum gravity centre 
around the correct interpretation of the background independence of GTR. It is 
therefore vital that our metaphysical models align with an appropriate 
interpretation of the spacetime of GTR, one that is also consistent with the 
conceptual requirements indicated by emerging theories of QG.  
In working towards such an appropriate interpretation, the following section 
argues that the debate between relationism and substantivalism now appears 
redundant and, further, that consideration of quantum gravity suggests that a 
structuralist account of spacetime better meets the conceptual requirements 
presented. This conclusion signposts the route towards alternative 
metaphysical models of change and persistence, ones able to support a 
compatibilist account of presentism. 
2.6.4 The Case for Structuralism 
Though the arguments against a substantival interpretation are significant, it is 
by no means clear that the spacetime of GTR unambiguously supports the 
alternative, relational, interpretation. Indeed, Butterfield and Isham (2001, 
p.52) argue that GTR supports relationism to the extent that the four-
dimensional metric of spacetime is dynamical (and so depends on or varies with 
the matter it describes); however, it supports substantivalism in that ‘the 
presence in the theory of the metric and connection is not determined by the 
spatio-temporal relations of material bodies’.  
This ambiguity in the interpretation of the spacetime of GTR seems to arise 
from the feeling that one side of the Einstein Field Equations (§ 2.4.2) has to 
take physical priority over the other, in a causal sense. Indeed, this is what is 
implied in the earlier quotation from Misner et al (1973).70 Rather than 
debating which side of the equation has physical priority – spacetime in the case 
of substantivalism or matter in the case of relationism – an alternative position 
is to take the equivalence, between spacetime and the gravitational field, in the 
Einstein Field Equations more seriously. Such an equivalence can equally be 
                                                        
70 ‘Space acts on matter, telling it how to move.  In turn, matter reacts back on space, telling it 
how to curve.’ 
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seen as representing a physical field with metrical properties. Support for this 
interpretation comes from quantum gravity. QG appears to require that gravity 
is treated as a physical field, if for no other reason than to achieve the necessary 
quantisation, and this is what the various approaches outlined previously 
suggest. This has led some to consider whether the debate between relationism 
and substantivalism is, in fact, now redundant. 
Brown (2005) argues (along similar lines to Rovelli, 1997) that it is misleading 
to make the distinction between matter fields and spacetime (as given by the 
spatiotemporal metric, gμν) where the latter is the ‘arena’ within which matter 
and physical processes occur. They argue that gμν is justifiably considered to be 
an autonomous physical field, albeit with certain unique features (such as the 
fact that it couples with every other physical field and is non-vanishing for all 
spacetime). Brown quotes Rovelli (1997): 
A strong burst of gravitational waves could come from the sky and knock 
down the rock of Gibraltar, precisely as a strong burst of electromagnetic 
radiation could. Why is the … [second] ‘matter’ and the … [first] ‘space’? 
Why should we regard the … [first] burst as ontologically different from 
the second? Clearly the distinction can now be seen as ill-founded. 
(Rovelli, 1997, p.193) 
For Rovelli, Einstein’s equation of the gravitational field with spacetime 
geometry can be understood in two, mutually exclusive, ways: either that the 
gravitational field is (ontologically) nothing over and above the distortion of 
spacetime geometry or that spacetime geometry is a ‘manifestation of a 
particular physical field, the gravitational field’. Rovelli prefers the latter. 
Rickles (2008b) argues that the ‘dual role’71 of the spatiotemporal metric, and 
the reciprocity between matter and spacetime (which is what distinguishes GTR 
from previous spacetime theories) means that there is an essential ‘ambiguity 
over the ontological nature of the field: spacetime or material object’ (p. 136), 
which itself arises from Einstein’s principle of equivalence. To this extent there 
                                                        
71 ‘Dual role’ refers to the fact that the metric, gμν, determines both the geometrical properties, 
or structure, of spacetime and the properties of the gravitational field. 
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is some justification for Rynaseiwicz’s (1996) claim that the debate between 
substantivalism and relationalism is ‘outmoded’. Rickles agrees and argues that 
both relationism and substantivalism ultimately lose out to structuralism: 
According to the relationalist (about motion) all motion is relative 
motion. But motion relative to what? The gravitational field? But if it is 
the gravitational field, then we face a problem in GR (and background 
independent theories in general): is this field spacetime or matter? 
Einstein, and Rovelli, claim that the gravitational field should be 
identified with spacetime. Here we see that both positions can get a 
foothold on the ontological rock face of general relativity; the 
substantivalist can lay claim to the same object against which relative 
motion occurs. […] Matters have clearly degenerated […] to the point 
where this division is no longer doing any real work (2008b, pp. 146-7). 
Rickles’ idea is that the relationist’s relations can be reduced to geometrical 
structure. Similarly, the substantivalist may also claim that this intrinsic 
structure coincides with their ontological commitments to a substantival 
spacetime, the ‘absolute’ coordinates of which may be mapped by using the 
intrinsic geometrical structure to define a set of ‘intrinsic coordinates’. 
Obviously, as Rickles points out, the relationist might equally well refer to the 
latter as a material field and ‘so continues the interminable tug-of-war’ (p. 148).  
Rickles concludes that the debate between substantivalists and relationists is 
rendered redundant and that structuralism offers a better alternative: physical 
systems and spacetime are just different aspects of the same, ontologically 
fundamental, structure. 
It must be stressed that the argument here is certainly not intended to motivate 
an ontological structuralism of the type championed by Rickles. Rather, it is that 
the equivalence between spacetime and the gravitational field can be viewed, 
under a strict interpretation, as there being a single entity, the physical field, 
that is spatiotemporally structured. The position I am proposing here is to see 
the relational structure as real, but not ontologically fundamental. Rather it is 
derivative of an objectively dynamic physical field (the energy-momentum 
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field) that manifests spatiotemporally. I shall describe this as reductionist 
structuralism, to distinguish it from ontic structuralism. 
Conceiving the relationship in this manner provides advantages that help to 
address some of the conceptual issues encountered in quantum gravity. In the 
first place, quantum gravity requires there to be a (physical) field that can be 
the subject of a quantisation procedure. Secondly, a structuralist interpretation 
permits a better understanding of the requirement of background 
independence. As noted previously (§ 2.4.3) there is a consensus that resolving 
the core conceptual issues in quantum gravity relies upon a correct 
interpretation of the background independence of GTR. The suggestion I 
propose here is that the underlying problem is not how we interpret 
background independence, as such, but rather, how we interpret the 
equivalence between spacetime and the gravitational field that gives rise to 
background independence. Reading the equivalence as a strict equivalence 
allows one to make more sense of background independence, particularly the 
apparent dichotomy between ‘stage’ and ‘actor’, and the sense in which 
gravitons both have to move within spacetime and be spacetime. Such a 
dichotomy only appears paradoxical if we retain the concept of spacetime as an 
independently existing, substantival entity, separate from matter or matter 
fields. If, instead, spacetime is held to be the structure of reality then the 
paradox falls away: the metaphysically primitive entity is a dynamically existing 
physical field (matter or mass-energy) that is structured spatiotemporally. 
2.7 Conclusion  
In Chapter 1 I concluded that the starting point for a theory of presentism, 
compatible with physical theory, involves the adoption of two foundational 
premises: P1 and P2. This chapter has argued in support of these premises. The 
conceptual difficulties encountered in formulating quantum gravity (§ 2.3) 
support the view that, rather than being metaphysically primitive, time 




These conceptual difficulties are not unique to emerging theories of quantum 
gravity (§ 2.3.2), which have yet to be empirically established, but lie within the 
foundations of GTR itself (§ 2.4.3).  Resolving these conceptual difficulties 
requires an adequate interpretation of background independence within GTR. 
This is seen as an essential commitment for any theory of quantum gravity. A 
structural interpretation of the spacetime of GTR provides the best way of 
understanding background independence (§ 2.6.4). 
I have also argued that physics does not support the view that reality is 
objectively static.  In fact, the way in which time is defined within our physical 
theories provides support for the objective reality of change (§ 2.5). This 
provides a route for a compatibilist model of presentism which regards 
(space)time as the structure of an intrinsically dynamic, rather than static, 
reality.  
This approach to time has significant implications for establishing an 
appropriate metaphysics of change and persistence; this will be pursued in 
Chapters 4 and 5. Prior to this it is necessary, in the following chapter (Chapter 
3) to address the charge that the ontological commitments of presentism are 
incompatible with physical theory; in particular, the view that ontological parity 
(and so, eternalism), provides the better metaphysical interpretation of the 




CHAPTER 3 – A REJECTION OF ONTOLOGICAL PARITY 
3.1 Introduction 
Eternalism is the view that all times, objects and events (past, present and 
future) are equally actual, or real and exist ontologically on a par. Presentism, 
the view that only present things exist, denies ontological parity. Since only 
present things exist, the present is ontologically privileged. Eternalism is 
generally considered to be well-supported by the Special Theory of Relativity 
(STR). The aim of this chapter is to undermine this claim and to show that the 
ontological commitments of presentism are compatible with relativistic physics. 
This compatibility requires the presentist to reject the idea that the present, or 
‘now’, is a unique time and so avoid the commitment to a 3+1 dimensional 
model of reality. I argue that the presentist, who embraces the intrinsic four-
dimensionality of reality, is able to provide a suitable account of relativistic 
kinematic effects based on the invariance of the speed of light. It is the 
metaphysical import of the latter fact that provides the key to establishing an 
appropriate ontology for a compatibilist account of presentism. 
I begin (§3.2 & 3.3) by reviewing the paradigmatic arguments to eternalism, 
known as the ‘Rietdijk-Putnam-Penrose’ (RPP) arguments and follow this with 
consideration of a more recent formulation, by Peterson and Silberstein (2010). 
I argue that both fail. I then assess the merits of the claim that eternalism 
provides the best metaphysical explanation of relativistic kinematic effects 
(§3.5). I provide an argument to undermine the key premise on which this claim 
is based. The remainder of the chapter offers an account of relativistic 
kinematic effects on behalf of the presentist and concludes with a consideration 
of the metaphysical import of the STR. 
This chapter makes reference to Minkowski spacetime diagrams in describing 
and analysing some of the arguments. A description of these, and an explanation 




3.2 The ‘Rietdijk-Putnam-Penrose’ (RPP) Arguments to Eternalism 
from STR 
It was not until 1966 that formal arguments72 were established that attempt to 
demonstrate that the relativity of simultaneity within the STR leads to 
eternalism, and this represents the point at which the static view of reality 
becomes the predominant metaphysical interpretation of our best theories of 
physics. The first of these was provided by Rietdijk (1966), followed by Putnam 
(1967) and subsequently reinforced by Penrose (1990). All arrive at their 
conclusions by way of the same basic argument that I shall summarise below, 
with reference to a version given by Petkov (2006) in analysing Stein’s (1968, 
1991) objections.73 
Figure 3.1 shows three inertial observers (A, B and C) in relative motion: 
 
Observers A and B occupy reference frames RA and RB. A and B are, respectively, 
approaching and receding from stationary observer C and meet at spacetime 
point M. The events P and Q along the world-line of observer C represent 
different moments in C’s proper time tCP and tCQ. For example, tCP could 
represent the event of C hitting his thumb with a hammer and tCQ, the event of C 
crying out in pain. Hyperplanes of simultaneity74 can be drawn for each 
                                                        
72 Russell (2009) also anticipates these in his ‘ABC of Relativity’ (first published in 1925), in 
particular, the implications of the relativity of simultaneity for our time ordering of events and 
the lack of an unambiguous ‘universal time’ (pp. 46-48). 
73 Other formulations and discussions of this argument are provided in Savitt (2000), Bourne 
(2004) and Callender (2008). 
74 Hyperplanes of simultaneity are lines of constant time. 
Figure 3.1: Diagram 
courtesy of Petkov (2006, p. 
211, Fig. 1). 
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observer, A and B, when they meet at point M; these are given by the lines 
labelled ‘A’s present’ and ‘B’s present’ respectively. The argument proceeds as 
follows. For observer B events M and P are simultaneous, therefore events M 
and P must be equally real, or determinate, for B. In contrast, for observer A, 
events M and Q are simultaneous and so M and Q are equally real, or 
determinate, for A. On the assumption that reality is observer-independent and 
absolute, and since both P and Q are equally real or determinate with respect to 
point M, the events and moments signified by tCP and tCQ must be equally real. 
This is despite the fact that, for observer C, not only is tCQ later than tCP but the 
latter is causally prior to the former.  
The significance of the result becomes even greater when it is appreciated that 
similar reasoning is applicable to the infinite number of simultaneity 
hyperplanes that can be drawn through spacetime point M. For all points and 
events, past, present and future, comprising observer C’s timeline, there exist 
possible reference frames whereby observers meeting at M will disagree as to 
which events in their timeline are real as of M. This result is possible only if the 
following eternalist conclusion holds: all moments of C’s existence have 
ontological parity, and all events and times (past, present and future) along C’s 
timeline are equally real (or “coreal”). 
This argument may be reconstructed in the following way. The first three 
premises assume the truth of the STR. 
1. Two non-identical reference frames, RA and RB, are in relative inertial 
motion and have origins coincident at spacetime point, M.
 (Premise) 
2. The relation of simultaneity between any two spatially separated 
events within Minkowski spacetime is reference frame dependent and 
is defined by three-dimensional hyperplanes orthogonal to the time 
axis of the reference frame chosen. (Premise) 
3. An infinite number of hyperplanes of simultaneity may be drawn 
through any given spacetime point M depending upon the inertial 
reference frame adopted. (Premise) 
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4. Events that are simultaneous within a given reference frame (R) must 
be equally real ('coreal') or determinate with respect to one another, 
and equally real or determinate with respect to the observer occupying 
that reference frame. (Premise) 
5. The reality of any event is absolute and observer, or reference frame, 
independent. (Premise) 
6. Coreality is transitive between reference frames. (Premise) 
7. Q is simultaneous with M in reference frame RA and P is simultaneous 
with M in reference frame RB. (From 1, 2) 
8. Q is real as of M in reference frame RA and P is real as of M in reference 
frame RB. (From 2, 4) 
9. Q is absolutely real and P is absolutely real. (From 5, 8) 
10. Q is real as of P (From 6, 9) 
11. All spacetime points and events are equally real, or determinate, with 
respect to one another. (From 3, 4, 10) 
There are two principal objections in the literature to the RPP formulation of 
the argument to eternalism. The first targets premise 4 and maintains that 
simultaneity is not an adequate criterion for reality (and thereby for 
coreality).75 The basis of this argument is that the STR dictates that simultaneity 
is both frame-relative (premise 2) but also a matter of convention.76 On the 
(presumably uncontroversial) grounds that reality is absolute and observer-
independent, the frame-relative nature of simultaneity counts against it being 
considered a sufficient criterion for reality. 
                                                        
75 For example, Stein (1968, 1991) and Bourne (2006, p.172-176). 
76 The conventionality of simultaneity reflects the fact that spacetime is intrinsically four-
dimensional and so, by choosing to represent this in terms of 3 spatial coordinates and 1 
temporal coordinate, the matter of the choice of this fourth (temporal) coordinate is arbitrary 
and a matter of convention. 
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The second objection77 targets the transitivity of coreality (premise 6). The 
transitivity of coreality requires justification since it is vital in proceeding to the 
conclusion (11) of eternalism and the ontological parity of all times and events. 
Sklar (1977, 1985) argues that under the RPP argument, coreality is defined 
solely in terms of simultaneity (premise 4), yet simultaneity is reference frame 
dependent within the STR (premise 2) and therefore not transitive between 
reference frames. Consequently, we have good reason to deny the transitivity of 
the coreality relation: 
Given the relativisation of simultaneity to a reference frame in relativity, 
anyone who wishes to relate determinate reality to temporal presence 
must also relativise having reality to a state of motion of an observer. 
And given the non-transitivity of simultaneity in relativity across 
observers in differing reference frames, we could easily find our way out 
of this argument by simply denying that ‘having reality for’ is a transitive 
relation (1985, p. 291) 
In the following section I describe a reformulation of the argument to 
eternalism, from Peterson and Silberstein (2010), which aims to address these 
two standard objections. 
3.3 The Peterson-Silberstein Reformulation 
Peterson and Silberstein (2010) accept the objections targeted at the RPP 
formulation of the argument to eternalism, and offer what they regard as a 
‘new, more conclusive argument in favour’ (p. 209) of eternalism. They 
recognise the need for the coreality relation to be determined by something 
over and above frame-relative simultaneity, in order to counter both charges: 
that simultaneity is not an adequate criterion for reality, and that coreality is 
not shown to be transitive between reference frames. Consequently, they 
propose a re-definition of coreality: two events, A and B, are coreal iff they are 
simultaneous, and they share an identical R-value (pp. 212-214): 
                                                        
77 For example, Sklar (1977). 
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Corealitydef = frame-relative simultaneity + equivalence of binary R-
value 
‘R-value’ is a unary property of any event, such that an event is absolutely real if 
R=1 and unreal if R=0. According to Peterson and Silberstein, if two events are 
simultaneous within a given reference frame but both are also absolutely real 
(i.e., they have an R-value of 1) then they are coreal in all reference frames. In 
such circumstances we are justified in considering their coreality to be 
transitive (premise 6), and so the argument to eternalism is supported. 
The absolute reality of a given event (i.e., the situation where R=1 obtains) 
depends upon the satisfaction of two, individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient, criteria which they term ‘definiteness’ and ‘distinctness’. They argue 
that both are reference frame independent and transitive; the attribution of 
transitivity to coreality is thereby justified.  
In what follows, I first outline Peterson and Silberstein’s criteria of definiteness 
and distinctness (§ 3.3.1). I consider each of the criteria in turn. I argue that 
definiteness is not transitive under either of the formulations that Peterson and 
Silberstein provide (§ 3.3.2), and that the sense of definiteness they allude to 
begs the question at issue between the presentist and eternalist. I then argue 
that though the criterion of distinctness is transitive, it cannot, on pain of 
circularity, be a criterion for the reality of events (§ 3.3.3). Neither criterion 
therefore provides the desired mechanism sufficient to establish the transitivity 
of coreality without generating a charge of circularity. Consequently, the 
original objections to the RPP formulation of the argument remain. 
3.3.1 The Criteria of Definiteness and Distinctness 
Peterson and Silberstein define the concept of definiteness with respect to both 
properties and events, in the following manner: 
A property is definite if it has a value that can be ‘meaningfully 
determined’ (p. 219). 
An event is definite if it ‘is property-definite with respect to at least one 
property’ (p. 219). 
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They illustrate the notion of definiteness using examples from quantum 
mechanics. If a quantum system is in an eigenstate of x-spin, then all 
measurements on the system yield the same value of x-spin and the system can 
be said to be ‘property-definite’ with respect to spin in the x-direction. In 
contrast, if the quantum system is in a superposition of x-spin states, different 
measurements will yield different (probabilistically describable) results with 
respect to x-spin. In this case the system is ‘property-indefinite’ with respect to 
x-spin. So, for Peterson and Silberstein, an event is definite if it has at least one 
property to which we can assign a determinate value (in the widest sense of 
value), for example, value of spin in the x-direction. 
The second necessary condition on the reality of an event is distinctness. The 
distinctness of an event is described as follows:  
a distinct event must be in some way different from other distinct events 
(a la Leibniz, call it the discernibility of non-identicals) […] two 
completely indistinguishable events cannot be numerically distinct. 
(p. 220) 
Distinctness is therefore given in terms of discernibility. 
3.3.2 Evaluating the Criterion of Definiteness 
I argue that Peterson and Silberstein construe definiteness in two separate 
ways. The second formulation of definiteness begs the question of the reality of 
an event, and under neither construal is the criterion of definiteness transitive. 
The addition of the criterion of definiteness in their definition of coreality 
therefore fails to secure the transitivity of coreality in the manner required to 
reach the conclusion of eternalism. 
Definiteness is defined by Peterson and Silberstein, in general terms, as the 
possession of a determinate value (2010, p. 219). However, their argument for 
the transitivity of definiteness relies upon an analogy they draw between 
possession of a determinate value and the concept of relativistic invariance, and 
this leads to an additional formulation of definiteness. 
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In arguing for the transitivity of definiteness, the authors begin by proposing 
that ‘any relativistically invariant relational property must be transitive across 
all reference frames’ (p. 223). A relativistically invariant property is one upon 
which all observers, in all inertial reference frames, can agree. The value 
assigned to the property by an observer in one reference frame will be the same 
as the value assigned by an observer in a different inertial frame. Examples 
include the speed of light, c, and the spacetime interval, ds2, between any two 
events.  
For the purposes of their argument, Peterson and Silberstein propose that one 
such relativistically invariant property is ‘the number of events that occur’ 
(p.224). On the grounds that this property is analogous to definiteness, they 
claim that the transitivity of the latter is similarly justified: 
All observers, no matter their frame, will agree on the number of events 
that occur. Thus, no matter what frame an observer is in, it will never be 
the case that she will see an event take place that another observer does 
or could not see. Though observers may disagree about some of the 
properties of an event, no observer will see a “novel” event; that is, there 
is no event simpliciter that one can only see if one is in a certain 
reference frame. This means that the very existence, the very 
definiteness of an event-as-such must be a relativistic invariant, and thus 
as per our pre-established criterion, definiteness must be transitive 
across frames. (p. 224) 
‘The number of events that occur’ is provided as a paradigmatic example of 
definiteness which is construed, in more general terms, as the possession of 
some determinate value: an event is definite if it has more than one property to 
which a determinate value can be assigned, or ‘meaningfully determined’. 
Defined in this way definiteness is a monadic property and, if so, it cannot also 
be transitive on the grounds that transitivity is applicable only to relations. A 
relational property is one possessed by a particular in virtue of the relations it 
bears to other things. As such, it is not clear how either ‘the number of events 
that occur’, or the property of definiteness, could be construed as relational 
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(irrespective of whether they might be considered relativistically-invariant) 
and, if such properties are not relational then they cannot be transitive. 
Nonetheless, the argument they give suggests that it is on the grounds of the 
relativistic invariance of ‘the number of events that occur’ that, by analogy, 
definiteness should be considered transitive between reference frames. It 
appears that it is not ‘transitivity’, in the normal sense of the term, that is being 
appealed to here. Rather, it is the property of being invariant between reference 
frames that is sought. If definiteness, as a necessary criterion on reality, is 
invariant between reference frames, in other words, if its applicability is agreed 
upon by all observers then the event is absolutely real, for all observers. In this 
case, the transitivity, or otherwise, of definiteness is irrelevant in moving to the 
conclusion of eternalism. If we allow Peterson and Silberstein this modified line 
of argument then we need to assess whether the property of definiteness, as 
exemplified by ‘the number of events that occur’, is indeed relativistically 
invariant. And in this case it needs to be clarified exactly which sense of ‘occur’ 
it is that is being appealed to. 
On one reading of ‘occur’ it is just not the case that ‘all observers, no matter 
their frame, will agree on the number of events that occur’ (Ibid., p.224). As seen 
in the description of the RPP arguments (§ 3.2), observers in relative motion do 
disagree on what events have occurred, indeed this is the primary motivation of 
the argument to eternalism. Penrose (1990) describes the following scenario: 
The events on the Andromeda galaxy […] judged by the two people to be 
simultaneous with the moment that they pass one another could amount 
to a difference of several days […]. For one of the people, the space fleet 
launched with the intent to wipe out life on the planet Earth is already on 
its way; while for the other, the very decision about whether or not to 
launch that fleet has not yet even been made! (pp. 260-261) 
The relativity of simultaneity suggests that different observers, within different 
reference frames, will disagree as to which events have occurred. This sense of 
‘occur’ is one that equates with ‘simultaneous with’ and, as such, is reference-
72 
 
frame dependent. Since it is reference-frame dependent it is neither 
relativistically invariant nor transitive. 
In the paragraph quoted above (p. 224), however, it becomes clear that 
Peterson and Silberstein allude to another sense of occurrence in describing 
‘the number of events that occur’ as exemplifying definiteness. They make 
reference to the ‘event simpliciter’ and this suggests a sense of occurrence 
independent of any particular reference frame: they state that the ‘very 
definiteness’ of an event is its ‘very existence’, about which no observers could 
disagree. Here the definiteness of an event is construed in terms of its absolute 
occurrence, or its absolute existence, independent of any particular reference 
frame. This rendition of definiteness appeals to a notion of existence which all 
commentators of a realist bent (presentist and eternalist alike) would 
presumably accept: existence is something both observer and reference frame 
independent. 
Nonetheless, if it is this notion of occurrence, instead, that is at the core of their 
alternative concept of definiteness then it begs the question central to the 
dispute between the presentist and the eternalist. For Peterson and Silberstein 
(§ 3.3), definiteness is intended to be a necessary criterion on the absolute 
reality of an event, one that determines that R=1. If so such a criterion cannot be 
defined in terms of the ‘very existence’ or occurrence of the event independent 
of reference frame, on pain of circularity. It is the (absolute) reality of a given 
event, or particular, that is precisely at issue between the presentist and the 
eternalist.  
It was noted above that the transitivity, or otherwise, of definiteness is 
irrelevant if definiteness is given in terms of frame-invariance. Aside from 
issues of circularity, it is worth stating that, contrary to the argument made by 
Peterson and Silberstein, this second concept of definiteness is also not 
transitive. As with the initial construal of definiteness (as possession of a 
determinate value), it is not transitive on the grounds that it is not a relational 
property. The absolute occurrence of an event qua absolute is a property 
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independent of the existence of anything else, and so independent from any 
relations it might bear to anything else.  
In summary, Peterson and Silberstein construe definiteness in one of two ways: 
as the possession of a determinate value or in terms of reference-frame 
independent existence. Under neither construal is definiteness transitive and, if 
it is not transitive, it cannot be employed to justify the transitivity of their 
reformulation of coreality. In addition, the second formulation of definiteness 
cannot be used as a criterion on the reality of events without circularity. 
3.3.3 Evaluating the Criterion of Distinctness 
Peterson and Silberstein describe the criterion of distinctness in terms of 
numerical distinctness, or ‘discernibility’. At first glance then, distinctness, as an 
intrinsic property of a given event is not a relational property and so, on those 
grounds, cannot be transitive. 
However, the authors elaborate further on the nature of distinctness, once again 
with reference to relativistic invariance, in this case the invariance of the 
spacetime interval (ds2) between events: 
Because the interval between events is an invariant, it is always possible 
for observers in different frames to distinguish between different space-
time events in a consistent manner. Because of this, no observer will 
confuse two events that are seen as distinct in another frame. (p. 224) 
Their argument is in two parts. First, they claim that the distinctness of any two 
events is provided for by the invariant spacetime interval between them. This 
seems reasonable since they define distinctness in terms of discernibility: the 
invariant spacetime interval between any two events means that all observers 
in all inertial frames will consider them to be distinct events and will agree on 
the extent of the interval that separates them. Second, since the invariant 
spacetime interval is transitive between reference frames then so, by analogy, is 
distinctness. Distinctness, seen in terms of ‘being invariantly spacetime 
separated from’, is both a relational property and one to which transitivity 
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applies, and so it can be agreed that distinctness is transitive across reference 
frames. 
Although distinctness is transitive, as with the criterion of definiteness, I argue 
that distinctness begs the question at issue between the presentist and 
eternalist. There cannot be an invariant spacetime interval between two events 
unless those events occur. On the grounds that relations imply the existence of 
their relata, the existence of an invariant spacetime interval between events 
depends upon the prior reality of those events. If distinctness is a relational 
property that relates two events, then for the relation to exist the two events 
themselves must exist.  And if distinctness requires that both events exist, it 
cannot, on pain of circularity, be a criterion for the reality of those events. 
3.4 A Summary of the Problems with the Argument to Eternalism 
It is useful to reiterate the purpose of the criteria of definiteness and 
distinctness in Peterson and Silberstein’s modified argument to eternalism.  
The criticism of the original (RPP formulation) of the argument is twofold. First, 
simultaneity is not an adequate criterion to determine the coreality of any two 
events within a reference frame: the simultaneity of two events within a single 
reference frame is not sufficient for an observer within that frame to claim that 
they are both real. In addition, in accordance with the STR, simultaneity is not 
transitive between reference frames (it is only transitive within a given 
reference frame). Therefore, even if simultaneity were an adequate criterion of 
the coreality of two events in one reference frame, we are not justified in 
moving to the reference frame of a different observer and asserting that those 
two events are coreal for them. 
In order to address the first criticism, Peterson and Silberstein recognise that 
the coreality of two events within a given reference frame (R0) must be 
something more than their simultaneity. In order to be coreal, events must also 
share an R-value equal to 1 (§ 3.3), where an R-value of 1 indicates that the 
event is absolutely real. Definiteness and distinctness are proposed as 
necessary and sufficient criteria for an event to possess R=1, and so be 
absolutely real, within a given reference frame. In order for the coreality of any 
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two events, within that frame, to be transitive and so coreal for observers in all 
other reference frames, definiteness and distinctness must also be shown to be 
transitive. It is transitivity that permits the inference that two events that are 
coreal (or absolutely real) within one reference frame (R0), must also be coreal 
for all observers, in all possible reference frames.78 It is this step that leads to 
the conclusion of eternalism. 
I have argued that definiteness cannot be transitive, under either formulation 
provided by Peterson and Silberstein. In addition, under their second 
formulation, definiteness assumes the reality of the event to which it applies 
and so is redundant as an addition to simultaneity in the re-definition of 
coreality. I also argue that, though distinctness is transitive between reference 
frames it also assumes the reality of the events to which it is applied, it 
therefore fails to supplement the notion of coreality with anything over and 
above frame-relative simultaneity. Since frame-relative simultaneity is non-
transitive, the original objection to the RPP formulation of the argument to 
eternalism stands. 
Nonetheless, the argument might be considered to have merit if it turns out that 
the truth of the STR provides good reason to suggest that eternalism (and its 
associated static view of reality) is significantly better supported than rival 
metaphysical theories. The following section critically assesses the extent to 
which eternalism (as the ontological parity of all events) provides the ‘best fit’ 
in terms of a metaphysics of reality and finds it to be lacking support from the 
STR. 
3.5 Eternalism as Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) 
Despite the shortcomings of the argument to eternalism from the STR, it 
remains the case that eternalism is generally considered79 the metaphysical 
theory best placed to provide an adequate explanation of the relativistic 
kinematic effects of the STR (such as length contraction and time dilation). The 
                                                        
78 More accurately, ‘all possible reference frames’ means all reference frames potentially 
coincident with the origin of R0. 
79 See, for example, Balashov and Janssen (2003), Petkov (2006) and Norton (2008). 
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argument is that unless we accept the ontological parity of all actual events, we 
struggle to account for the empirically verifiable results of the STR. 
The standard account of the utility of eternalism in explaining relativistic 
kinematic effects will be illustrated using the argument in Petkov (2006). For 
Petkov, relativistic length contraction (for example, that of a rod) is only 
possible if the ‘worldtube of the rod is a real four-dimensional object, which 
means that the rod exists equally at all moments of its history’ (p.215). Petkov 
refers to two observers in relative motion (A and B), who meet at point M. The 
rod (L) is at rest in A’s reference frame. He illustrates this as follows: 
 
Observer B, who is in relative motion with respect to A and the rod, measures 
the rod to have a contracted length LB such that LB < LA (where LA is the length 
of the rod at rest in A’s reference frame). Petkov’s argument is as follows: 
A and B have different three-dimensional rods, but they see the same 
three-dimensional cross-section L which, however, cannot be regarded 
as a three-dimensional rod since all parts of a three-dimensional object 
exist simultaneously at one moment (the moment ‘now’)…It follows from 
here that it is not possible to interpret the length contraction in a sense 
that it is the same three-dimensional rod that exists for A and B, but they 
see it differently…The fact that A and B have different three-dimensional 
rods means that the two rods of lengths LA and LB, respectively, belong to 
the presents of A and B that correspond to event M. (2006, p. 218) 
  
Figure 3.2 – The world-tube 
of a rod at rest in observer A’s 
reference frame.  
Diagram courtesy of Petkov 
(2006, p. 218, Fig. 4). 
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Petkov concludes:  
A’s present rod also contains parts of B’s past, present, and future rod. 
This would not be possible if the rod did not exist equally in its past, 
present and future. Therefore, A and B conclude that their experiment 
has a profound physical meaning – it proves that all physical objects are 
extended in time, which means that they are four-dimensional (2006, pp. 
220-1). 
Hales and Johnson (2003) provide an argument based on a similar reasoning, 
using the example of a relativistic train, though the force of their argument is to 
argue for perdurantism, over endurantism, as the ‘best fit’ with the empirical 
facts of the STR.80 Both Petkov, and Hales and Johnson, state the argument in 
tensed terms, by suggesting that the three-dimensional rod measured by each 
observer contains parts that may be attributed to the past and the future of the 
other observer. The generic IBE argument to eternalism from length 
contraction may be reconstructed as follows: 
1. The lifetime of a 3D rod (its past, present and future) can be shown as a 
4D world-tube on a Minkowski spacetime diagram. (Premise) 
2. Each observer’s measurement of the rod is equally valid as a description 
of reality at the time of measurement (the principle of relativity or ‘no 
privileged observers’ requirement). (Premise) 
3. Each observer measures a different 3D cross-section of the rod’s 4D 
world-tube at the same time t0. (Premise) 
4. If an entity can be measured at time t0, then the entity exists at time t0 
(Ontological Assumption). (Premise) 
5. The existence of parts of an object that are past and future with respect 
to a given present time, relative to an observer’s reference frame, is best 
                                                        
80 The question of whether eternalism entails perdurantism is a separate debate and is 
considered, for example, by Merricks (1995). 
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explained by positing the co-existence of those past, present and future 
parts. (Premise) 
6. Observer B’s 3D cross-section contains parts of the rod that are past with 
respect to A’s 3D cross-section and parts that are future with respect to 
A’s 3D cross-section. (From 1, 3) 
7. Each observer’s measured 3D cross-section exists at the time t0 of 
measurement. (From 2, 3, 4) 
8. Eternalism (the coexistence of the past, present and future 3D cross-
sections of the rod) provides the best metaphysical explanation of the 
length contraction results of the STR. (From 5, 6, 7)  
Although there are possible arguments that could be suggested to undermine 
premise 2, these will not be pursued here and the principle of relativity is 
accepted.81 The key premises that allow the argument to eternalism to go 
through are premises 3 and 4. In the following sections I provide arguments to 
reject these premises, consequently the conclusion that eternalism provides the 
best metaphysical explanation is false. 
3.5.1 The Grounds for Rejecting Premise 3 
Premise 3 states that each observer measures a different 3D cross-section of the 
rod’s 4D world-tube when they meet at point M, the point of measurement. I 
argue here that premise 3 is false and that both observers measure the same 3D 
cross-section of the rod’s world-tube. 
In the following example I shall use the convention for Minkowski diagrams 
where the unprimed axes are orthogonal and represent the reference frame at 
rest (S) with respect to the object considered, and primed axes represent the 
                                                        
81 For example, the following alternatives to premise 2 might be proposed. Firstly, that one 
observer makes the objectively ‘correct’ measurement, the other observer’s measurement is 
false. However, this implies there is no empirical method of determining the preferred frame 
and it is considered here that the positing of in-principle unobservable preferred frames should 
be rejected on the grounds that we have no reason to think that there is such a preferred frame 
and no explanation for the hypothesis that there might be. A second alternative might claim that 
reality is ‘fractured’ and relative to each observer’s reference frame. Against this it is suggested 
that a theory positing a ‘fractured’ reality should be rejected in favour of one that posits a single, 
unified reality on the grounds that the latter is more explanatorily elegant and powerful. 
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reference frame (S’) in relative motion. I also centre the axes at the mid-point of 
the rod since this makes the example easier to understand.  
The following scenario is considered. 
Figure 3.3 shows rod, R, at rest in frame S (xA, tA) with Alice standing at the 
midpoint (x0t0). Measurement of the length of the rod requires a measurement 
of the position of each end of the rod at the same time (t0) within the rest frame, 
R, of the rod.82 In order to do this, Alice arranges for a light pulse to emit 
simultaneously (with respect to x0t0 in frame S) from either end of R at t0.83 A 
while later she receives the light from both ends of the rod, at point M (x0t1), 
and thereby calculates the length of the rod to be ΔxA. 
Bob, in frame S’ (x’B, t’B), travelling with relative velocity, v, with respect to S, is 
coincident with Alice and the mid-point of the rod at point M. He too measures 
the rod at M but finds it to have a contracted length Δx’B < ΔxA.84 
                                                        
82 Note that Alice’s reference frame and the rest frame of the rod, R, are identical. 
83 Using an appropriate synchronisation procedure. 
84 It should be noted that, contrary to appearances on the diagram, line Δx’B is, geometrically, 
less than line ΔxA because the scale, representing unit distance, is not the same along the 
different axes xA and x’B. Distances in Minkowski spacetime are not given by the Euclidean line 




In what follows, there are two points that need to be emphasised about the 
nature of measurement within the STR: 
1. Any measurement requires the transmission and receipt of light (or 
other) signals. 
2. The speed of light is finite (it takes time to propagate); there is therefore 
no instantaneous signalling. This means that what is measured is always 
past with respect to the observers making the measurement. 
Both Alice and Bob measure the rod at M using the light signals received, at that 
point, from either end (the paths of the light signals are indicated by the light 
cone in the diagram). As a consequence of the finite speed of light, and the fact 
that it takes time to propagate, what both observers measure at point M is the 
rod, R, as it existed between spacetime points xR1t0 and xR2t0 (the points at which 
Figure 3.3 – 
Measurement of rod, R, 
at rest in frame S (xA, tA) 
with respect to Alice 
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the light was emitted). It follows that what each observer measures, at 
spacetime point M, is the same 3D cross-section of the rod (the rod that existed 
between xR1t0 - xR2t0 in its rest frame) and not different 3D cross-sections. 
Premise 3 is therefore false. 
Nonetheless, although Alice and Bob measure the same 3D cross-section, their 
measurements assign a different length to that cross-section and the reason for 
this is explained in §3.6.3. 
3.5.2 The Grounds for Rejecting Premise 4 
Premise 4 states that ‘if an entity can be measured at t0, then the entity exists at 
t0’. Although this seems intuitively appealing, this is not true within the STR. 
The explanation for this also turns on what it means to make a measurement 
within the theory. As noted above, any measurement relies upon the 
transmission and receipt of some signal. 
In the scenario described, both Alice and Bob rely upon the propagation of light 
signals from either end of the rod (existing in the interval xR1t0 - xR2t0) in order 
to make their respective measurements. As already noted, the finite speed of 
light means that the 3D cross-section of the rod that they both measure at M is 
the 3D rod as it previously existed in the spatiotemporal interval xR1t0 - xR2t0. For 
this reason, a distinction necessarily arises between what exists at a point of 
measurement (M) and what is measured at that point. What exists at the single 
spacetime point, M, is Alice, Bob, the mid-point of the rod (x0t1) and the two 
light signals, that converge at that point, from either end of the rod. What is 
measured at point M, by way of the converging light signals, is the rod, R, as it 
previously existed between points xR1t0 - xR2t0. Since any measurement requires 
the propagation of light signals from an object to the point of measurement, the 
object measured does not necessarily exist at the point of measurement. The 
following scenario makes this clearer. 
3.5.2.1 The Disintegrating Rod Argument 
In Figure 3.3 it was implicitly assumed that all parts of the rod existing in the 
interval xR1t0 -xR2t0 continue to exist between t0 and t1, in its rest frame. This is, 
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of course, not necessarily the case. An equally consistent scenario can be 
modelled and represented using the same Minkowski diagram. 
Suppose that, at the point at which Alice arranges for a light pulse to emit 
simultaneously from either end of R, the mechanism she employs also causes a 
progressive disintegration of the rod from each end; this destructive influence 
also propagates at the speed of light. By the time (t1) that Alice meets Bob at M 
the rod has disintegrated to a point particle occupying M (x0t1). In this case the 
world-tube of the rod is not a ‘tube’ but is coincident with the light cone since 
the rod disintegrates at the speed of light, as shown in Figure 3.4. 
 
On the assumption that Alice and Bob are restricted to occupying the single 
spacetime point, M, they are none the wiser as to the disintegration of the rod. 
Nevertheless, at M, Alice and Bob, as in the previous scenario, receive the light 
signals emitted from each end of the rod (that existed at xR1t0 - xR2t0) and so 
perform their respective calculations. The respective lengths they assign to the 
rod will, nonetheless, still be given by the length intervals ΔxA and Δx’B (shown 
in Figure 3.4), where Δx’B < ΔxA, since these calculations depend only on the 
Figure 3.4 – Length 
contraction in the case 
of a disintegrating rod 
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speed of light and the respective coordinate axes. These remain equally valid 
descriptions of the rod as it previously existed at xR1t0 - xR2t0, even though the 
rod, now at M, exists only as a point particle.  
This example reveals how two ontologically divergent scenarios can be 
modelled by the same Minkowski diagram. It can be concluded from this that 
the intervals ΔxA and Δx’B, although equivalent spatiotemporal descriptions of 
the rod previously existing at xR1t0 - xR2t0, imply nothing about the ontological 
status of the rod at M, or indeed at any point subsequent to M. This example 
shows that premise 4 is not necessarily true, the rod that is measured at M does 
not necessarily exist at that point. 
3.5.3 Why the Argument to Eternalism Fails 
It has been argued that both premises 3 and 4, in the IBE argument to 
eternalism, are false. Each observer measures the same 3D cross-section of the 
rod as it previously existed and the fact that they assign different 
spatiotemporal descriptions to the rod (for the observer in relative motion the 
length is contracted) implies nothing as to the existential status of the rod at the 
point of measurement. Nonetheless, there is a need to explain why it is that the 
conflicting descriptions of the length, both of which are equally valid (from the 
principle of relativity), generate the erroneous conclusion that they correspond 
to different 3D cross-sections of the rod’s 4D world-tube and, further, that Bob’s 
3D cross-section contains parts of the rod that are past and future with respect 
to Alice. 
I first outline the reasoning in support of the conclusion that Bob’s 3D cross-
section contains parts of the rod that are past and future with respect to Alice. I 
then argue that this relies upon an assumption that has no basis in the STR. 
The lifetime of the 4D rod can be denoted by a ‘world-tube’ on a spacetime 
diagram; this is indicated in Figure 3.5 by the grey hashed lines that proceed 
from either end of the rod and run parallel to the tA axis. Assuming that the 
whole rod (originating in the spatiotemporal interval xR1t0 - xR2t0) continues to 
exist, rather than disintegrating, then the mid-point of the rod would move 
along a line perpendicular to x0t0 up to point M (x0t1); in doing so it traces a 
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‘tube’ in Minkowski spacetime. This world-tube represents the causal history of 
the 4D object, resolved into separate temporal and spatial coordinates, and is 
only defined relative to the reference frame at rest with respect to the object 
described. 
From Figure 3.5 it can be seen that the 3+1D coordinate descriptions assigned 
by each observer (at M) appear to coincide with different 3D cross-sections of 
the rod’s world-tube, parts of which occur in the future and the past relative to 
the observer’s meeting point, M. Alice describes the rod as occupying the 
interval t1 - t1, with respect to point M, whereas Bob describes the rod as 
occupying the interval t´0 - t´0, with respect to point M. Considered as cross-
sections through the rod’s world-tube this appears to suggest that, for Bob, one 
end of the rod exists in its past (at spacetime point t´0) and the other end in its 
future (at spacetime point t´0). 
The inference that each observer’s 3+1D description corresponds with a 
different existent proper part of the rod’s 4D world-tube requires the 
assumption that there is an absolute coincidence between the spacetime 
coordinates in the different observer’s reference frames. The world-tube of the 
rod is defined only with respect to its rest frame (Alice’s reference frame); 
consequently, in order that the 3+1D description assigned by Bob (in his 
reference frame) is a 3D slice through the rod’s world-tube (defined in Alice’s 
reference frame) there must be a relation of identity between the coordinate 
points defining the position of the rod in Bob’s reference frame and the 




In particular, the requirement for an identity between the coordinates means 
that coordinate point t´0, in Bob’s reference frame, is absolutely coincident 
with a coordinate point (xR1t0.5) in Alice’s reference frame and similarly that 
coordinate point t´0 (Bob’s frame) is absolutely coincident with coordinate 
point, xR2t1.5 (Alice’s frame). I provide two reasons to undermine this 
assumption of absolute coincidence. 
The first argument is provided by the example of the disintegrating rod 
(§3.5.2.1). The premise that objects exist as four-dimensional world-tubes in 
Minkowski spacetime provides an intuitive and visually persuasive explanation 
of length contraction. The discrepancy in the spatial intervals measured by each 
Coordinate point 
xR1t0.5 in Alice’s 
frame 
Coordinate point 











t´0 in Bob’s frame 
World-tube 
of the rod 
Coordinate point 
t´0 in Bob’s frame 
Figure 3.5 – Coincidence of spacetime coordinates 
in reference frames S and S´ 
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observer coincide with different three-dimensional cross-sections through the 
rod’s four-dimensional world-tube. However, the case of the disintegrating rod 
reveals that it cannot be the case (however visually persuasive) that there is an 
identity between the coordinate points on each observer’s (spatial) coordinate 
axis and spacetime points at which the rod exists when measured at M. In this 
case, the length intervals assigned by each observer do not coincide with the 
world-tube of the rod (Figure 3.4); the ‘world-tube’ of the rapidly disintegrating 
rod is given by a cone on the spacetime diagram (coincident with the light cone 
defining the path of light emitted from each end of the rod). If there is no 
correspondence in this case, between the measurements of length by both 
observers and a cross-section through the rod’s world-tube, then there is no 
justification is assuming such a correspondence in the case where the whole 
length of the rod continues to exist. The different measurements of length 
obtained by the two observers therefore do not correspond with the present 
existence (at the point of measurement) of future and past spatial parts of the 
rod. Rather, the observers’ measured length intervals are two, equally valid, 
spatiotemporal descriptions of the rod as it existed (at xR1t0 - xR2t0 in its rest 
frame) prior to the meeting of Alice and Bob.  
The disintegrating rod argument makes it clear that there is a distinction to be 
made between coordinate points (which provide different, equally valid, 
spatiotemporal descriptions) and spacetime points (as points at which objects 
and events exist). It is pertinent here, as Maudlin (2012, p.26) notes to heed 
Einstein’s warning that coordinates need not have any direct physical 
significance. The Minkowski diagram is equally well regarded as a heuristic 
tool: i.e., as a geometric representation of reality employed to predict the 
different measurement results of different observers. 
This leads to a second argument against the absolute coincidence of the 
measurement coordinates and the spacetime points defining the four-
dimensional world-tube of the rod.  
In order that coordinate points within different reference frames are absolutely 
coincident within Minkowski spacetime, the point of coincidence has to be 
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defined by some event common to both observers (or reference frames). This 
common event thereby defines a spacetime point.  In the case of Alice and Bob 
such an event is their meeting at point M. This coincidence event, an event 
common to both their causal histories, permits the equation x0t1  x´0t´0, which 
defines point M and allows the origins of their respective reference frames to 
coincide. In the example illustrated, though, there is no other such event, 
common to both Alice and Bob. In particular, there is no common event that 
permits an equation between coordinate point t´0, in Bob’s reference frame, 
and coordinate point xR1t0.5, in Alice’s frame. A similar argument holds in 
respect of the coordinate points t´0 (Bob) and xR2t1.5 (Alice). As such, there is 
nothing to justify the assertion of an identity between these coordinate points 
in the separate reference frames. Since the world-tube of the rod is defined only 
with respect to its rest frame (Alice’s reference frame) it cannot be inferred that 
the coordinate point, t´0, in Bob’s reference frame constitutes part of the rod’s 
world-tube, in other words, that it is a spacetime point occupied by the rod (and 
associated with a previous moment in time). An analogous argument applies to 
the inference that coordinate point t´0 (in Bob’s reference frame) lies on the 
world-tube of the rod and so comprises a spacetime point in the causal future of 
the rod. 
The eternalist explanation of relativistic length contraction, in terms of the 
existence of objects as four-dimensional world-tubes, although visually 
persuasive, is false. It cannot be inferred that Bob’s assignment of 3+1D 
coordinates on measurement of the rod corresponds with parts of the rod’s 4D 
world-tube that are past and future with respect to Alice. 
3.6 A Compatible Presentist Approach 
In the remainder of this chapter I argue for the compatibility of presentism with 
the STR and propose how a compatibilist model of presentism should account 
for relativistic kinematic effects. I end with a reflection on the metaphysical 
import of the STR and this provides the key to establishing a suitable 




3.6.1 Abandoning 3+1D Reality 
In this, and the following section, I argue that the presentist should accept the 
intrinsically four-dimensional nature of reality, and that this is perfectly 
compatible with presentism. In § 3.6.3, I use this feature of reality to provide an 
account of relativistic effects on behalf of the presentist. 
It is standardly assumed85 that the presentist, who also subscribes to the ‘thesis 
of objective passage’ (premise P1, Chapter 1, § 1.6), is committed to absolute 
simultaneity and describing reality in 3+1 dimensional terms. Nonetheless, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, serious problems face the presentist when objective 
passage is formulated as temporal passage, as a flow of time, or with respect to 
time; it is this notion of passage that relies upon absolute simultaneity. Chapter 
1 concludes that a compatibilist model of presentism requires a mechanism for 
internalising the tense-indicative, dynamic aspects of reality, and so formulating 
them independently of time. This means that the requirement for absolute 
simultaneity should be abandoned; it also means that the present, or ‘now’, 
should not be seen as a unique, or indeed any, time.86 
Aside from the McTaggart-style problems of contradiction and infinite regress, 
the search for a unique plane of simultaneity, within relativistic spacetime, still 
encounters the thorny metaphysical issue of Callender’s (2008) ‘coordination 
problem’ (§1.4.3). If this does not provide reason enough for the presentist to 
eschew all talk of absolute simultaneity, there is a further motivation. It will be 
recalled from the critical analysis of the arguments to eternalism (§3.2, 3.3) that 
it is the appeal to simultaneity, as sufficient criterion for the coreality of events, 
that underpins the arguments. If the principle objection to these arguments is to 
be upheld then, on the grounds of consistency, simultaneity cannot also be 
employed by the presentist as providing the ontological privilege of the present.   
For all these reasons I believe the presentist should seek to reconcile their 
position with the fact that reality is intrinsically four-dimensional. In the 
                                                        
85 I refer the reader back to footnote 22, §1.4.3 where an overview is given of commentators 
who maintain this position. 
86 The way in which the present can be formulated independently of any reference to time will 
be discussed in Chapter 4. 
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following section I describe what it means to exist four-dimensionally and why 
this is not at odds with the commitments of the presentist.  
3.6.2 Existing Four-Dimensionally 
The term ‘four dimensionalism’ is often employed with reference to 
perdurantism and the corresponding static view of reality (e.g. Sider, 1997, 
2001). As such there is an implicit bias against the compatibility of presentism 
with acceptance that reality is four-dimensional. However, if the term is used in 
line with its meaning within the STR there is no incompatibility. 
Within classical, Newton spacetime it is possible to represent the complete 
lifetime of an object as a four-dimensional world-tube, and so the fact that 
objects can be represented by four-dimensional world-tubes within the STR is 
nothing new. Objects also exist four-dimensionally within classical spacetime. 
Nonetheless, there is a difference between what it means for objects to exist 
four-dimensionally under Newtonian spacetime and within the spacetime of the 
STR (Minkowski spacetime). Specifically, in the former there is no inter-
dependency between the three spatial and the one temporal dimension, they 
are completely separate. Consequently, existing four-dimensionally within 
Newtonian spacetime means that all observers, regardless of their relative 
velocity, will assign the same spatial and temporal intervals between objects 
and events, they are fixed for all observers. If spatial and temporal intervals are 
fixed, there will be no discrepancies in these intervals between observers in 
relative motion. In particular, there will be no length contraction and no time 
dilation. 
This is different under the STR. The spacetime of the STR is intrinsically four-
dimensional, in the sense that the spatial and temporal intervals are inseparably 
linked. Spacetime is truly spatiotemporal, rather than (separately) spatial and 
temporal. There are two ways, in particular, in which this unification is 
manifest. First, objects and events are separated by an invariant spatiotemporal 
interval (ds2), and the extent of this interval is agreed upon by all observers 
irrespective of their state of motion. Second, observers in relative motion will 
resolve the invariant interval between any two events into different spatial and 
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temporal components. In particular, observers in relative motion to an object 
will measure temporal intervals as dilated and spatial intervals (or length) as 
contracted.87 Nonetheless, within both classical and relativistic spacetimes what 
it means for reality to be four-dimensional is given in similar terms, specifically 
in relation to measurement and the consequent assignment of spatial and 
temporal intervals.  
As such, there is nothing in the meaning of ‘existing four-dimensionally’ that is 
incompatible with presentism. Yet it remains the case that it is considered 
incompatible and this seems to be for two reasons, both of which have been 
discredited by the arguments given previously. 
First, the disparity between measured temporal intervals, in particular, counts 
against seeing the present (time) as ontologically privileged and this is 
connected with the denial of absolute simultaneity in the spacetime of the STR. 
Reasons for the presentist to abandon the commitment to absolute simultaneity 
have been given in § 3.6.1. If the presentist does not explicate the present in 
terms of a unique time, then there is no a priori reason why a presentist model 
cannot be compatible with an intrinsically four-dimensional reality. This does, 
however, require an alternative account of the present; this will be presented in 
§ 5.8 and a supporting ontology is developed in Chapter 6. 
Second, the intrinsically four-dimensional nature of reality gives rise to 
relativistic kinematic effects and these effects are used to support the 
conclusion of eternalism. However, this argument is based upon a premise (the 
absolute coincidence of measurement coordinates with spacetime points) that 
is shown to be false in the example of the Disintegrating Rod. This cannot, 
therefore, be used to argue for an incompatibility between presentist 
commitments and the notion that reality is intrinsically four-dimensional. The 
equation of existing four-dimensionally with four-dimensionalism, and 
ontological parity, is just not supported. 
                                                        
87 Length is only contracted in the direction of motion. 
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For the presentist only that which is present exists. If absolute simultaneity and 
the notion of the present as a unique time is abandoned, as suggested, there is 
scope to regard the present as spatiotemporally structured, in a manner 
described by Minkowski spacetime. The idea to be pursued in the following 
chapters is that the present (as that which exists) is objectively and intrinsically 
dynamic, and it is this feature of reality that gives rise to its (four-dimensional) 
spatiotemporal structure. By internalising the dynamic aspects of reality in this 
way the problems (discussed in Chapter 1) associated with modelling objective 
passage in 3+1D terms (as temporal passage) are avoided. 
If presentism is consistent with four-dimensionality, then it should be possible 
to provide an account of relativistic kinematic effects compatible with 
presentism; this is the subject of the following section. 
3.6.3 An Explanation of Relativistic Kinematic Effects 
I argue that relativistic kinematic effects (length contraction and time dilation) 
arise solely from the nature of measurement and the invariance of the speed of 
light. As such, these effects are compatible with a presentist position that 
regards 4D spacetime as the structure of an objectively dynamic reality. 
Within Minkowski spacetime the invariant spacetime interval (ds2) between 
events is an objective feature of reality; this is agreed upon by all observers 
irrespective of their state of motion. What is disagreed upon is how this 
invariant interval is resolved into separate spatial and temporal intervals.  
The significant point, emphasised previously, is that resolving this interval into 
separate spatial and temporal components only assumes meaning in the context 
of a measurement. Consequently, the separate (spatial and temporal) intervals 
themselves are not an objective feature of reality. Contrary to our intuitive 
notion of measurement, as involving the measurement of something that 
corresponds directly with some objective feature of reality, the measurement of 
spatial and temporal intervals under STR is merely the resolving of the 
invariant (and so objective) spatiotemporal interval into separate (frame-
dependent) spatial and temporal intervals. To this extent, the description ‘the 
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measurement of spatial and temporal intervals’ is misleading, they are not so 
much being measured as being assigned.  
The discrepancy between the relative apportionment of spatial and temporal 
intervals encountered by observers in relative motion is referred to as time 
dilation and length contraction. This discrepancy arises for two reasons only: 
1. Any measurement (viz. the assignment of separate spatial and temporal 
coordinates) requires the return propagation of a light signal. 
2. The speed of light is invariant for all observers, regardless of their state 
of motion 
I illustrate how the discrepancy arises, in what follows, using the example of 
time dilation. 
Any measurement of time intervals between events requires a physical clock. 
Consider a clock at rest with respect to an observer. The time interval, t0, for 
one tick of the clock, is given by the distance travelled by a light pulse from one 





If the same clock is in relative motion, v, with respect to an observer it will be 













In this case, the time interval for one tick of the clock is also given by the 
distance travelled by the light pulse divided by c, but the (relative) distance 









Solving this equation for t provides the relation between the two time intervals, 











Thus the time interval for one tick on the clock (t) is longer (and so the clock is 
slowed) for the observer in relative motion as compared with the interval (t0) 
for the observer at rest with respect to the clock. With respect to the observer in 
relative motion the light signal must travel further in order to complete one tick, 
and since the speed of light is a constant c for all observers the time interval 
must increase.  
This result is quite general and applies to all clocks (not just light clocks) since, 
if it were not general, it would constitute a mechanism for the detection of 
absolute motion, in contradiction to the principle of relativity. All clocks 
(whether light clocks, body clocks or atomic clocks) involve motion of one form 
or another and that motion cannot be employed to detect a state of absolute 
rest. 
It has been emphasised that adopting this line of explanation requires the 
presentist to abandon a 3+1D model of reality and accept that there are no 
uniquely and objectively temporal intervals between events, only objective 
spatiotemporal intervals (ds2). Nonetheless, it may be countered here that even 
if the presentist accepts this, surely the existence of an invariant spatiotemporal 
interval implies the existence of past events, contrary to presentism?  
In rejecting eternalism as the best explanation of length contraction (§ 3.5.1) it 
was emphasised that what is measured is always past with respect to the 
observers making the measurement. The (different) measurements of length 
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made by Alice and Bob when they meet (point M) are equally valid descriptions 
of the rod as it previously existed (along the interval given by xR1t0 - xR2t0 in its 
rest frame). Though their assignments of spatial intervals (lengths) for the rod 
may differ, their measurements at that point would indicate their agreement on 
the spatiotemporal interval (ds2) separating them (at M) from the (previously 
existing) rod. Nonetheless, the existence of this interval does not imply the 
present existence of the past rod (which would be contrary to presentism) or 
indeed the existence of anything that is not present (at M). The existence of the 
interval (between M and the rod as it previously existed) is given by the light 
beams, existing at M (that have arrived from either end of the previously 
existing rod) and the relevant laws of nature (the finite speed of light and its 
invariance for all observers).  
In conclusion, accounting for the effects of time dilation, or length contraction, 
within the STR does not require recourse to ontological parity (or eternalism), 
it just needs to be understood that the assignment of separate temporal and 
spatial intervals is something that only acquires meaning in relation to 
measurement, and measurement in turn involves the transmission and 
reception of light signals. In virtue of the invariance of the speed of light for all 
observers the invariant spatiotemporal interval is resolved into spatial and 
temporal components differently by different observers. 
3.7 Evaluating the Metaphysical Lessons of STR 
It is clear that there are metaphysical lessons to be gleaned from the 
assumption of the truth of the STR. It is less clear what exactly these lessons are 
and, given the limited applicability88 of the STR, we need to be cautious in 
evaluating what these may be.  
The most significant conclusion of the STR is the intrinsic entanglement of 
spatial and temporal intervals between events: consequently, reality is 
objectively four-dimensional. Norton (2000), although somewhat sceptical 
about the ontological ‘morals’ that may be drawn from the STR, nonetheless 
                                                        
88 By ‘limited applicability’ I refer to the extent to which GTR and emerging theories of QG revise 
or delimit the applicability of STR. 
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concurs that its central lesson is that the relativity of simultaneity ‘expresses a 
profound entanglement of space and time’ (p.188) into one four-dimensional, 
spatiotemporal reality. The crucial question is how this result is to be 
interpreted. The standard metaphysical interpretation of this result is the 
conclusion of eternalism. The preceding arguments have aimed to show that 
eternalism, as ontological parity, is not a metaphysical conclusion that we are 
justified in drawing. An intrinsically four-dimensional reality is equally 
compatible with presentism. 
In assessing the metaphysical import of the STR I suggest that the question that 
should be the focus of attention is why it is that reality is intrinsically four-
dimensional, rather than 3+1D. The explanation of how relativistic effects arise 
gives some indication of the answer to this question. The invariant 
spatiotemporal interval separating events represents an objective feature of 
reality. What is relative, or observer-dependent, is the resolving of this interval 
into separate temporal and spatial components; these differ between observers 
depending on their relative motion. In turn, it was noted that what underpins 
this difference is the invariant speed of light. Reality is intrinsically four-
dimensional (rather than 3+1D) because of the invariance of the speed of light, 
c, for all observers, irrespective of their state of motion. This is a profound fact 
and it is this, I would suggest, that demands a suitable metaphysical 
interpretation. 
The preceding discussions of the STR involve reference to light principally in 
relation to signalling and measurement. This gives the appearance that the 
theory is primarily instrumentalist, anthropocentric and ‘observer-relative’, 
with little scope for substantive metaphysical interpretation. Nonetheless, the 
key role that light occupies within the theory is not something that should be 
overlooked, however, understanding its significance requires a brief detour. 
All particles that constitute the universe are either ‘fermions’ or ‘bosons’. 
Fermions (e.g., electrons, protons, neutrons) are the fundamental building 
blocks of matter. On the other hand, bosons (e.g., photons, gravitons, gluons) are 
particles that mediate interactions between matter (fermions) and are generally 
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the quanta of force fields. As quanta they are discrete packets of energy that 
transmit force or causal influence. The universe thereby divides neatly into 
matter and the interactions (or forces) between matter. Light is therefore more 
than a convenient method of signalling between observers. Light is composed of 
photons89 and so has significance in that it mediates interactions between 
matter and propagates causal influence. The fact that its speed is finite means 
that there is no instantaneous influence, rather there is an objective and 
invariant interval (the spatiotemporal interval, ds2) between events so 
connected, and it is this that gives rise to the spatiotemporal structure of reality. 
The invariance of the spatiotemporal interval between events arises directly 
from the invariance of the speed (or velocity) of light since it is light (or some 
other form of the propagation of energy or influence) that connects events. 
Since velocity is defined in general terms as Δx/Δt, velocity therefore describes 
a unit interval of motion. Thus, the invariance of the velocity of light, c, means 
that its motion is invariant for all observers. It follows that the invariant 
spatiotemporal interval that separates events is an interval, or unit, of motion, 
rather than an objective spatial or temporal interval. It is this motion (of light or 
other propagating influence) that determines the spatiotemporal structure of 
reality. It is for these reasons that light cones figure in the construction of 
Minkowski spacetime, and that the latter is often described as causally 
structured. 
Given this, I believe that the ontological moral to be drawn from the invariance 
of the velocity of light is that it is motion, rather than spacetime that is 
metaphysically primitive; in particular, that spacetime (or, more accurately, 
spacetime structure) is derivative of the motion and interaction of mass-energy. 
This premise will be pursued in Chapter 6 where an ontology for a compatibilist 
theory of presentism is developed based on Belkind’s (2012) derivation of the 
structure of Minkowski spacetime from units of primitive motion. This route 
allows the establishment of a presentist model that regards Minkowski 
spacetime as the structure of an objectively dynamic reality. 
                                                        
89 Photons are the quanta of the electromagnetic force field. 
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3.8 Concluding Thoughts 
The aims of this chapter have been to show that the ontological commitments of 
presentism are compatible with relativistic physics, and to undermine claims 
that eternalism provides the best metaphysical interpretation of the results of 
the STR. 
I have argued that presentism is compatible with an intrinsically four-
dimensional reality and that the presentist has good grounds to abandon the 
commitment to a 3+1D reality, which regards the present as a unique time. 
Under the STR, existing four-dimensionally means that observers in relative 
motion will agree on the invariant spatiotemporal interval (ds2) separating 
events, but assign different spatial and temporal descriptions (as a consequence 
of measurement) to that objective interval. It is the spatiotemporal interval that 
has objective significance, rather than the separate spatial and temporal 
components (which are observer and measurement-relative). This is 
compatible with a presentist model that adopts a reductionist structuralist view 
of spacetime, under which reality (the now) is structured spatiotemporally. 
An explanation of relativistic effects has been given that is not reliant upon the 
metaphysical commitments of eternalism. Relativistic kinematic effects are the 
assignment of different spatial and temporal intervals by observers in relative 
motion. As such they are a feature of reality that only acquires meaning in 
relation to measurement, and this, in turn, requires the transmission and 
reception of light signals. In virtue of the invariance of the velocity of light, the 
invariant spatiotemporal interval is resolved into spatial and temporal 
components differently by observers in relative motion. The lack of an 
objective, unique temporal interval between events is only problematic for a 
presentist committed to formulating objective passage in 3+1D terms. 
The presentist, in seeking a compatibilist account, should therefore embrace the 
fact that reality is intrinsically four-dimensional, rather than fall into a trap of 
equating an objectively dynamic reality with one that possesses a unique 3+1D 




CHAPTER 4 – PRESENTISM vs ETERNALISM – THE SCEPTICAL DEBATE 
4.1 Introduction 
I conclude in Chapter 2 that the best route to achieving a compatibilist model of 
presentism is to regard spacetime as the structure of reality. Since an eternalist 
might also subscribe to such a position, this influences the terms of the debate 
between presentism and eternalism, both of which are standardly construed as 
(mutually exclusive) theories of time. A danger arises if the course taken leads 
to an account that has little to distinguish it, metaphysically, from that of the 
eternalist. Indeed, commentators have recently suggested that there is no 
metaphysical substance to the debate and this has, to some extent, been 
supported by proponents of a structuralist position (e.g. Dorato, 2006b).  
The aim of this chapter is to review and undermine the sceptical argument that 
the debate between presentism and eternalism has no ontological substance. I 
argue that the sceptical challenge misconstrues the debate by conflating 
matters metaphysical and linguistic, in a way that conceals the ontological core 
of the debate. The terms of the debate trap the presentist in the ‘presentist’s 
dilemma’ (Meyer, 2013). I argue that the ontological substance of the 
disagreement turns on the nature of what it is that makes the existential claims, 
on each side, true. I describe how ‘Existence Presentism’ (Tallant, 2014) 
successfully circumvents the presentist’s dilemma; understanding how this is 
achieved provides an important insight into how a compatibilist metaphysical 
foundation for presentism can be established. Achieving this is the ultimate goal 
of this thesis. Importantly, it also reveals that the debate between presentism 
and eternalism is not a debate about time, per se, but about the nature of 
concrete reality. 
4.2 The Sceptical Argument 
Eternalism and presentism are standardly considered to be theories of time. 
Nonetheless, both positions also represent ontologically substantial theses 
about what exists. A number of commentators have sought to argue that there is 
no substantial, ontological difference between the two positions.  Rather, the 
debate collapses to a merely semantic one which turns on the temporal 
99 
 
equivocation of ‘exists’, as it functions in the claims made on either side. This 
section reviews these claims. 
Presentism regards the present as ontologically privileged. Though no 
unequivocal definition is accepted by all proponents, presentism can be 
formulated in general terms as the position that ‘only present things exist’90 
(Ingram and Tallant, 2018). Eternalism, by contrast, is the view that past, 
present and future things91 exist and are ontologically on a par. Such an 
apparent divergence of opinion should, at first sight, translate into a clear 
existential claim that one side can accept and the other deny. However, this has 
proved to be far from the case.  
A central claim is that the debate turns on the equivocation associated with the 
verbs ‘to be’ and ‘to exist’.92 There is certainly a history of equivocation over the 
term ‘exists’. Austin (1962) reflects on the nature of existence to motivate the 
identification of some ‘contrast class’ in order to achieve a meaningful notion of 
existence or reality: 
a definite sense attaches to the assertion that something is real, a real 
such-and-such, only in the light of a specific way in which it might be, or 
might have been not real. This, of course, is why the attempt to find a 
characteristic common to all things that are or could be called ‘real’ is 
doomed to failure; the function of ‘real’ is not to contribute positively to 
the characterisation of anything, but to exclude possible ways of being 
not real […] (p.70) 
’Exist’, of course, is itself extremely tricky. The word is a verb, but it does 
not describe something that things do all the time, like breathing, only 
quieter – ticking over, as it were, in a metaphysical sort of way. It is only 
too easy to start wondering what, then, existing is. (p. 68) 
                                                        
90 In order to distinguish presentism from the growing block view Ingram and Tallant proceed 
to qualify the position as ‘always, only present things exist’. 
91 Statements of both presentism and eternalism vary depending upon whether they range over 
things, objects, events or times. For example, Merricks (2006, p. 103) describes presentism as 
the view that ‘only the present time is real’. 




Many commentators on the debate appeal to Rescher’s (1966) analysis to 
facilitate a disambiguation of the notion of ‘exists’. He highlights four ways of 
understanding ‘is’, as follows:  
(i) The “atemporal is” that means “is timelessly.” (“Three is a prime 
number.”) 
(ii) The “is of the present” that means “is now.” (“The sun is setting.”) 
(iii) The “omnitemporal is” that means “is always.” (“Copper is a 
conductor of electricity.”) 
(iv) The “transtemporal is” that means “is in the present period.” (“The 
earth is a planet of the sun.”) 
Both Dorato (2006b) and Savitt (2006) exploit the equivocation in the notion of 
‘exists’ to motivate a sceptical position. Savitt’s argument employs Rescher’s 
first two senses of ‘is’ together with a ‘detensed’ sense (is, was or will be), which 
he sees as exhausting the possible senses of ‘is’ with which to provide a 
meaningful distinction. Savitt argues that the eternalist cannot assert ‘Isaac 
Newton exists’ (in the tensed, ‘is now’, sense - Rescher’s sense (ii)), whereas the 
presentist cannot deny ‘Isaac Newton exists’ (in the detensed sense). Further, 
both presentists and eternalists can agree that ‘Isaac Newton EXISTS’ (in the 
atemporal sense - Rescher’s sense (i)) in so far as ‘in 1666 one could say truly 
“Isaac Newton exists”’ (in the tensed sense i.e. now). Thus, for all three 
characterisations of the verb ‘exists’ Savitt can find no formulation that 
satisfactorily distinguishes presentism from eternalism (2006, pp. 112-116).  
Along similar lines Dorato (2006b) argues that both presentists (who do not 
wish to deny a commitment to the future existence of certain events) and 
eternalists are committed to tenseless existence, defined in the following 
manner: 
Def2alt2: e tenselessly exists just in case it was the case that e exists 
(tensedly), or e exists (tensedly) or it will be the case that e exists 
(tensedly). (p. 102) 
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Existential claims, claims about what exists, employ ‘exists’ in the verb form. As 
such, any claim attributing existence to a singular object requires us to use the 
verb in either the tensed or tenseless form; once it is clear which form of the 
verb is being employed, the sceptical argument goes, it is not possible to arrive 
at the single thesis that one side is able to affirm and the other deny. As Meyer 
(2013, p.69) notes: ‘It is a feature of English syntax that we cannot attribute 
existence to an object without committing ourselves, by our choice of tense for 
the verb ‘to exist’, to a past, present, or future time at which the object exists’. As 
a consequence, both presentists and eternalists agree that ‘Aristotle exists 
(tenselessly)’. Conversely, both parties deny that Aristotle exists in the tensed 
sense of existence (‘Aristotle exists now’). The argument concludes that once we 
specify the sense of existence that is intended there is no existential claim about 
which presentists and eternalists disagree. It appears that the difference 
between presentism and eternalism is merely semantic, rather than ontological. 
Influenced by Austin, Dorato urges that a genuine, ontic, distinction between 
eternalism and presentism requires ‘a clear sense in which non-currently 
existing objects are unreal’ (p.95). 
4.3 The Presentist’s Dilemma 
The onus has generally been on the presentist to offer a definition of presentism 
that is sufficient to circumvent the sceptic’s attack. Recent literature93 has 
provided translations of the various statements proffered, in line with each 
possible sense of ‘to exist’, to render them either trivially true or obviously false. 
I illustrate this using the argument from Meyer (2013). Meyer argues that the 
triviality objection against presentism stands on the basis of ‘a mix of logical 
analysis and empirical investigation […] Even if Einstein had been wrong and 
Newton right about the laws of mechanics, presentism would still have been 
either trivially true […] or obviously false’ (p.85). He states the presentist thesis 
as: 
(P) Nothing exists that is not present. 
                                                        
93 For example, Dorato (2006b), Lombard (2010), Meyer (2013) and Savitt (2006). 
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Meyer argues that this formulation is unable to distinguish the ‘present from 
other times’ (p.67). He describes the impossibility of disambiguating the 
different meanings of ‘exists’, in order to establish a non-trivial and true claim, 
as the ‘presentist’s dilemma’. The presentist thesis, (P), is to be understood as 
either: 
(P1): Nothing exists now that is not present, or 
(P2): Nothing exists temporally that is not present (where ‘exists 
temporally’ means ‘has existed, exists now or will exist’). 
(P1) is trivially true; this reading of ‘exists’ is too narrow since it already 
excludes any non-present objects. (P2) widens the scope of (P) and is thereby 
non-trivial, however (P2) is now rendered false by: 
 (JC): Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon 
(P2) is rendered false since Julius Caesar has existed (and thus ‘exists 
temporally’), yet he is not present.  Thus, concludes Meyer, ‘presentism is either 
trivially true or obviously false’ (p.69). Tallant (2014) and Pezet (2017) 
similarly show how Rescher’s analysis renders the presentist thesis, as 
standardly construed, either trivial or false, and both suggest alternative 
formulations, to be considered later. 
In conclusion, several commentators have argued that the temporal 
equivocation of the verb ‘exists’, into either tensed or tenseless senses, renders 
the difference between presentist and eternalist existential claims merely 
semantic (rather than ontological). Further, attempts to formulate a statement 
of presentism that the presentist can uniquely assert, when translated into the 
alternative, temporal sense of ‘exists’, yields either a trivial truth or an obvious 
falsehood. 
4.4 Responses to the Sceptic 
In response to the sceptical claims, three main lines of argument are employed 
in an attempt to assert a meaningful difference between presentism and 
eternalism, and so escape the ‘presentist’s dilemma’. These are as follows: first, 
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to describe the difference relative to some background spacetime theory, 
second, by analogy with modal actualism, and, third, by appealing to a notion of 
existence simpliciter. I discuss each in turn and highlight their shortcomings. 
4.4.1 Reference to a Background Spacetime Theory 
Savitt (2006, pp. 122-127) suggests that any constructive distinction between 
presentism and eternalism requires their description ‘relative to some 
background spacetime theory’. Given that both presentism and eternalism are 
claimed by their exponents to be theories about the nature of time, and the 
relationship between existence and time, formulating the debate in relation to 
spacetime theory should ostensibly provide a suitable arena for a substantial 
debate. Savitt’s approach is to mirror Dummett’s (1969, pp. 252-253) model of 
the realist/anti-realist distinction; he urges that we draw the distinction in 
terms of different perspectives on spacetime. Dummett describes the realist as 
conceptualising the whole of temporal reality by imagining themselves as 
standing (temporally) outside that reality and adopting a ‘bird’s-eye’ 
perspective on the totality. The anti-realist, in contrast, does not consider it 
possible to conceptualise, or describe, the world other than from the standpoint 
of a given, temporal perspective. 
For Savitt, the perspectives of Dummett’s realist and anti-realist are analogous 
to the perspectives of the eternalist and presentist. These perspectives are 
though, for Savitt, compatible. Each is equally valid, as a perspective on reality, 
and each has its own explanatory advantages.  
A similar consideration leads Dorato (2006b, p. 106) to describe the distinction 
between presentism and eternalism as merely ‘pragmatic’. It relates to the 
usefulness in ordinary language of the two senses of existence: tensed, relating 
to the subjective, or internal perspective, and tenseless, describing the 
objective, external or scientific perspective on reality. Since both of these 
perspectives are equally compatible with Minkowski spacetime, the existence of 
Minkowski spacetime should not be employed to the advantage of eternalism, 
according to Dorato. 
104 
 
Though conciliatory in motivation, the idea that the distinction between 
presentism and eternalism is one of compatible, equally valid perspectives on 
spacetime is not advantageous to presentists, for the following reasons. First, 
both Savitt and Dorato commit the presentist to an assumption that spacetime 
can be uniquely foliated into hyperplanes of simultaneity, each of which occur 
successively. This is not acceptable to those who wish to establish a presentist 
account that is compatible with our best physical theories.94 Second, such 
models imply that presentism offers a ‘subjective view’ on reality. The 
motivation for this, presumably, is that tensed claims about existence are 
subject-relative and their meaning can only be analysed in a token-reflexive 
manner. This, however, is merely a semantic or perspectival matter and is one 
example of how the metaphysical debate is easily confounded by the linguistic 
terms in which it is conveyed. In making what is an existential claim, the 
presentist does not proffer a subjective perspective on reality or spacetime. 
Their claim is a substantial metaphysical one. 
Wüthrich (2012), though agreeing that the debate only acquires substance 
within the context of spacetime theories, rejects the compatibilist accounts of 
Savitt and Dorato. For Wüthrich, there is a substantive, ontological difference 
such that the two positions are not reducible to, or capable of being reconciled 
with, each other: 
eternalism can be understood as the position awarding existence to all 
events in ℳ, with the spatio-temporal properties given by the relations 
among the events as they are encoded in the metric field gab defined on 
ℳ. Presentism, on the other hand, takes an equivalence relation 𝑆 which 
foliates ℳ (“simultaneity") and then restricts physical existence to those 
events in the folium corresponding to “now". (p.5) 
This approach, as with that of Dorato and Savitt, commits the presentist to 
absolute simultaneity and the objective reality of privileged, three-dimensional 
                                                        
94 Chapter 3 describes how STR, in asserting the intrinsic four-dimensionality of reality, 
prescribes that there can be no uniquely temporal intervals between events. This restriction is 
magnified in the move to GTR (as discussed in Chapter 2) where the commitment to 




hyperplanes of simultaneity which successively come into, and go out of, 
existence. It is this unique, universal time that stands as the privileged present, 
or ‘now’. Wüthrich, himself, recognises that this route is not open to a presentist 
wishing to align their position with relativistic physics.95 Nonetheless, many 
presentists and non-presentists alike96 consider that A-theorists in general are, 
or should be, committed to an approach that posits privileged planes of 
simultaneity.  Though this approach may render the debate substantive, as 
argued in the previous chapters, there are good reasons for the presentist to 
reject a formulation that equates the present with a privileged slice of 
spacetime. 
There are additional reasons to avoid this line of argument. Tallant (2019, §4), 
in reviewing a formulation of presentism by Correia and Rosenkranz (2015), 
objects to their model on the grounds that it portrays reality as consisting of a 
single, static slice of spacetime. This type of objection originates with Merricks 
(2007), and Mulder (2016, p. 32) adopts a similar stance: he refers to ‘negative 
presentism’ as the view that takes the eternalist’s time-line and removes 
everything apart from the present time (or moment), shrinking reality to a 
single, thin slice. This view is unacceptable to most ‘standard’ presentists on the 
grounds that it aligns too closely with eternalism and models the presentist’s 
reality as merely a ‘super-thin slice’ of the eternalist’s block universe. Such 
accounts provide nothing with which to explicate the ontological privilege of 
the present, or provide for the objective significance of tense. In conclusion, 
framing the debate with respect to a background spacetime theory does not 
appear to offer the compatibilist presentist with what is needed. 
  
                                                        
95 It should be noted that Wüthrich himself espouses ‘Ersatz presentism’, a position which 
restricts physical existence to the present but permits abstract existents to be located at times 
other than the present. 
96 For example, Craig (2008), Hawley (2006), Saunders (2002), Zimmerman (2011), Nasmith 
(2011), Monton (2006). 
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4.4.2 The Analogy with Modal Actualism 
An alternative approach to articulating the ontologically substantial difference 
between presentism and eternalism is by analogy with actualism. One of the 
early attempts is that of Adams (1986), following Prior (1960): 
As the actualist holds that there are no merely possible things, but only 
things that actually exist, so the presentist holds that there are no merely 
past or future things, but only things that exist now. For presentism, 
’exists’ in its sole primitive sense is a one-place predicate equivalent to 
‘actually exists now’, and the presentist’s primitive quantifiers range 
only over things that actually exist now. (Adams, 1986, p. 321) 
Actualists can accept the truth of ‘it is possible that unicorns exist’ without 
committing to the truth of ‘there are unicorns’; this is because the existential 
quantifier is inside the scope of the possibility operator: 
(1) (∃x)(Ux) 
Using this kind of approach, Sider (2006) and Crisp (2004) both utilise an 
analogous mechanism to assert the difference between the presentist and 
eternalist. Both parties in the debate can agree on tensed claims, such as 
‘Dinosaurs once existed’, but they disagree on what makes such claims true and 
thus disagree over what exists. According to Sider (p. 78) the presentist’s claim 
that ‘dinosaurs once existed’ is formalised as: 
 (2P) P∃xDx (It was the case that: there exist dinosaurs) 
Whereas for the eternalist the same claim is provided by: 
 (2E) ∃x(Dx ∧ Bxu) (There exist dinosaurs, located temporally before 
us) 
The difference, according to Sider, is that (2E) entails ‘x(Dx)’ but (2P) does not. 
For the presentist (2E) is false because ‘x(Dx)’ is false. Both presentists and 
eternalists mean the same thing in applying the existential quantifier, but, by 
analogy with modal actualism, since the existential quantifier is within the 
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scope of the past tense operator, ‘P’, the presentist is not committed to the 
existential claim of the eternalist, ‘x(Dx)’. 
Sider anticipates the sceptical retort that this difference is superficial and 
merely a matter of syntax, rather than semantics. For Sider, the sceptic needs to 
demonstrate that the presentist’s ‘Px’ (or ‘WAS x’) does indeed count as a 
genuine quantifier (and so expresses the notion of existence) and thereby 
entails x(Dx), in order to provide a successful counter-argument (Ibid., pp. 80-
82). 
Crisp (2004) argues in a similar vein to Sider, but does so in order to draw a 
distinction between de dicto and de re intensional statements. In doing so he 
seeks to provide a sense in which the disagreement concerns a genuine dispute 
over what exists, rather than the sense (or tense) of ‘exists’.97 Crisp notes that 
presentists can accept the truth of de dicto statements (a statement that 
concerns propositions, rather than things), such as the following: 
(RE1): WAS (for some x, x is the Roman Empire and x will not exist in t∞) 
where ‘t∞’ represents the present moment (2004, p. 18). 
Such statements contain the quantifier within the scope of the past tense 
operator. However, presentists would deny the truth of the corresponding de re 
statement (a statement that concerns the existence of things): 
(RE2): For some x, x was the Roman Empire and x is no longer present 
(Ibid.) 
In the latter, the occurrence of the existential quantifier outside the scope of the 
past tense operator does imply an existential commitment. So, for Crisp, the 
triviality objection to the presentist thesis confounds a de dicto truth with a de 
re falsehood. The proposition ‘Caesar crossed the Rubicon’ is true de dicto, on 
the grounds that it means that there was someone, Caesar, who crossed the 
                                                        
97 This contrasts with Lombard’s (2010) criticism of the analogy with modal actualism. 
Lombard disputes that the analogy provides a genuine disagreement between the parties over 
‘what exists’; whereas this is the case in the dispute between modal realists and actualists. He 
counters that the disagreement is simply about over which tense of ‘exists’ is being employed. 
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Rubicon. The presentist thus accepts statements of the form ‘P∃xRx’ but can still 
deny the de re claim (of the form ‘∃xPRx’) that there currently exists some 
object, Caesar, that satisfies ‘PRx’. The de re claim then, according to Crisp, is an 
assertion that the presentist can, unlike the eternalist, deny. 
Tallant (2014, pp. 480, 489), however, maintains that the analogy with 
actualism does nothing to relieve the presentist’s dilemma, and this has to do 
with the formulation of presentism that both Crisp and Sider provide. In the 
case of Crisp’s argument, Tallant formalises his de re claim (that the presentist, 
unlike the eternalist, can deny) as follows: 
(RE2*): x (x was the Roman Empire and PRES x) 
Following Meyer’s (2005) distinction (§ 4.3) RE2* may be translated in two 
ways: either in the tensed sense of existing now ‘(n)’, or, the tenseless sense 
‘(t)’ of temporally existing (i.e., ‘has existed, exists, or will exist’). In the tensed 
case (n), according to Tallant, RE2* yields a contradiction (i.e., ‘there now exists 
something that is not present’), whereas the alternative, tenseless reading (t) 
does not provide something that the presentist can ‘sensibly deny’. 
Tallant presents a similar analysis of Sider’s (2006) argument; again, 
considering both senses of ‘exists’ employed in the application of ‘’ in WAS 
x(Dx) and x(Dx). If, along the lines of Sider’s counter-challenge to the sceptic, 
the presentist position is stated using the tensed reading of the quantifier (n): 
   [WAS nx(Dx) entails nx(Dx)] 
This leads to a claim upon which both presentists and eternalists can agree, 
since what is within the square brackets is clearly false. Alternatively, under the 
tenseless sense of the quantifier, (t), the presentist position translates as: 
   [WAS tx(Dx) entails that tx(Dx)] 
However, this is false since WAS tx(Dx) does entail tx(Dx) and so cannot be 
used by the presentist to distinguish their position after all. 
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The analogy with actualism thus appears to fail. The notion that an ontological 
difference can be achieved solely by preferential placement of the existential 
quantifier, ∃, fails since the presentist is once again restricted to the choice 
between either tensed or tenseless senses of ∃, and thereby forced, once again, 
into the presentist’s dilemma. 
4.4.3 The Appeal to Existence Simpliciter 
In drawing the analogy with actualism, the quotation above from Adams (1986) 
appeals to the sense in which ‘exists’ is employed by the presentist ‘in its sole 
primitive sense’ and this leads to the thought that an appeal to a primitive 
notion of existence, or existence simpliciter, could offer an alternative 
mechanism by which the presentist might avoid Meyer’s ‘presentist dilemma’. 
The thought is that existence is something to be comprehended, in an ‘untensed’ 
sense, beyond its tensed or tenseless senses, and this is proposed by Hestevold 
and Carter (2002). They draw upon an analogy with Lewis’ modal realism in an 
attempt to detach existence from existence at a particular time, and describe it 
thus:  
X exists simpliciter, if and only if, X is among the things that the universe 
includes—if and only if X is real. That X exists simpliciter does not alone 
imply that X did exist, that X presently exists, nor that X will exist.  
(2002, p. 499) 
As such they consider this permits a ‘non-trivial’ statement of the presentist 
thesis, as follows: 
P6  Necessarily, if x existss [simpliciter], then x presently exists  
(Ibid., p. 499) 
However, Lombard (2010) maintains that Hestevold and Carter’s notion of 
‘existence simpliciter’ is not obviously different from his own notion of ‘is real’:  
If some object is real, then it either existed, exists, or will exist (or would 
exist even if there were not times). Thus, to say of some object that it is 
(now) real is to say neither that it did nor that it will exist […]. Thus 
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Hestevold and Carter’s (2002a) concept of tenseless existence seems 
clearly to match my notion of what is real. (p. 74, footnote 23.) 
As a consequence, Lombard argues, P6 either implies that Aristotle exists now 
or that Aristotle is not real, both of which are false. Further, if P6 is considered 
true at all times, the implication that follows is that all things that exist 
simpliciter exist at all times. This is clearly contrary to presentism unless 
‘presently’ refers to a unique time in which case, Lombard challenges, the 
presentist has to say which time it is and why it is so special. 
Meyer (2013, p. 70) also considers it is difficult for the presentist to capture the 
required sense of existence simpliciter, one that is able to transcend the 
temporal in a manner that works. In evaluating its potential he translates the 
standard presentist thesis as follows: 
(P3): Nothing exists simpliciter that is not present 
Meyer contends that if a given object exists simpliciter there seem to be limited 
candidates for the way in which it might exist. If the object exists as an actual, 
concrete entity (‘in time’) then it must have existed at some time, in which case 
his tenseless notion of existence (P2, § 4.3) applies, in other words, it ‘has 
existed, does exist or will exist’. The only other possibilities, which provide 
some sense of existing ‘outside time’, are existence as an abstract entity or 
existence as a possible entity. However, construing a presentist thesis in terms 
of either possible or abstract existence fails to align with the presentist position. 
Meyer concludes that the presentist’s dilemma remains.  
The problem with the notion of existence simpliciter is that it is difficult to 
elucidate. The difficulty arises because existence simpliciter needs to be a sense 
of existence that is ‘untensed’ or ‘detensed’, a sense that is beyond the tensed or 
tenseless senses of existence that make any statement of the presentist thesis 
susceptible to the presentist’s dilemma.  Yet, it is clear that the presentist’s 
claims about existence are about concrete, spatiotemporal existence, existence 
which is in, or of, time. The motivation behind existence simpliciter is to detach 
existence from existence at a particular time, yet concrete existence is 
inextricably tied to existence at a particular time. 
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This section has reviewed three ways in which presentists have attempted to 
formulate their position in an ontologically substantive manner, in response to 
the sceptical claim. Formulating the debate with reference to a background 
spacetime theory, although providing a substantial difference between the two 
sides, compromises the presentist position. It renders it incompatible with 
physical theory and models presentism as a ‘limiting case’ of eternalism. On the 
other hand, the analogy with modal actualism and the appeal to existence 
simpliciter, both fail to avoid the ‘presentist’s dilemma’: presentism is rendered 
either trivially true or false. In the next section I revisit the sceptical claim and 
argue that it is based upon a conflation of metaphysics and linguistics. 
4.5 The Sceptical Claim Examined - A Conflation of Metaphysics and 
Linguistics?  
In assessing the sceptic’s claim it is first useful to consider the area of 
agreement on both sides of the debate. For both presentists and eternalists the 
subject of their respective claims is concrete, spatiotemporal existence and 
entities that exist spatiotemporally. References to possible and abstract 
existents, and existence ‘beyond’ time, serve merely to muddy the waters of the 
debate. The equivocality, or otherwise, of the concept of existence, upon which 
the sceptical argument is based (§ 4.2), is therefore irrelevant to establishing 
the substance of the disagreement between presentism and eternalism. There is 
no equivocality over the category of existence referred to on each side of the 
debate, since the claims of both parties refer to concrete existence. 
It is precisely for this reason that both parties in the debate can agree on the 
truth value of both tensed and tenseless existential claims. As noted earlier, in 
making existential claims about particulars we are linguistically restricted to 
using ‘exists’ in the verb form, which means that such claims can be interpreted 
in either a tensed or tenseless sense. Since all concrete entities exist at some 
time or other and, if there is no dispute at which (B-series) time a given entity 
exists, then there need be no dispute over the truth value of the relevant 
existential claim (tensed or tenseless) since the truth values for those claims are 
provided by the relevant B-series temporal indices.  
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For a tensed existence claim (e.g. ‘Clinton exists now’) the truth value of the 
claim is given with reference to token-reflexive truth conditions which make 
reference to a B-series time: 
‘Clinton exists now’ is true iff a token utterance or inscription of it is 
simultaneous with the existence of Clinton 
Presentists and eternalists can similarly agree on the truth value of tenseless 
existence claims: 
For all x, such that x is concrete, x does, did or will exist is true iff x exists 
at some (B-series) time 
This is because the right-hand-side of the embedded biconditional is simply a 
restatement of the condition that x is a concrete entity. 
The sceptical claim succeeds only to the extent that once the tense of the 
relevant claim is settled then there is no disagreement. Further this is, as the 
sceptics themselves note, merely a semantic matter and should not be seen as 
the true source of the disagreement. This fact is simply a vagary of linguistic 
reference and should not detract from locating the ontological substance of the 
debate. In order to ensure that the respective positions locate the metaphysical 
core of the debate we need to ensure that the debate does not turn on the 
meaning (or truth value) of existence claims. If, indeed, there is a substantive 
disagreement, the ontological substance of that disagreement will turn on the 
nature of what it is that makes the relevant claims true.98 The sceptical challenge 
has not ruled out the possibility of locating this ontological substance and to 
this extent the metaphysical debate needs to be kept on track. 
  
                                                        
98 Stoneham (2009) argues in a similar vein in asserting that a substantive difference between 
presentism and eternalism may only be achieved given acceptance of the Truthmaker Principle 




4.6 An Intuitive Sense of the Ontological Difference 
Despite the force of the sceptical claim and the difficulties in rendering 
presentism in the form of a substantial thesis, there is a sense in which there is 
a ontologically significant difference between the two sides in the debate; as 
Zimmerman (1998, p. 209) notes, ‘presentism is neither a boring truth nor an 
interesting falsehood’. 
From the viewpoint of the presentist, the substance of the debate lies with the 
assertion that the present moment is ontologically privileged. The eternalist 
denies that any moment is ontologically privileged; their set of existent entities 
is larger. Therefore, the presentist thesis is more ontologically restrictive.  
We can certainly gain an intuitive grasp of the sense of this metaphysically 
significant difference. This is illustrated by Peterson & Silberstein’s (2010, p. 
221) reference to ‘Newton’s God’s’ view of the universe. Irrespective of the 
question of determinism, were Newton’s God a presentist, observing the 
universe from a fifth-dimensional ‘perch’ outside (four-dimensional) spacetime, 
they would see only a continually evolving present. If Newton’s God were an 
eternalist, in contrast, they would ‘observe’ all concrete events, past, present 
and future. To this extent there is a debate about what exists.99 Crudely, the 
eternalist has ‘more stuff’ in their set of existent entities than the presentist. I 
would suggest that both eternalists and presentists do have such an intuitive 
grasp of the metaphysically significant difference between them. 
This reflects Wüthrich’s (2012) view that it is possible for the presentist and 
eternalist to establish a substantive difference simply by enumerating what 
physically exists.  As Wüthrich emphasises, the debate ‘concerns physical 
existence rather than our language used to express existence claims’ (2012, p.4) 
and so the debate should not be thrown off course by the latter. Consequently, 
                                                        
99 Contrast Lombard (2010, p. 72), who states that: ‘The alleged controversy between 
presentists and eternalists does not involve, as the other metaphysical disputes mentioned by 
Sider do, any dispute about what exists. There may be genuine issues over which presentists 
and eternalists disagree; but those issues are not about the reality of time, the reality of what 
exists in time, or the nature of persistence’. 
114 
 
there should be a way of linguistically representing this without thereby forcing 
an ontological commitment.  
In conclusion, the ‘presentist’s dilemma’ is an artifice of the terms under which 
the debate has standardly been formulated. The presentist should therefore 
avoid falling into the trap of formulating their position in terms of claims about 
what exists. Despite the fact that presentists and eternalists can enumerate 
what exists and what does not exist, and thereby end up with different sets of 
existent entities, any attempts to formulate a claim about the existence of given 
concrete particulars is subject to either a tensed or tenseless translation and 
thereby produces a statement upon which both can agree. Getting to the 
ontological heart of the debate requires representation without ontological 
commitment, yet this seems impossible to achieve within the arena of 
existential quantification. 
4.7 The Ontological Heart of the Debate 
I have argued above that the ontological substance of the debate turns on the 
nature of what it is that makes the respective existential claims true (§ 4.5). The 
fact that both sides target concrete existence, in making their claims, does not 
imply that they agree on the nature of the truthmakers grounding those claims. 
For the eternalist what makes a given existential claim, X exists, true is its given 
(B-series) spatiotemporal location; this determines, and is sufficient for, the 
existence (or reality) of X. Since all concrete particulars are spatiotemporally 
locatable, all concrete particulars exist. 
This stance on the nature of concrete existence is highlighted in the 
contributions of Dorato (2006b) and Savitt (2006). For Dorato the existence of 
any concrete event just is its occurrence (or location) at a given spatiotemporal 
point: 
[...] in Minkowski spacetime timelike-separated events are objectively, 
invariantly timelike-related, and events, by definition, occur or happen. 
They do so, so to speak, a priori. […] the fact that in a block-view pairs of 
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timelike-separated events exist at their location […] And the events’ very 
being is their occurring. (Dorato, 2006b, p. 97) 
In a similar vein, Savitt (2006, p. 123), in characterising the difference between 
eternalism and presentism with reference to a background spacetime theory 
(such as Galilean spacetime G), explicitly states the eternalist position as: 
 CE5 An event e Exists iff e ∈ G (where Exists means ‘was, is or will be’) 
An event exists iff it can be associated with a given point on the spacetime 
manifold, G: ‘the existence of an event for an eternalist is simply its being in G’ 
(p.126). 
For the eternalist therefore, concrete existence just is existence at a particular 
(B-series) time, t, or at a particular location in spacetime. Spatiotemporal 
location is a sufficient determinant of concrete existence. The eternalist thesis 
might therefore be formulated as follows: 
ET: Concrete existence is occurrence at a particular spatiotemporal 
location (or, spacetime point)100 
This is not the case for the presentist who, although accepting that B-series 
temporal relations can hold between concrete entities, does not accept that they 
determine an entity’s existence.101 For the presentist, what makes ‘X exists’ true 
is that X exists now. The arguments of the previous chapters have emphasised 
that the present should not be seen as a unique, or indeed any, B-series time. If 
the ‘now’ is not a B-series time then, for the presentist, spatiotemporal location 
does not determine the existence of concrete particulars. Consequently, the 
presentist must regard existence as metaphysically prior to B-series time (or 
spacetime). It is for this reason that the arguments of the preceding chapters 
suggest that the route to a successful account of presentism (one that is both 
                                                        
100 It is accepted that this restricts the discussion to our universe, as a four-dimensional 
spatiotemporal universe. As Baron & Miller (2013) indicate, timeless eternalist universes are 
also a possibility. 
101 The reader is referred back to § 3.6.3 where it is argued that the presentist is able to account 
for the fact of an invariant spatiotemporal interval between events without compromising their 
ontological position. The way in which the presentist might model Minkowski spacetime as the 
structure of an objectively dynamic reality is presented in Chapter 6. 
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compatible with physical theory and avoids the standard problems associated 
with dynamic theories of time) is one that regards B-series spacetime as the 
structure of an objectively dynamic reality. Such an approach reflects the 
motivation behind the appeal to existence simpliciter: a sense of existence that 
is prior to spacetime. 
In conclusion both presentists and eternalists make a different, but 
metaphysically substantial, claim about the nature of concrete existence. The 
challenges that face a successful formulation of presentism are therefore 
twofold. First, the presentist must avoid formulating their position in the form 
of an existential claim, since this falls foul of the ‘presentist’s dilemma’. Second, 
presentism requires a mechanism to formulate both existence, and the 
ontological privilege of the present, as metaphysically prior to (B-series) time 
without generating the conclusion that existence is somehow timeless or 
atemporal. The problems discussed above have prompted recent contributors 
(e.g. Merricks, 2007, Tallant, 2014, Mulder, 2016 and Pezet, 2017) to attempt to 
reformulate the presentist thesis on a more fundamental level, away from 
seeing the present in terms of a present ‘time’, and instead formulating it in 
purely ontological terms. These models are reviewed in the following section. 
4.8 Existence Presentism 
The foundations of Existence Presentism can be seen in the work of A.N. Prior 
(1970) and later Craig (1997);102 however, Merricks (2007) (and previously 
Zimmerman, 1996) represents one of the first moves towards an identification 
of existence with presence, more recently proposed by Tallant (2014). Merricks 
notes the common misconstrual of presentism on the basis of the eternalist’s 
view of existence as existence at a particular time. He suggests, on behalf of the 
presentist, that ‘while objects exist at the present time, they exist at no other 
times, since there are no other times at which to be located’ (p.124). He argues 
that the objectors: 
                                                        
102 Craig (1997) describes Prior (1970) as suggesting an equation between the concepts of the 
present and the real: ‘the present simply is the real considered in relation to two particular 
species of unreality, namely the past and the future’ (p. 245). 
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(wrongly) ascribe to presentists the eternalist’s claim that to exist at a 
time is to be located at some super-thin slice of being. But presentists 
should no more accept this than the non-Lewisian should accept that to 
possibly exist is to be located in some universe. (p.124)  
Merricks’ point is that there is no such entity as ‘the present time’. Rather, he 
suggests that presentists ‘should, instead, say that existing at the present time 
just is existing’ (p.125). Obviously Merricks, here, still refers to the present in 
terms of a ‘present time’, despite his rejection of the notion of there being an 
entity which stands as the ‘present time’. This is abandoned in Tallant’s 
formulation of Existence Presentism. 
Tallant, in acknowledging Merricks, notes that this approach: 
ties presentism to a claim about the nature of existence. It seems right 
that presentism ought to be understood, not merely as a thesis 
concerning the number of times that exist, but also as a thesis with a 
commitment to the nature of those times (p.493).  
Nonetheless, there are problems with Merricks’ rendition. Tallant exposes this 
by disambiguating it along the lines of Meyer’s (2013) treatment of the 
(standard) presentist thesis. Employing Meyer’s two senses of ‘is’ (§ 4.3) reveals 
that Merricks’ formula still succumbs to the presentist’s dilemma, in yielding 
either a trivially true or an obviously false proposition: 
(M1): Existing at the present time just is now existing 
(M2): Existing at the present time just has been, is, and will be, existing 
       (Tallant 2014, p. 393) 
Tallant notes that these arguments also extend to Zimmerman’s (1996) 
formulation: 
to be present just is to be real or to exist (p. 117) 
Tallant concludes that the only way to avoid these inexorable problems is to 
make an identity between presence and existence. 
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EP: Presence is existence (p.494) 
Although the ‘is’ is the ‘is’ of identity, the copula is also tensed (presence ‘is now 
identical with’ existence) and this yields a statement to which the eternalist 
cannot also subscribe. He illustrates this with the example of the Battle of 
Hastings: ‘The Battle of Hastings is not present and so the eternalist cannot 
endorse EP’ (p.494). Objects qualify as present by existing and this is something 
that no eternalist would accept. It is relevant, here, to note the difference 
between Tallant’s formulation and that of Zimmerman which, though close, 
Tallant also argues is trivially true. Zimmerman uses ‘exists’ in the verb form 
and, as such, is subject to translation along tensed lines to yield a trivial truth, as 
follows: 
D1) To be present just is to exist-now (Tallant, 2014, p. 493) 
The difference, then, is that under Tallant’s formulation ‘existence’ shifts from 
its verb form to its noun form. Consequently, it is not existence that is tensed 
rather it is the ‘is’ of identity. As such ‘existence’ is freed from any connotations 
relating to time or tense; this succeeds in providing the more primitive sense of 
existence, along the lines sought by the appeal to ‘existence simpliciter’. Further, 
from the identity, presence is also freed from any equation with a unique (or 
indeed any) time, and this provides a route for establishing existence as 
metaphysically prior to (B-series) time. 
Mulder (2016) concurs that Tallant’s Existence Presentism does not succumb to 
Meyer’s disambiguation arguments and that it represents a shift ‘from existence 
claims proper to a claim about existence’ under which ‘existence becomes an 
inherently temporal notion, and therefore no longer requires being linked to 
times’ (p.34). It also abandons the notion of times as ‘locations’. The debate 
between the presentist and eternalist is thereby established as an ontologically 
significant debate about the nature of existence; since the equation of presence 





The arguments of Chapter 2 suggested that a compatibilist account of 
presentism should adopt a structuralist account of (B-series) time, one that sees 
time as the structure of reality. Since such an account of time is equally available 
to the eternalist, this chapter has been concerned with undermining the 
sceptical claim that there is no ontologically substantial difference between 
presentism and eternalism. It is argued that, of all recent formulations of 
presentism, it is only Existence Presentism that successfully asserts this 
difference and rebuts the sceptic. In asserting an identity between existence and 
presence, Existence Presentism is able to circumvent Meyer’s ‘presentist’s 
dilemma’ since the formulation of Existence Presentism is not a claim that can 
be countenanced by the eternalist.  
The most significant implication of Existence Presentism, from the standpoint of 
this thesis, is that it frees presentism from any metaphysical dependency on B-
series time. This has two consequences. First, it opens the door to a 
compatibilist account of presentism, since there is no need for the present to be 
identified with a unique, or privileged, B-series time. Second, since existence is 
no longer regarded as existence in time, or at a time, this offers the opportunity 
to develop an account under which B-series time is derivative of the structure of 
an objectively dynamic reality. This, though, leaves open several questions. In 
particular, the question of how an objectively dynamic reality might be 
modelled independently from (B-series) time. It also leaves open the question 
of the nature and role of tense (which, for the presentist, indicates something 
metaphysically fundamental about reality) and its connection with B-series 
time. These questions will be considered in Chapter 5, which proposes a 
suitable account of persistence and change within a model of Existence 




CHAPTER 5 – TAKING TENSE SERIOUSLY: A SUITABLE ACCOUNT OF 
PERSISTENCE AND CHANGE FOR EXISTENCE PRESENTISM  
5.1 Introduction 
The arguments in the preceding chapters motivate the position that a successful 
compatibilist account of presentism should be based upon the following key 
elements: 
EP:  an identification of the present with existence and a rejection of the 
idea of the present as a unique (B-series) time – ‘Existence Presentism’ 
(from Chapter 4); 
RS: a reductionist account of B-series time which reduces time to the 
structure of an objectively dynamic reality – a ‘reductionist 
structuralism’ (from Chapter 2).  
Both these commitments have implications for corresponding accounts of 
change and persistence. The task of this chapter is to formulate an account of 
each that best aligns with the compatibilist model of Existence Presentism 
under development. 
A recurring theme underpins the arguments of this chapter, this is that the 
presentist requires some means of modelling an objectively dynamic reality 
independently of B-series time. I refer to this as internalising those aspects of 
reality within the present. It is only by doing so that the presentist can avoid the 
standard McTaggartian problems associated with temporal ‘flow’ (§§ 1.4.1 & 
1.4.2) and side-step the ‘presentist’s dilemma’ (§ 4.3). Adequate formulations of 
persistence and change will prove key to achieving this goal. These will also 
form the foundation of an appropriate ontology for presentism (in Chapter 6), 
one which utilises categories appropriate to an objectively tensed reality. 
The arguments of this chapter will proceed along the following lines. After 
outlining the standard accounts of change and persistence (endurance and 
perdurance), I set out criteria for a suitable account of change and persistence, 
given the prior commitments of the Existence Presentist. I then argue, on the 
basis of these criteria, that neither of the standard accounts is suitable since 
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each is underpinned by the B-series time of eternalism. Even strictly tensed 
approaches to endurance (e.g., Zimmerman, 1998 and Baron, 2018) encounter 
problems; in particular, they fall foul of Lowe’s argument that transtemporal 
identity cannot be grounded without circularity. This, together with Tallant’s 
(2018) arguments, suggests that the Existence Presentist should abandon the 
idea that persistence is provided by transtemporal identity. Consequently, I 
argue that suitable accounts of persistence and real change should be informed 
by how it is that reality is objectively tensed. I do this through an assessment of 
the objective correlates of tense, and this indicates the mechanism needed to 
internalise the dynamic aspects of reality. This, in turn, motivates a 
reformulation of persistence as continuing existence and a re-definition of 
change in terms of objective creation and annihilation.  
In what follows, I refer to the Existence Presentist as a presentist who ‘takes 
tense seriously’,103 or is a ‘serious presentist’.104 In using this description, I 
mean that the Existence Presentist subscribes to both of the following theses: 
1. reality is objectively tensed, and 
2. the present is not a B-series time. 
Fine’s (2005, p. 299) distinction between ontic and factive presentism is 
relevant here. Ontic presentism is an ontological thesis about what there is.105 
Factive presentism is a metaphysical thesis concerning how things are.106 The 
Existence Presentist, as a ‘serious’ presentist, not only subscribes to the ontic 
claim (that only present things exist) but also asserts that tense reflects 
something ontologically fundamental about reality. As a result, ‘serious’ 
presentism, as well as asserting an ontologically restrictive thesis about what 
                                                        
103 Note that this usage of ‘taking tense seriously’ contrasts with that of Zimmerman (2005, p. 
405), who understands it as ‘an affirmation of the eliminability of temporally perspectival 
propositions’. Under the latter interpretation ‘taking tense seriously’ can be compatible with the 
commitments of the B-theorist. 
104 The description of a ‘serious presentist’ here contrasts with standard usage under which 
‘serious presentism’ is described as the view that objects can possess properties or stand in 
relations only at times at which they exist (e.g., Inman, 2012). 
105 In particular, ‘the view that only presently existing things are ‘real’ in some or another sense 
of the term’ (Fine, 2005, p. 298) 
106 In particular, ‘the view that reality is tensed’ (Ibid., p. 299) 
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there is, must also be a thesis about how things exist (in other words, that 
reality is objectively tensed). This position distinguishes the compatibilist, 
Existence Presentist from a presentist for whom the ontologically privileged 
present can be associated with a thin slice of spacetime, perhaps on the grounds 
of pursuing an alternative interpretation of STR.107  
5.2 The Standard Models of Change & Persistence – Endurance and 
Perdurance 
As described in Chapter 1, the standard accounts of persistence, endurance and 
perdurance, are geared towards providing a solution to the problem of 
temporary intrinsics. Both accounts aim to provide an understanding of how 
things can both stay the same over time (identity) and yet undergo real change 
(a change in intrinsic properties). The implied contradiction here arises from an 
inherent tension between the following two assumptions: 
(i) Persistence is numerical identity over time and numerical identity is 
provided for by Leibniz’s Law, namely: for all x and for all y, x and y are 
identical iff x and y are qualitatively indiscernible. 
(ii) Change is the possession of incompatible intrinsic properties at different 
times. 
Both endurance and perdurance use what I have referred to as ‘temporal 
indexation’ to circumvent the implied contradiction in any attribution of change 
to a persisting object. Further explanation of how temporal indexation works to 
ameliorate the problem of temporary intrinsics, under each model, is given in § 
1.5.1. 
Under endurance, persistence is given by numerical identity over time: an 
object is wholly present at each time at which it exists. ‘Wholly present’ is 
generally taken to mean devoid of temporal parts (Lowe, 1998) or existing in its 
‘entirety at one particular time, and ‘”no-when” else’ and ‘existing exclusively at 
                                                        
107 For example, Craig (2008) provides a comprehensive argument in favour of a Lorentzian 
(3+1D) interpretation of STR on both empirical and metaphysical grounds. Brown (2005) 
similarly adopts an alternative interpretation which regards relativistic kinematic effects as 
being dynamical in nature. 
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a particular time’ (Ingthorsson, 2009, p. 9). In order for entities to exist wholly 
and completely at each of the many times at which they exist, endurantism 
requires temporal movement, or passage. To avoid the problem of temporary 
intrinsics, statements about change require either the temporal indexation of 
the copula (e.g., A is-at-t1 F) or of the relevant predicate (e.g., A is F-at-t1).  
Under perdurance, there is no genuine identity over time. Rather, persistence is 
viewed as a relation between distinct temporal parts existing at different times. 
Under this model it is the object that is temporally indexed by treating it as a 
sum of temporal parts (e.g., A-at-t1 is F). This mechanism also avoids the 
contradiction arising from the problem of temporary intrinsics, since the 
incompatible properties are possessed by different entities (the different 
temporal parts). 
Though endurance and perdurance, through temporal indexation, successfully 
circumvent the problem of temporary intrinsics, neither is suitable for a 
compatibilist account of presentism. Prior to providing the reasons for this I 
first set out criteria for a suitable account in the following section.  
5.3 Preliminary Desiderata for a Suitable Account 
Endurantism and perdurantism are underpinned by common assumptions 
about change and persistence (outlined in (i) and (ii) above) and this signposts 
the problems to be encountered by a presentist model. First, change and 
persistence are both characterised by reference to different times. Yet, for the 
presentist, there is only a single moment, the present. Second, the proposal (RS, 
§5.1) that (space)time be seen as the structure of an objectively dynamic reality 
means that time is not metaphysically primitive.108 Such a position is in tension 
with the formulations of change and persistence under the standard accounts, 
where time bears the definitional burden. The separate commitments of 
presentism and compatibilism therefore motivate certain desiderata for a 
                                                        
108 As described in Chapter 2, I use the term ‘metaphysically primitive’ as shorthand for 
‘metaphysically independent of the existence of entities’. 
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suitable account of both persistence and change which I describe in the 
following two sections. 
5.3.1 Independence from B-Series Time 
The first criterion is that both persistence and change are formulated 
independently of B-series time. The reason for this is as follows. Under 
presentism only present things exist; consequently, that which exists must both 
persist and change in the present.109 Since, under the preferred formulation of 
presentism (Existence Presentism), the present is independent of any, and all, 
B-series times, change and persistence must be construed independently of B-
series time. This criterion is also consistent with the commitment to a 
compatibilist approach that views time as the structure of reality. The problems 
associated with emerging theories of quantum gravity (Chapter 2) motivate 
abandoning the view that time is metaphysically primitive, yet this view is a 
central assumption of the standard accounts of endurance and perdurance (as 
argued in Chapter 1). If time is not metaphysically primitive, then both change 
and persistence need to be formulated independently of time. The first 
desideratum is therefore as follows: 
(D1): Change and persistence are formulated independently of B-series 
time. 
5.3.2 ‘Real’ Metaphysical Change versus Temporal Variation 
The second criterion concerns change only. The Existence Presentist, as a 
‘serious presentist’, understands change in a fundamentally different way from 
the eternalist, and this is connected with their differing ontological 
commitments. In particular, the Existence Presentist subscribes to ‘real change’ 
and this is different from mere temporal variation, as the following explains. 
In Chapter 4 I argue that eternalism equates existence with occurrence at a 
particular spatiotemporal location and this aligns with a commitment to the 
ontological parity of past, present and future. This leads to an approach to 
                                                        




change that defines it in terms of a background, B-series time. Change is thereby 
metaphysically dependent on time and, since all times are ontologically 
equivalent, this has the consequence that change and objective becoming are 
expressed by temporal variation. Change, as temporal variation, is the 
instantiation of different properties at different temporal locations in a manner 
analogous to qualitative variation at different spatial locations. This means that 
descriptions such as ‘the poker is hot at time, t1 and cold at time, t2’ do not 
express a qualitative variation that is fundamentally different from descriptions 
that state it is ‘hot at one end’ and ‘cold at the other’, at a given time (Sider, 
2001, pp. 212-214). This is the ‘static’ view of change. 
This is not how the ‘serious’ presentist views change. Both Pezet (2017) and 
Tallant (2019, p. 13), amongst others, adopt the position that mere temporal 
variation is insufficient to provide for real change. They hold the presentist to 
subscribe to a view that the whole of what exists is objectively and continually 
changing, and it is this feature of reality that is captured by tense. Real change is 
not dependent upon spatiotemporal location and it is not different amounts of 
what there is at different temporal locations. Pezet describes such real change 
as ‘metaphysical change’ (2017, p. 1824), to distinguish it from temporal 
variation; as such ‘metaphysical change’ is denied by the eternalist.  
In order to guarantee a distinction, metaphysical change has to be described in 
a way that is not underpinned by a token reflexive account that references B-
series temporal indices. To achieve this Pezet disambiguates two senses of the 
existential quantifier. The fundamental, unrestricted quantifier, (∃As), 
represents ‘what there is as of now’, or the constitution of reality when it is now; 
this captures all of what there is. A more restricted quantifier, (∃At), which is 
derivative of ∃As, expresses ‘what there is at the now’, or what is temporally 
located at the now. Using these different senses of the quantifier allows an 
expression of change to be rendered into two forms, one of which is denied by 
the eternalist. Take, for example, the statement ‘there are now humans, but in 
the future there will be no humans’. According to Pezet this can be formalised in 
the following two ways: 
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 (1*) N (∃Atx(Hx)) & F (¬∃At y (Hy)) 
(1**)  N (∃Asx(Hx)) & F (¬∃As y (Hy)) 
(1*) as an expression of change can be accepted by both eternalists and 
presentists, but describes merely ‘temporal variation’.  This accounts for the 
sense in which both presentist and eternalists can agree with the statement ‘It 
is now the case that there is at the now a human, and it will be the case that 
there is not at then a human’ (Ibid, p.1824).  On the other hand, (1**) describes 
‘metaphysical change’, or real change, which is accepted by the presentist but 
denied by the eternalist. In the form (1**) the same expression of change (‘there 
are now humans, but in the future there will be no humans’) translates as ‘It is 
now the case that there is as of now a human, and it will be the case that there is 
not as of then a human’ (Ibid).  
Regardless of whether the formal expression of this distinction works, or not,110 
the idea captures an intuitive distinction in the way in which change is viewed 
by the presentist and the eternalist. In particular, for Pezet ‘metaphysical 
change presupposes that what there is or the way things are, is temporary, and 
that is just another way of saying that the italicised “is” and “are” are indeed 
tensed’ (Ibid, p. 1825). The ‘serious’ presentist - the presentist who subscribes 
to the position that reality is objectively tensed - should therefore additionally 
subscribe to the thesis of metaphysical change: 
(CM): The whole of what exists is changing 
To support this assertion, I provide an argument, in the following section, to 
show that the position that reality is objectively tensed implies metaphysical 
change. 
The concept of metaphysical change distinguishes the account of the ‘serious’ 
presentist not only from that of the eternalist, but also from other A-theorists 
who subscribe to a ‘dynamic’ account, such as Tooley (1997) and Button (2006). 
As Pezet notes, Tooley also employs the ‘as of’ modification but this still renders 
                                                        




change in terms of the relativisation of permanent facts to their temporal 
locations and, in this sense, it is not significantly different from the temporal 
variation of the eternalist. A key characteristic of metaphysical change is that 
the temporal, or dynamic, aspects of reality should be internalised rather than 
made relative to an external, B-series time, and it is this that will be used later in 
providing a definition of change suitable for the Existence Presentist. 
Therefore, the second criterion for a suitable account of change is that it is 
consistent with ‘real’, metaphysical change rather than merely temporal 
variation: 
(D2): The definition of change is consistent with ‘real’ metaphysical 
change (CM). 
5.3.3 Taking Tense Seriously Implies that there is Metaphysical 
Change 
Having established two criteria for a suitable account of change and persistence, 
given the commitments (EP and RS) of the compatibilist presentist, in the 
remainder of this chapter I develop these accounts. Prior to this, I follow on 
from the suggestion made in the previous section that the ‘serious’ presentist 
should subscribe to the thesis of metaphysical change. This was motivated by 
the intuition that metaphysical change is that feature of reality that is captured 
by tense. Here I provide an argument for a more formal connection, namely, 
that metaphysical change is implied if reality is objectively tensed. 
The ‘serious’ presentist, i.e., the presentist who also ‘takes tense seriously’, 
subscribes to the view that reality is objectively tensed; this is the view that:111 
(T1): Reality exemplifies passage: for all concrete entities, ,  is present 
implies  was future and will be past. 
                                                        
111 It is accepted that the scope of T1 does not apply to the existence of the first and last 
moments of a finite universe, if that universe is created from nothing and annihilates to nothing. 
However, such a position generates serious metaphysical problems of its own. Under an 
alternative, multiverse theory (such as that propounded by Mersini-Houghton, 2008) the first 
and last moment of our universe may be seen as having a causally grounded ‘past’ and ‘future’, 
but in the sense of ‘states’, rather than ‘times’. 
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Under Existence Presentism (§ 4.8) an identity is asserted between existence 
and presence, and so all that exists is necessarily present: 
 (T2): The whole of what exists is present 
From T1 and T2 it follows that: 
 (T3): The whole of what exists was future and will be past 
A definition of change appropriate to a compatibilist account of Existence 
Presentism will be provided in § 5.8. In advance of this, it merely needs to be 
noted that change, for the reasons given above, needs to be formulated 
independently of B-series time. It also appears that some form of 
incompatibility condition seems essential to change, together with a notion of 
transition. In advance of further analysis, the following is offered as a working 
description of change, although it is admittedly short of being a definition: 
 (T4): Change involves transition between incompatible states. 
From (T3) and (T4) it can be seen that the thesis of metaphysical change 
follows: 
 (TM): The whole of what exists is changing. 
The thesis of metaphysical change is therefore implied under any presentist 
account that, like Existence Presentism, takes tense seriously. 
5.4 The Unsuitability of the Standard Accounts of Persistence 
I describe in this section how the standard accounts of persistence fail to meet 
the proposed desiderata since both are underpinned by the B-series time of 
eternalism. I then consider claims that a strictly tensed approach to endurance 
(e.g. Zimmerman, 1998, Haslanger, 2003 and Baron, 2018) might work for the 
presentist. Arguments from both Tallant (2018) and Lowe (1998) suggest that 
these fail. The assumption that persistence should be underpinned by 
transtemporal identity is the source of these problems. Consequently, an 




5.4.1 The Unsuitability of Perdurantism for the Presentist 
Perdurantism, while it offers ‘neat solutions to metaphysical problems’ 
(Ingthorsson, 2009, p. 4), is unsuitable for the compatibilist presentist. This is 
because it satisfies neither of the criteria, D1 and D2. In what follows I use 
Tallant’s arguments to show that perdurance is contrary to D1, since it implies 
the existence of non-present times. I then argue that perdurance is also 
incompatible with real, metaphysical change (D2).  
Perdurantism, at first glance, certainly appears to run counter to presentism.112 
Since, under presentism, the past and future do not exist there can be no other 
temporal location available for different temporal parts to occupy. Indeed, 
notable presentists, such as Prior (1958), Geach (1972) and Chisholm (1976) 
reject the notion of temporal parts. Tallant (2018) provides an argument to 
support this conclusion on the basis that perdurance commits the presentist to 
‘transtemporal identity dependencies’ for which they lack the requisite 
ontological bases.  
Tallant argues that under perdurance the identity of the persisting whole 
depends upon its having each of the temporal parts as a mereological part. 
Tallant’s argument utilises a notion of identity dependence from Lowe, outlined 
in Tahko and Lowe (2016), that is defined as follows: 
x depends for its identity upon y =df There is a function f such that it is 
part of the essence of x that x is f(y) (2016, § 4.2).  
In the case of perdurance the candidate function, f, is ‘having y as a (temporal) 
part’. Since not all of the temporal parts are presently existing, the persistent 
whole can at most be the sum of what presently exists. Yet the temporal part 
that presently exists changes with time and, as a consequence, ‘there is no 
persistence over time, since the identity of the sum changes over time’ (Tallant, 
2018, §3.1). Non-existent temporal parts cannot, for Tallant, constitute the 
                                                        
112 Nonetheless, attempts have been made to combine presentism and perdurantism. Brogaard 
(2000) attempts such a feat: objects persist by possessing temporal parts but each only exists in 
the present moment. Lombard (1999) adopts a similar approach. Benovsky (2007) objects that 
a persisting entity cannot be composed of non-existent temporal parts. 
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identity of an existing sum. He illustrates this with the example of a heap of 
stones: the identity of the heap, qua mereological sum, can only be fixed by 
those stones that exist, and that are parts of the heap. 
Tallant anticipates a counter-argument that relies upon asserting a distinction 
between temporal and spatial wholes.113 This argument claims that temporal 
wholes can be distinguished from spatial wholes in virtue of the fact that they 
are not dependent upon the existence of each of their (temporal) parts. Tallant 
accepts that a distinction can be drawn between temporal and spatial parts, but 
that this is irrelevant to the argument. His argument centres on the 
dependencies in play between mereological parts and wholes, irrespective of 
the nature of the whole. It is in the nature of a mereological whole that its 
identity is determined by the existence of its parts and this is true irrespective 
of whether one considers, for example, spatial parts, ‘conceptual parts’, 
‘spiritual parts’ or ‘logical parts’ (Ibid, §4.4). If Tallant’s argument succeeds, 
perdurantism is unsuitable for a compatibilist presentist model since it implies 
the existence of times other than the present. 
Perdurantism is also incompatible with real change. Real change, as 
represented by the thesis of metaphysical change (CM), requires that the whole 
of what exists is objectively and continually changing. Under perdurance, the 
problem of temporary intrinsics is resolved by rendering the object into distinct 
temporal parts, each of which possesses an incompatible intrinsic property. As a 
consequence, the object, as a whole, does not possess its (incompatible) 
properties and so it is not the object, as a whole, that changes its shape. Under 
perdurance, change is, rather, temporal variation; change just is different 
entities (temporal parts) possessing different, incompatible properties.114 
                                                        
113 For example, Brogaard’s (2000) argument relies upon such a distinction. 
114 It is conceded that this criticism is applicable only where perdurantism is combined with 
eternalism. Some (e.g., Lombard, 1999 and Brogaard, 2000) have argued that perdurantism can 
be compatible with presentism. Lombard argues that events (which presumably should be 
accommodated within a presentist ontology) are temporal parts. If the present consists wholly 
of temporal parts this is compatible with real, metaphysical change since the whole of what 
exists is changing, as the different temporal parts come in and out of existence. However, events 
exist by occurring and are thereby themselves changes, rather than existing as persisting entities 
that undergo changes. Such a presentist perdurantist model could arguably not account for 
persisting entities that undergo changes. 
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Lombard (2010) regards this as ‘simulated’ change, in the way in which a series 
of still photographs simulates change. The temporal parts, of themselves, are 
essentially changeless components. If perdurance is combined, as it frequently 
is, with a tenseless view of time, change is reduced to a conjunction of 
changeless entities: change becomes mere (temporal) variation. As Mellor 
(1998, p. 71) notes:  
If a poker is hot at 2.15 and cold at 3.15, then those always were and 
always will be its temperatures at those times […] So if, as everyone 
agrees, coexistence rules out change in the spatial case, how can it be 
compatible with change in time? 
Perdurance therefore fails to meet both criteria, D1 and D2, for a suitable 
account of persistence under a compatibilist presentism. 
5.4.2 The Unsuitability of Endurantism for the Presentist 
Endurantism is undoubtedly the model of persistence that is most naturally 
associated with presentism (and indeed any tensed theory of time)115 in the 
sense that things are wholly present whenever they exist. Presentism makes it 
easier to preserve what Haslanger (2003) refers to as the ‘proper subject 
condition’ of endurantism. This is the intuition that it is the whole object that 
possesses its associated properties and the whole object that both changes and 
persists. Despite this, it is argued here that endurantism, though often seen as 
the natural bedfellow for presentism, also satisfies neither D1 nor D2. 
Tallant’s (2018) argument, considered above, also extends to endurantism, 
which means that endurantism fails to satisfy D1 because it commits the 
presentist to the existence of non-present (B-series) times. Under endurantism, 
persistence is given by numerical identity over time: any object is wholly 
present at each time at which it exists. This being so, Tallant applies Lowe’s 
notion of identity dependence once again. In this case, he argues, the relevant 
                                                        
115 Carter and Hestevold (1994), Loux (1998), Lowe (1998), Benovsky (2007) and Baron (2018) 
maintain such a stance. Merricks (1999) provides an argument that the existence of enduring 
objects implies presentism. This does not mean, however, that presentism implies an endurance 
account of persistence. 
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function, f, for endurance has to be ‘being an existent at times other than t’ (Ibid, 
§ 3.3). Since persistence is distinguishable from instantaneous existence, the 
identity of the persisting entity, qua persisting entity, is consequently (identity) 
dependent upon the existence of the whole entity at multiple times. Existence at 
multiple times is incompatible with presentism and, therefore, so is 
endurantism.  
Tallant further maintains that the presentist strategy of employing presently 
existing surrogates as the relevant truthmakers for past tensed claims is of no 
help in rehabilitating endurance. This is because presently existing surrogates 
exist only in the present, yet endurance, construed as transtemporal identity, 
requires temporal location at more than one time. The identity of a present 
object is dependent upon its being wholly present at each time at which it 
exists; yet, for the presentist, there is no other temporal moment at which an 
object is wholly present other than the present moment. 
The second problem is that endurantism is also incompatible with real change, 
and so fails to satisfy D2. As perdurantism temporally indexes the object, so 
endurantism temporally indexes properties, in order to avoid the problem of 
temporary intrinsics. Under endurantism, the candle is considered ‘straight-at-t’ 
rather than just straight simpliciter.  
This temporal relativisation of properties, although preserving numerical 
identity, means that an entity has all its temporally-indexed properties at all 
times. As Seibt (2007) notes, this means that the candle is always straight-at-t1 
and bent-at-t2. This runs contrary to the requirement of providing for real 
change. Assume that t2 is present. To provide for real, metaphysical change 
endurance must account for the fact that now, at t2 (and no-when else), the 
whole candle is changing. Yet there appears to be nothing to which the 
endurantist can appeal in order to do this. The endurantist cannot appeal to a 
difference in the candle’s properties since the properties it possesses now 
(being straight-at-t1 and bent-at-t2) are identical to those it had at t1 even 
though it was not changing at t1. It appears that the very mechanism introduced 
to avoid a contradiction between identity and change (temporal indexation) 
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preserves numerical identity at the expense of real change since the 
incompatibility condition of change is lost. If there is no incompatibility in 
properties with which to appeal, it is unclear in what respect the whole of what 
exists (assuming there is just the candle) can be said to be changing. 
To conclude, both endurantism and perdurantism fail to satisfy each of the 
requirements on an appropriate account of persistence for the compatibilist 
Existence Presentist. Both commit the presentist to the existence of times other 
than the present and both are inadequate in accounting for ‘real’ metaphysical 
change. 
5.4.3 The Underlying Problem – an Eternalist View of Time 
Tallant’s (2018) argument works against both endurantism and perdurantism 
because it targets the common central assumption that persistence is identity 
over time. This assumption conflicts with presentism because it requires 
transtemporal identity dependencies to hold: these, in turn, imply the existence 
of times other than the present. Both models of persistence are therefore 
underpinned by the B-series time of eternalism and this is why neither can 
provide a suitable account of persistence for the presentist. 
Hinchliff (1996) argues to a similar conclusion: it is the assumption of an 
eternalist view of time, common to both endurantism and perdurantism, that 
gives rise to the problem of temporary intrinsics. The possession of 
incompatible properties by one and the same entity only appears to give rise to 
a contradiction where all times are considered to be ontologically on a par. 
Change is the possession of incompatible properties at different times. 
However, if those different times are ontologically indistinguishable, and exist 
on a par, then one and the same object possesses incompatible properties, and a 
contradiction ensues. Indeed, it was Lewis (1986a, p. 204) himself who 
originally conceded that presentism does not, as such, suffer from the problem 
of temporary intrinsics. No contradiction arises for the presentist since ‘the only 
intrinsic properties of a thing are those it has at the present moment’, and so the 
possession of incompatible intrinsic properties just does not arise. Nonetheless, 
Lewis’ fatal blow is that the presentist escapes the problem of temporary 
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intrinsics precisely because they fail to allow for persistence at all and this is 
because presentism does not allow for different times at which entities can be 
wholly present. 
Such problems reinforce the requirement that a presentist model of persistence 
should be formulated independently of B-series time (criterion D1), in order to 
avoid a commitment to times other than the present. Further, if by ‘taking tense 
seriously’ the presentist does circumvent the problem of temporary intrinsics, 
as Hinchliff (1996) suggests, this indicates the potential route to achieving an 
appropriate account of persistence, one that is completely independent of B-
series time. Indeed, it is sometimes claimed that by ‘taking tense seriously’ the 
presentist can account for both persistence and ‘real’ change, and such claims 
will be reviewed in the following section. I argue that these approaches are 
unsuccessful because they fail to achieve complete independence from B-series 
time, and this is rooted in a failure to abandon the notion that persistence 
should be grounded in transtemporal identity. 
5.4.4 No Problems for the (Serious) Presentist? 
There are several responses to Lewis’ (1986a) claim that the presentist, 
although not succumbing to the problem of temporary intrinsics, cannot 
account for persistence. The strategies have in common a focus on formulating 
persistence in strictly tensed terms.  
Zimmerman (1998) counters Lewis’ charge against presentism by arguing that 
persistence does not require the existence of more than one time, but only that 
other times will exist and did exist at which the entity will be, or was, wholly 
present. Thus, the candle is wholly present now, was wholly present at a prior 
time and will be wholly present at a future moment. This is how he sees the 
(serious) presentist as accounting for persistence. Similarly, Haslanger (2003) 
challenges the claim that the presentist is ontologically under-resourced to 
provide for the persistence of the candle. Such a position, she argues, merely 
begs the question against the presentist by assuming that a tenseless 
framework is required to provide the necessary truthmakers: ‘The fact that the 
candle was straight is a present (past-tensed) fact about it’ (2003, p.340). 
135 
 
This approach, as it stands, still falls foul of Tallant’s argument (§ 5.4.1). The 
argument is that the presentist cannot account for persistence, even using 
tensed truthmakers, when persistence is defined in terms of transtemporal 
identity dependence (as it is under both standard models). This is because any 
sort of identity dependence requires that the constituents of that dependence 
relation are existent entities: 
my concern is that there is a trans-temporal identity dependence: a 
dependence of the present object upon the past. Identity dependence 
consists in there being a function that takes (at least) one entity as an 
input and generates an output. Lowe’s (2010: §4) example is a useful 
reminder: the function ‘being the marriage of’ takes an input from two 
(existing) people and gives us the identity of the marriage. Simply, then: 
what kind of function is saturated by a now past, non-existent entity? 
There is no obvious response. (Tallant, 2018, § 4.2) 
The transtemporal identity function at work under the standard models of 
persistence serves to locate the persisting object at multiple times. Tallant does 
not disagree with Haslanger’s point that this assumes an eternalist framework: 
rather, it is precisely this that makes both endurantism and perdurantism 
incompatible with presentism. 
Endurance (e.g.) analyses persistence as a matter of O’s being wholly 
present at a range of times. It does not analyse persistence in terms of it 
being true that O was wholly present at a range of times. (Tallant, 2018, § 
4.1) 
Tallant’s argument indicates that seeking to adopt a tensed formulation of 
either endurance or perdurance, as they stand, will be unsuccessful. What 
seems to be required is a completely different formulation of persistence, one 
that is, nonetheless, consistent with an objectively tensed reality. This is the 
approach attempted by Baron (2018). 
Baron (2018) suggests that Tallant’s argument itself assumes a tenseless (or 
‘locative’) definition of endurance (‘wholly located at a range of times, t’) as well 
as a tenseless rendition of Lowe’s identity function. By rigorous application of a 
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tensed approach to both, Baron argues that transtemporal identity can be made 
consistent with a model that is endurantist in spirit. He redefines endurance in 
tensed terms (which he refers to as ‘tensed locative endurance’, TEL): 
An object O endures from the past to the present iff O is wholly located in 
the present and either O was wholly located at some time in the past 
when that time existed or O will be located at some time in the future 
when that time comes into existence. (2018, p.5) 
He argues that this is consistent with Lowe’s concept of identity dependence, 
provided the latter is given in terms of a tensed function (f*) which had as an 
argument a past entity when that entity was present, rather than, on a tenseless 
construal, constraining the presentist to locate a past time to stand as the 
argument in the function: 
In short, then, the nefarious presentist can say the following: an entity 
endures when it has a location now (by f∗) and had a location in the past 
(by f∗), where this latter fact is delivered by the nefarious strategy of 
cheating116 (2018, p.9). 
Since, under Baron’s redefinition of endurance, a persisting object is not located 
at multiple times, the non-existence of past times has no impact on the 
effectiveness of Lowe’s function. Here, Lowe’s function takes only the present 
time, rather than multiple times, as an argument and so does not succeed in 
locating the object at multiple times. Yet it succeeds in capturing the sense in 
which persistence involves being wholly located at each moment at which an 
object exists. 
Although Baron’s strategy appears to bypass the difficulties presented by 
Tallant’s argument, he maintains the core tenet of the standard accounts that 
persistence has to be provided by transtemporal identity. Consequently, it is not 
                                                        
116 The ‘nefarious strategy of cheating’ (after Tallant and Ingram, 2015) refers to grounding (or 
constituting) facts about the past ‘in virtue of’ how the past was, in a non-ontologically 
committing manner. Thus, facts about the past (and, similarly, singular propositions) are 
constituted by entities that used to exist, but do not exist now. 
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clear that his formulation of persistence can succeed; I provide the reasons for 
this in the following section. 
5.4.5 The Need to Abandon Transtemporal Identity 
The assumption that persistence is numerical identity over time lies at the heart 
of the problem of temporary intrinsics, as noted in § 5.2. This assumption can be 
traced to the, now definitive, quotation from Lewis which provides the standard 
notion of persistence: 
Let us say that something persists iff, somehow or other, it exists at 
various times; this is the neutral word: Something perdures iff it persists 
by having different temporal parts, or stages, at different times […] 
whereas it endures iff it persists by being wholly present at more than 
one time (1986a, p. 202) 
According to Lewis, persistence, as the ‘neutral word’, assumes that one and the 
same continuant exists ‘at various times’, and so implicitly assumes that 
persistence has to be a matter of some kind of transtemporal identity 
dependency.  Accounting for persistence thereby becomes a binary choice 
between endurantism and perdurantism, which, as we have seen, prejudices, at 
the outset, the development of a suitable presentist account of persistence. 
It is the notion of existence ‘at various times’ that is unsuitable for the Existence 
Presentist, even when formulated in strictly tensed terms, as attempted by 
Baron. Baron’s definition of ‘tensed locative endurance’ (§ 5.4.4) maintains the 
concept of transtemporal identity dependence in so far as O’s continuing 
identity depends upon its ‘being wholly located in the present’ and having been 
‘wholly located at some time in the past when that time existed’ (Baron, 2018, 
p.5). 
As noted previously (§ 5.3), for the Existence Presentist the present is 
independent of any, and all, B-series times. The present is not a B-series time. 
On the assumption that the Existence Presentist also subscribes to objective 
temporal passage, this implies that neither the past nor the future can be 
constituted by B-series times that previously existed, or are yet to exist, 
138 
 
respectively. If they were, temporal passage would equate to the movement of 
the present along such a series of B-times, in a manner akin to the Moving 
Spotlight model (as described by Broad, 1923, p.59); yet this is not a model to 
which  the Existence Presentist does, or can, subscribe.117 If the past is not a 
time, or set of times, that previously existed then a presently existing entity 
cannot, contra Baron (2018, p.5), have been ‘wholly located at a time in the past 
when that time existed’. There was nothing at which an entity can have been 
located and so the persistence of an entity from past to present cannot be based 
upon a prior temporal location, however strict the tensed construal of that 
location. 
There is a further argument from Lowe which suggests that Baron’s approach 
cannot succeed. Lowe (1998, pp. 110-114) questions whether persistence (as 
endurance) can be successfully accounted for in terms of transtemporal 
identity. Transtemporal identity, as continuing identity through time, grounds 
the identity of an entity in spatiotemporal continuity. Lowe argues that 
spatiotemporal continuity is not sufficient to provide an identity criterion for, 
say, one given tomato, as opposed to two distinct tomatoes that occupy the 
same spatiotemporal area, without presupposing that the instantiation refers to 
one and the same tomato. In other words, spatiotemporal continuity 
presupposes the identity conditions it is seeking to describe. Lowe anticipates 
the potential retort that the impenetrability of material objects provides the 
means to distinguish the two cases. He argues that the impenetrability of 
material objects itself presupposes that the object concerned is a persisting 
entity. Impenetrability arises because concrete objects are material objects, and 
matter excludes other matter from occupying the same spatiotemporal region. 
The capacity for impenetrability thus arises only in virtue of the fact that 
material objects are persisting entities: ‘only a thing of a persisting kind can 
exercise a capacity to exclude another thing from the place it occupies’ (2001, p. 
                                                        
117 Under the Moving Spotlight Model, the present is seen as a property possessed by an 
objectively privileged moment of time. The present changes by the movement of this property 
along a series of times in a manner similar to a ‘moving spotlight’ which shines a light on the 
given, privileged moment of time that denotes the present. As such, the model succumbs to 
McTaggart’s argument where temporal change conceived as movement relative to B-series 
indices generates either contradiction or vicious infinite regress. 
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113). Consequently, the capacity for impenetrability cannot underpin the 
identity of the object without circularity, and it is not clear what other potential 
candidates there might be. This leads Lowe to conclude that continuing identity 
is primitive (2001, p. 121-125). 
Lowe’s argument is significant because it is a more general argument that 
persistence cannot be grounded in transtemporal identity, at all, without 
circularity. The focus of Tallant’s argument is that both endurance and 
perdurance (because they rely upon transtemporal identity) commit the 
presentist to non-present times. Rather than accepting that there is no model of 
persistence compatible with presentism, Lowe’s argument suggests we should 
challenge the assumption that persistence has to be given in terms of 
transtemporal identity. If an appropriate formulation of persistence is not to be 
underpinned by transtemporal identity dependencies, the presentist requires 
alternative grounds on which to construct an account. 
In locating an alternative ground for persistence, it is apparent that the 
presentist should maintain a strictly tensed approach since, by doing so, they 
avoid the problem of temporary intrinsics. This leads to the thought that the 
presentist should look to the objective correlates of tense to provide the 
requisite grounds upon which to model both persistence and real, metaphysical 
change. This line of enquiry is pursued in the following section. 
5.5 The Objective Correlates of Tense 
Identifying the objective correlates of tense requires a clear analysis of the 
notion of objective passage as the starting point.  
For the serious presentist that which exists is present, but also, that which 
exists was future and will be past.118 What is present is therefore transient or 
temporary. This, by itself, however, is insufficient to characterise objective 
passage. If the present were just characterised by transience this would be 
consistent with the present being instantaneous. Yet the present is not 
instantaneous; an instantaneous present would not exhibit objective passage. 
                                                        
118 Excepting first and last moments. 
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Rather, the present (as existence) itself continues on and, in doing so, it also 
exemplifies an essential continuity. This suggests that the concept of objective 
passage actually encompasses two different aspects of reality: the present 
exemplifies both transience and continuity. That which exists (and so 
constitutes the present) is transient, but the present (as existence) itself 
continues on. The objective correlates of tense are therefore twofold: transience 
and continuity. It is through the combination of these two aspects of reality that 
the present is intrinsically dynamic, it is in this way that the present ‘flows’. The 
challenge for the presentist is therefore to construe these two objective 
correlates of tense (and so objective passage) independently of B-series time, 
and so internalise them within the present.  
If transience and continuity are accepted as the objective correlates of tense 
then, at first glance, there is an intuitive alignment between persistence and 
continuity, on the one hand, and real change and transience, on the other. In the 
following sections I develop the case that this alignment permits the presentist 
to reformulate both persistence and change, in strictly tensed terms, so as to 
satisfy the original criteria, D1 and D2. Doing so succeeds in internalising the 
dynamic aspects of reality (indicated by tense) and so provides an account of 
objective becoming which does not succumb to the usual McTaggartian 
problems of contradiction and infinite regress (§ 1.4). 
5.6 A Reformulation of Persistence 
In this section I follow Lowe (1998) in adopting the position that continuing 
identity is primitive. I argue that this allows persistence to be construed in a 
manner that aligns with one of the objective correlates of tense, namely, 
continuity. 
Abandoning the notion that persistence is provided by transtemporal identity, 
or identity over time, does not mean that we should forgo a strictly tensed-
based approach towards an adequate conception of persistence. In particular, I 
suggest that the following might be offered as a starting point: 




This meets criterion D1 in that it is formulated independently of B-series time 
and so is consistent with Existence Presentism. It is also consistent with the 
commitments of the ‘serious’ presentist, the presentist who subscribes to the 
view that reality is objectively tensed. What the formulation lacks, though, is 
something that guarantees, or grounds, the continuing identity of O from the 
past to the present, or from the present to the future. 
I follow Lowe’s lead in adopting the position that continuing identity is 
primitive; this would seem to make sense for the Existence Presentist. Such a 
presentist cannot define continuing identity in terms of B-series times, and 
Lowe’s argument further suggests there are no other candidates to feature in 
the definiens. If continuing identity is primitive it does not, however, follow that 
there is nothing more to persistence, or that persistence is ungrounded. 
The initial attempt at a strictly tensed construal of persistence given above (P1) 
indicates that, for the ‘serious’ presentist, persistence is grounded in the fact 
that reality is objectively tensed. Since, under Existence Presentism, an identity 
is asserted between presence and existence it follows that P1 can be restated as: 
P2: An object O persists iff O exists and either, O existed, or, O will exist 
If the continuing identity of O is taken as primitive, or ungrounded, then the O 
that presently exists is numerically identical with either the O that has existed, 
or, the O that will exist. In which case we can expand on P2 and state that the 
persistence of O just is its continuing existence. This suggests that a suitable 
definition of persistence under an Existence Presentist account is as follows: 
DefPS: Persistence = def continuity of existence 
This reformulation of persistence is both consistent with Existence Presentism 
and captures what is intuitive under the endurance model. It expresses the 
notion that it is the whole entity that is temporally continuous, without 
requiring existence at different times. The continuing existence of entities does 
not require them to be located with respect to any external time series. To this 
extent DefPS is also suitable for a compatibilist model of Existence Presentism 
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that denies a place in its ontology for external, substantival time, but one that 
views B-series time, in reductionist terms, as the structure of reality. 
DefPS also avoids the principal disadvantage of endurantism. In § 5.2 it was 
noted that, in order for entities to exist wholly and completely at each of the 
many times at which they exist, endurantism requires temporal movement, or 
passage. It is difficult to formalise this other than as movement with respect to 
B-series time, and this embroils the presentist in McTaggart-style problems of 
contradiction or vicious regress.  
In § 5.5 I argued that the objective correlates of tense are transience and 
continuity. Formulating persistence as continuity of existence not only provides 
a means of providing for persistence in strictly tensed terms (independently of 
B-series times), it also aligns persistence with one of the two objective 
correlates of tense: continuity. Construing persistence as continuing existence 
therefore also ensures that one of the temporal aspects of existence (associated 
with objective passage) becomes internalised, rather than indexed against an 
external, B-series time. This also makes sense for the Existence Presentist; that 
which exists persists in the present and it does so, not by existing at different 
times, but by continuing to exist in the present. For the Existence Presentist this 
is a strictly tensed construal of persistence. 
If persistence aligns with one of the objective correlates of tense this would 
suggest that real, metaphysical change should be grounded in the other, namely, 
transience. That which exists undergoes real, metaphysical change in the 
present and, if metaphysical change is also to be formulated independently of B-
series times (in other words, internalised in the present) then the notion of 
transience potentially provides the mechanism to achieve this. The following 
sections will be concerned with developing a suitably compatible model of 
change. 
5.7 Towards a Suitable Account of Change 
The standard accounts of persistence adopt a common conception of change (as 
noted in § 5.2): namely, that change is the possession of incompatible intrinsic 
properties at different times. This assumption, together with a shared, Lewisian, 
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view of persistence (as ‘existence at various times’) underpins the problem of 
temporary intrinsics. Such an account of change is not suitable for the 
presentist. 
The guiding principles for a suitable account of change, D1 and D2, require that 
change is characterised independently of B-series time, and that its formulation 
is consistent with the thesis of metaphysical change (CM). In addition, § 5.3.3 
indicates that the thesis of metaphysical change is implied by the position that 
reality is objectively tensed. This suggests as an initial hypothesis that, as with 
persistence, a suitable formulation of change for the presentist is one 
underpinned by the fact that reality is objectively tensed. The route to providing 
a satisfactory definition of change requires several steps. First, I distinguish the 
semantic from the metaphysical problem of temporary intrinsics and suggest a 
semantic solution that does not entail unsatisfactory metaphysical 
consequences for the presentist. This solution permits the presentist to 
circumvent the metaphysical problem. Understanding how this mechanism 
works confirms the hypothesis that real change is underpinned by ‘transience’, 
one of the two objective correlates of tense. In particular, equating an 
objectively tensed reality with one exemplifying continual creation and 
annihilation allows real, metaphysical change to be formulated independently 
of B-series times, and so internalised within the present. 
5.7.1 The Semantic versus the Metaphysical Problem 
The definition of change assumed within the standard models of persistence 
incorporates the idea that change depends upon, or occurs in, time, and seems 
to be a deeply entrenched notion. This is, I think, in part due to our reluctance to 
abandon the classical, Newtonian picture of reality, which retains its strongly 
intuitive appeal in our day to day lives, despite scientific evidence that it is not 
true. This is further supported by the mathematical representation of change 
within scientific theory. It is clear that we describe change, in subject-predicate 
terms, as incompatible properties at different times. However, the presentist 
needs to distinguish the semantic problem of change, concerning how change is 
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modelled or described, from the metaphysical problem of what change is 
ontologically. 
The need to draw a distinction between change, as it is ontologically, from the 
way in which change is described, or modelled, is supported by Lowe’s (1998) 
distinction between the semantic and the metaphysical problem of temporary 
intrinsics. The semantic problem concerns the potential contradiction that 
arises from the logical form of sentences used to ascribe temporary intrinsic 
properties to persisting subjects. Such statements take the form ‘a is F at t1’ and 
‘a is G at t2’ where F and G are incompatible predicates ascribed to one and the 
same object, a. The metaphysical problem, in contrast, concerns the matter of 
how reality is such that we can ascribe change (as the possession of 
incompatible properties) to objects without contradiction. 
Change construed (metaphysically) as different properties at different (B-
series) times is not only unsuitable for a presentist account, it is also 
incompatible with our best physical theories. The problem of time in quantum 
gravity (Chapter 2) suggests that strict adherence to background independence 
presents severe problems for the idea of time as something external and 
substantival. Instead, I argue (§ 2.6.4) that a reductionist structuralist account 
of time119 provides a better fit. This means that change and physical evolution, 
construed as different properties, or physical observables, at different times are 
ruled out. Even the static, B-series conception of change is compromised 
precisely because ‘no genuine physical magnitude takes on different values at 
different times’ (Earman, 2002, pp. 2-3). This already provides an indication 
that change needs to be fundamentally re-modelled, in a manner that achieves 
independence from B-series time, and this can only benefit a compatibilist 
account of Existence Presentism. By adopting a reductionist model of B-series 
time, the presentist can accept the reality of B-series relations and agree that 
the B-series (as the time of science) is sufficient for modelling and predicating 
                                                        
119 The proposed reductionist structuralist account regards spacetime as the structure of an 
objectively dynamic reality, at a fundamental level this is constituted by a dynamic energy-
momentum field. It is argued in Chapter 2 that this provides the best interpretation of GTR to 
resolve the problems presented by Quantum Gravity. 
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‘real’ change. Yet, they can also maintain that this is not what change is 
ontologically, or objectively in the world. 
The first step in formulating a suitable account of change is to adopt an 
alternative solution to the semantic problem of temporary intrinsics, one that 
has a better metaphysical alignment with presentism. This is the subject of the 
following subsection. 
5.7.2 ‘Is-at-t’: The Appropriate Solution to the Semantic Problem 
Of Lewis’ three proposed solutions to the semantic problem of temporary 
intrinsics, Lowe considers ‘a is-at-t F’ (Lewis’ solution (ii)) as the one best able 
to avoid embroiling ‘the semantics of common-sense talk in metaphysical 
controversy’ (2001, p.133). He sees the endurantist and perdurantist solutions 
as ‘revisionary’ with respect to predicates and ‘revisionary’ with respect to 
subjects, respectively. 
In what follows I suggest that the ‘is-at-t’ solution provides a better 
metaphysical alignment with a tensed conception of reality; it also allows the 
presentist to circumvent the metaphysical problem of how reality is, such that 
we can ascribe change to objects (as the possession of incompatible properties) 
without contradiction. Understanding how this is achieved suggests the route to 
an appropriate formulation of change. 
Lowe (1998, p.133) interprets the ‘is-at-t’ solution in terms of a two-place 
relation between the ‘having of a property’ and a ‘time’. This interpretation, 
however, is not suitable for the Existence Presentist; interpreting ‘is-at-t’ in 
terms of a two-place relation incurs a separation between the ‘having of a 
property’ and a given ‘time’. This separation brings with it the implication that 
time is substantival which is unsuitable for all the reasons given previously.120 
                                                        
120 These reasons (discussed elsewhere) are as follows. First, substantival time is unsupported 
by our best physical theories (§ 2.6) and so the presentist should avoid it on compatibilist 
grounds. Second, McTaggart-style problems arise when temporal movement or transition, 
characteristic of tensed reality, is represented as movement with respect to an external time (§§ 
1.4.1 & 1.4.2). Third, since all change, necessarily, occurs in the present, change must be 
formulated independently of B-series time (§ 5.3.1, D1). 
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Consequently, formulating change with respect to an external, background time 
is to be avoided. 
Since for the Existence Presentist the present is not a unique, B-series time (§ 
4.8), ‘is-at-t’ cannot be interpreted as temporal indexation – as indexing the 
copula to an external, B-series time - in a manner analogous to the temporal 
indexation of subject and predicate under the standard accounts. Rather, ‘is-at-t’ 
requires a strictly tensed interpretation. As noted previously (§ 5.4.3), it is only 
by doing so that the presentist is able to avoid the contradiction of temporary 
intrinsics. A strictly tensed interpretation works purely on the basis that the 
‘having’ of properties is a ‘just having’, or a ‘having simpliciter’. The having of 
properties is therefore a case of primitive predication, instantiated only in the 
present: the candle ‘just has’ the property of being bent (now). Such primitive 
predication also applies to both the past and future cases, but in these cases it is 
modified by the relevant tense operator (‘the candle just had straightness’). The 
strictly tensed interpretation of ‘a is-at-t F’ must therefore be a relation of 
instantiation between the object, a, and a property, F (a ‘having simpliciter’), 
contrary to Lowe’s interpretation of a two-place relation between the ‘having of 
a property’ and a ‘time’. 
Interpreted in the manner described, ‘is-at-t’ represents the ontological 
privilege of the present: all properties, F, that can be attributed to a are all and 
only those properties it ‘just has now’. In addition to avoiding contradiction, this 
approach allows the presentist to avoid the charge, levelled against 
endurantism, that temporally indexed properties are merely quasi-relations, 
rather than ‘genuine’, intrinsic properties.  
This strictly tensed interpretation of the having of properties (a having 
simpliciter) indicates that, in addition to incompatibility, change involves a 
transition between incompatible states, a transition between ‘a was F’ and ‘a is 
¬F’. The next step is to consider how such a transition can be modelled 




5.7.3 Change as it is in Reality 
I argued above that qualitative change involves a transition between 
incompatible properties: ‘a was F’ and ‘a is ¬F’. By considering some examples of 
such change it becomes apparent that this transition can be considered solely as 
a gain or loss of properties, in other words as a gain or loss simpliciter. 
Consequently, for the presentist, qualitative change should be construed as the 
gain or loss of properties simpliciter, rather than as the possession of properties 
at different times. 
Consider, as a concrete example, the change in colour of the Statue of Liberty 
from bronze to green. At the physical level, this is the result of an interaction 
between the copper metal constituting the statue and oxygen from moisture in 
the air to form a pale green patina of copper oxide. Another example is the lit 
candle that, in melting, becomes bent over time. The latter involves an exchange 
of energy, in the form of heat from the flame, which results in a melting of the 
wax. In each case the change, although described in qualitative terms as 
incompatible predicates at different times, as it is in reality involves some form 
of causal interaction which results in a gain or loss of properties. In the case of 
the Statue of Liberty, the statue gains the property of being green (from the 
layer of copper oxide). In respect of the candle, the candle loses the property of 
solidity and gains properties of liquidity and viscosity. 
This seems true for all cases of qualitative change as they are in reality; they 
involve a gain or loss of properties simpliciter. Further, the transition 
represented by this gain or loss is, in some manner, grounded in the fact that 
reality as objectively tensed exemplifies transience. I suggest that there is 
nothing, pertinent to change, that is not captured by modelling qualitative 
change in this way, rather than adopting the standard construal of change as the 
possession of different properties at different times. If this can be supported it 
provides a route to establishing a formulation of change independent of B-
series time, in accordance with criterion D1. 
Nonetheless, the analysis of change given thus far is incomplete since 
qualitative change, as a transition between incompatible properties, covers only 
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one sort of change. Under qualitative change the whole entity changes its 
properties. Meincke (2019, p.15) highlights another type of change, which she 
refers to as ‘substantial’ change. Substantial change involves entities coming into 
and going out of existence, in the manner in which ‘events’ (such as explosions) 
involve changes. Lowe (1998, p.122) similarly recognises these two different 
manifestations of change. 
It is pertinent to note here that these two types of change mirror an opposition 
reflected in the standard accounts of persistence. Endurance appears better 
aligned with qualitative change, persisting entities change by possessing 
different, incompatible properties at different times. The statue which was 
copper-coloured changes over time to become green; the statue as a persisting 
entity changes its colour from copper to green.   
In opposition, the temporal parts of perdurance more resemble events, in the 
sense of being instantaneous (or nearly instantaneous) entities that come into 
and go out of existence sequentially. Perdurance is thus better able to capture 
substantial change, as represented by the bang and flash of an explosion. To this 
extent both the standard accounts intuitively reflect different aspects of the 
nature of change. There is a natural tendency to consider objects as ‘wholly 
located’ in the present, whereas entities such as explosions have parts that are 
not yet present. We therefore have a tendency to refer only to ‘wholly present 
objects’ as changing, yet, it is equally the case that things such as explosions are 
changes. 
An adequate account of change needs to reflect both these types of change. By 
providing this, the presentist can forge a ‘third way’ between endurance and 
perdurance, and establish an account that avoids the limitations of each (§ 5.4). 
What is common to both types of change – qualitative and substantial – is that 
they involve a coming into and going out of existence; in the former case it is 
properties and in the latter, entities, and this indicates the mechanism required 
to internalise change and formulate it independently of B-series time. Some 
attempts have been made within presentist accounts to achieve this 
internalisation, and I describe these in the following subsection. Though these 
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attempts fail they provide an insight into how change should be formalised 
under a presentist account and also how it is that real change aligns with the 
concept of transience, identified as one of the objective correlates of tense. 
5.7.4 The Relevance of ‘Transientism’ 
The difficulties encountered in modelling objective passage may account for 
why the dynamic character of existence is often not made explicit in presentist 
models. As Gołosz (2013, p. 55) suggests, the traditional formulation of 
presentism as ‘only the present exists’ can imply that existence is static in 
nature. Nonetheless, a sense that there is the need to incorporate the dynamic 
aspects of reality into presentism appears to underpin recent accounts 
developed by Deasy (2017) and Correia and Rosenkranz (2015).  
For Deasy, any definition of presentism needs to include what he refers to as 
‘transientism’: 
TRANSIENTISM: Sometimes, something begins to exist and sometimes, 
something ceases to exist 
(formally: S(∃x P¬∃y y = x) & S(∃x F¬∃y y = x)) (2017, p. 390) 
Transientism, in combination with the A-theorist’s commitment to a privileged 
present, provides Deasy with his definition of presentism: 
PRESENTISM: There is an absolute, objective present instant (THE A-
THEORY) & sometimes, something begins to exist and sometimes, 
something ceases to exist (TRANSIENTISM)’ (p.391) 
Along similar lines, Correia and Rosenkranz (2015) include a notion of being a 
‘one-off’ (itself a conjunction of ‘new’ and ‘doomed’) as well as a concept of 
being ‘in time’, in their definition of presentism: 
Let us say that m is new iff always in the past, m does not exist, that m is 
doomed iff always in the future, m does not exist, and that m is in time iff 
sometimes, for some time t, m is contemporaneous with t. (2015, p. 22) 
Their definition of presentism is consequently: 
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Always, ∃t(t is one-off & ∀x(x is in time → x is contemporaneous with t)) 
(Ibid, p.24) 
Common to both the accounts is the sense that, for the presentist, existence is 
transient or temporary. 
Tallant (2019) argues that, as formulations of presentism, these two models 
ultimately fail.  In the case of Deasy this is because his model is compatible with 
scenarios that presentists would not accept. One of these Tallant describes as 
the ‘trundling block’ universe (Ibid, § 2). This is a modification of the growing 
block universe, which, after 1000 years, starts to lose the initial events (at the 
rear of the block) at such a rate that maintains its size whilst new events are 
constantly added to the ‘front edge’ of the block.  Although this scenario satisfies 
Deasy’s definition it is unacceptable to the presentist, and it is unacceptable 
because it allows for the existence of past objects: individuals such as William 
the Conqueror (who died in 1087) still exist in the ‘trundling block’ universe 
and so instantiate presentness. 
What is important here is not so much the possibility of counter-examples it is 
why Deasy’s model fails as a statement of presentism; it fails because it is 
underpinned by B-series times. The ‘Sometimes’ temporal operator (S), in the 
definition of transientism, quantifies over B-series instants of time at which 
things come into and go out of existence. By indexing existence to ‘times’ it 
renders the present a defined B-series interval: in the case of Tallant’s 
‘trundling block’ example, an interval of 1000 years. In Chapter 4 it was 
concluded that the reason why Existence Presentism is the only formulation of 
presentism, to date, able to avoid Meyer’s (2005, 2013) ‘presentist’s dilemma’ is 
precisely because the present is freed from equation with any given (or unique) 
time. A similar objection applies to the formulation given by Correia and 
Rosenkranz (2015); existence is existence at a particular B-series time (‘x is in 
time’) and the present is conceived of as a hyperplane of simultaneity (‘x is 
contemporaneous with t’).  
Despite this, the motivation behind both attempts, namely, to incorporate the 
idea that the present is transient and so continually changing, is a sound one. 
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The models fall short in so far as they externalise the dynamic aspects of reality 
(to an external time) rather than internalising them. 
Transientism, though it cannot be used to define presentism, does suggest a 
mechanism for aligning the notion of change as it applies to an objectively 
dynamic present, with change as it applies to the entities that comprise the 
present (described in § 5.7.3). A simple modification is required in order to 
ensure that change is internalised and modelled independently of B-series time. 
5.8 Formulating Change for the Presentist 
An appropriate definition of change, for the ‘serious’ presentist, has to be one 
that is consistent with ‘real’, metaphysical change (criterion D2), described by 
the following thesis:  
(CM): The whole of what exists is changing 
As previously suggested the thesis of metaphysical change is important in 
distinguishing the presentist’s account of change from that of the eternalist. The 
eternalist externalises the dynamic, or temporal, aspects of reality by defining 
change as relative to, and metaphysically dependent upon, an external, B-series 
time. The thesis of metaphysical change is an expression of a position that 
regards the dynamic aspects of reality as internalised and metaphysically 
independent of B-series time. 
The dynamic aspects of reality (the objective correlates of tense) are twofold: 
transience and continuity (§ 5.5). Since persistence (when formulated in strictly 
tensed terms) is the continuity of existence, it was suggested in § 5.6 that real, 
metaphysical change might be grounded in the other objective correlate of 
tense: transience.   Transience (as described in § 5.5) reflects the temporary 
nature of that which is present: that which exists has come into existence and 
will go out of existence. In other words, transience involves a coming into and 
going out of existence. It has also been argued (§ 5.7.3) that change (both 
qualitative and substantial), as it is in reality, involves a coming into and going 
out of existence. This leads to the thought that real change, for the presentist, 
should incorporate the idea, also recognised by Lowe, that ‘something begins to 
152 
 
be the case which was previously not the case’ (2001, p. 122). In other words, 
real change should be explicated in terms of creation and annihilation. Change, 
as it is metaphysically, involves the creation of something new (a property or 
entity) or the destruction of something existing, rather than the possession of 
incompatible properties at different times. This, then, provides the definition of 
‘real’ change suitable for the compatibilist presentist: 
DefRC: Real Change = def Something coming into existence and/or 
something going out of existence 
This definition of real change (DefRC) reflects what is insightful about Deasy’s 
transientism but, importantly, it is a formulation that is not indexed to (B-
series) times and so is acceptable to the Existence Presentist. It thereby satisfies 
both the original desiderata for a compatibilist account: it is formulated 
independently of B-series time (D1) and is consistent with metaphysical change 
(D2). 
5.9 Characterising the Present 
In this final section I argue that persistence and real change, as formulated, 
positively characterize the nature of the present. It will be seen (in Chapter 8) 
that this characterisation of the present provides a route to address a particular 
problem for the presentist namely, the asymmetry of fixity. I also argue, in what 
follows, that real change and persistence are metaphysically primitive, and this 
informs the ontological model required for a compatible account of presentism 
(Chapter 6).  
5.9.1 The Nature of the Present 
Under existence presentism, an identity is asserted between existence and 
presence, but this leaves open a further explication of the nature of presence.  
Tallant (2019, p. 409) notes, that several commentators charge presentists with 
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failing to provide clarity on the meaning and role of ‘presence’ or ‘presentness’ 
within their models.121 This criticism is addressed here. 
The identity between existence and presence is a profound claim and one which 
implores further elaboration. It does not automatically follow that because 
existence (and therefore presence) is primitive it is not further explicable. The 
fundamental categories of our ontology are primitive but this does not mean we 
cannot further describe the features of those categories. Indeed, it is these that 
bear the definitional burden of those categories. 
The formulations of persistence and real, metaphysical change given in this 
Chapter reflect how it is that reality, and so existence, is objectively tensed. In § 
5.5 I argue that the objective correlates of tense are both transience and 
continuity. The formulation of persistence, as continuing existence (DefPS, § 5.6), 
reflects continuity, whereas transience is reflected in the construal of real 
change (DefRC, § 5.8) as absolute creation and annihilation. Since, for the 
Existence Presentist, presence is existence this picture of objectively tensed 
existence also provides a characterisation of the present. The nature of the 
present, as that which exists, is provided by the two objective correlates of 
tense: persistence and real, metaphysical change. 
The definitions of persistence and real (metaphysical) change, provided above, 
reveal them to be opposing aspects of reality. Persistence, as a continuity of 
existence, and real change, as a coming into or going out of existence, are 
orthogonal features of reality. This opposition mirrors the opposing nature of 
persistence and change under the standard metaphysical models. Indeed, the 
problem of temporary intrinsics expresses precisely this issue: how it is that 
one and the same entity can both intrinsically change and yet remain identical? 
Nonetheless, this opposition belies an intimate connection between these two 
correlates of tense in characterising the present. The connection is this: the 
present persists, or continues on, in virtue of the constant creation and 
annihilation of entities that is given by real (metaphysical) change. In this 
                                                        
121 For example, Deasy (2017), Correia and Rosenkranz (2015), Williamson (2013, pp. 24-25). 
Pezet (2017, p. 1835) also concedes that ‘the presentist thesis is in need of supplementation 
with a worked out account of the A-determinations themselves’. 
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manner the ‘flow’ of the present is internalised, or self-generated, rather than 
externalised relative to a B-series time. The present is not dynamic by being a 
movement in, or of, time. The present is dynamic in so far as the whole of what 
exists continually changes through constant creation and annihilation. 
This characterisation of the present brings two advantages for the presentist. It 
allows objective passage to be modelled without engendering McTaggart-style 
problems.122 Secondly, it will be seen in Chapter 8 that the recognition that 
metaphysical change is an intrinsic feature of the present provides the 
presentist with the tools to account for the asymmetry of fixity between the 
past and the future. 
5.9.2 Real Change and Persistence as Metaphysically Primitive 
Since real change and persistence characterize the present, it would seem to 
follow that they are metaphysically primitive. In this subsection, I explicitly 
draw this out. It might be thought that adopting such a position would preclude 
the presentist from establishing a compatibilist model of presentism. Contrary 
to this, Chapter 6 will show that this is actually central to facilitating such an 
account, once an appropriate ontology has been formulated. 
For the purposes of what follows I restate the definitions of persistence (§ 5.6) 
and real, metaphysical change (§ 5.8): 
DefPS: Persistence = def continuity of existence 
DefRC: Real Change = def something coming into existence and/or 
something going out of existence 
Existence presentism formulates the present solely in terms of existence. I make 
the assumption here that the concept of existence is metaphysically primitive. 
By ‘metaphysically primitive’ I mean that it is ontologically ungrounded and 
that it does not reduce to any other concept. 
Under the model proposed both real change and persistence are defined solely 
in terms of existence. More than this they comprise two different aspects of a 
                                                        
122 McTaggart-style problems are discussed in Chapter 1, §1.6.1. 
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particular notion of existence, namely, concrete existence. In particular, 
persistence indicates the continuity, or on-going-ness of existence, whereas 
metaphysical change describes the transition into and out of existence. As such 
they describe contrary, or opposing, aspects of concrete existence. They are also 
mutually dependent. In order to persist, or continue to exist, concrete entities 
must come into existence and so persistence depends upon real, metaphysical 
change. On the other hand, in order to go out of existence an entity must already 
exist, and so be persisting. In this way real, metaphysical change depends upon 
persistence.123 
If concrete existence is taken to be metaphysically primitive then, as aspects of 
existence, both persistence and metaphysical change must also be 
metaphysically primitive. Each is ontologically ungrounded and neither can be 
reduced to any further concept other than that of existence. 
It will be revealed in Chapter 6 that it is in virtue of possessing these opposing, 
but mutually dependent, aspects that concrete existence is structured 
spatiotemporally, in the manner described by relativity theory. It will be argued 
that B-series relations arise from the structure of an objectively dynamic reality, 
one that exemplifies both persistence and real, metaphysical change – the 
objective correlates of tense.  
I propose that concepts that are metaphysically primitive need to be 
represented in the categories of an underlying ontology. The task of Chapter 6 is 
therefore to establish an appropriate ontological framework for presentism that 
can demonstrate compatibility with physical theory and one that reflects a 
reality in which real change and persistence are metaphysically primitive: in 
other words, a reality that is objectively tensed. 
  
                                                        
123 It might be countered that events (e.g., explosions) are archetypal concrete entities that only 
exemplify real change and not persistence. I would argue that any actual, concrete event always 
involves some (albeit indiscernible) temporal extension. This is further discussed in § 6.8 where 
I argue that events require persisting entities to interact and so, to this extent, real metaphysical 
change depends upon persistence. 
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CHAPTER 6 – AN ONTOLOGY FOR A COMPATIBILIST PRESENTISM 
6.1 Introduction 
I conclude in the previous chapter that real change and persistence are the 
objective correlates of tense, for the Existence Presentist, and that these are 
metaphysically primitive. By adopting this position, the presentist is able to 
internalise the dynamic aspects of reality, in other words, to formulate the 
objective correlates of tense independently of B-series time. Internalising the 
temporal aspects of reality requires an appropriate ontology, and this is 
developed in this chapter. In doing so the route to the compatibility of 
presentism with physical theory is established. 
I consider the process ontological models of Rescher (1996) and Seibt (1997, 
2007, 2009) and argue that though processes (as defined) exemplify 
persistence (through functional recurrence) change is construed as merely 
functional variation, rather than the real, metaphysical change required by the 
presentist. I take a modified process-based approach and propose a hierarchical 
ontological model based on four categories: ‘concrete substance’, ‘powerful 
properties’, ‘pure process’ and ‘interaction event’. The mutual dependency of 
pure process and interaction event reflects the equally primitive nature of 
persistence and real, metaphysical change. It also represents the wave-particle 
duality of concrete substance at the fundamental level. The compatibility of the 
proposed ontological model with a reductionist model of relativistic spacetime 
is argued for on the basis of a category alignment with Belkind’s (2012) 
Primitive Motion Relationalism. The latter provides the mechanism for B-series 
spacetime to emerge as the structure of a reality within which persistence and 
real, metaphysical change are primitive. 
6.2 Requirements on a Suitable Ontological Model 
The task of ontology is to establish a structured categorical scheme that best 
aligns with the truthmakers implied by both natural language and scientific 
discourse (e.g. Seibt, 2009, p.482). The starting point of such a task is to define 
or delimit the scope of that reality; the ontological scope here is the nature of 
concrete existence, or concrete being. The reality, or otherwise, of abstract 
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entities (for example, universals) is excluded at the outset. Consequently, a 
suitable ontological model must be able to explain successfully the inferences 
drawn from our natural language statements about existence in time, or 
spacetime. 
The arguments developed so far impose three requirements on a suitable 
ontological scheme. 
R1: The categories of the ontological schema should provide 
compatibility with our best physical theories 
R2: B-Series spacetime should reduce to the structure of reality 
R3: The ontological categories should reflect the metaphysically 
primitive nature of both real change and persistence; where real change 
and persistence are defined as follows: 
DefRC: Real change =def something coming into existence and/or 
something going out of existence 
DefPS: Persistence =def continuity of existence 
R1 reflects the overarching aim of the thesis which is to establish an ontology 
for Existence Presentism compatible with physical theory. R2 accommodates 
the arguments of Chapter 2 that a reductionist approach to spacetime provides 
the presentist with a route to achieving such compatibility. R3 embodies the 
conclusion of Chapter 5.  
I begin by drawing an analogy between persistence and real change, on the one 
hand, and the continuant-occurrent distinction, on the other. I note the 
difficulties in combining such opposing entities within a unified ontology, and 
then consider the potential of the category of process to achieve a duality 
between continuant and occurrent. 
6.3 The Occurrent-Continuant Distinction  
It is noted in § 5.9.1 that, as formulated, persistence and real, metaphysical 
change are opposing aspects of reality. Persistence seen as the continuation of 
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existence is orthogonal to a coming into or going out of existence (real change). 
This contrary nature is to some extent reflected in, what Simons (2000, p.78) 
refers to as, the ‘puzzling duality at the heart of our conception of the world 
which calls out for metaphysical clarification’. The duality he refers to is that 
between two categories of particular: continuants and occurrents. 
The terms ‘continuant’ and ‘occurrent’ originate from W.E. Johnson (1921 and 
1924, quoted in Simons, 2000, p. 78) and the category division implied aligns 
with the distinction between endurance and perdurance. Johnson defines a 
continuant as: 
that which continues to exist throughout some limited or unlimited 
period of time, during which its inner states or its outer connections with 
other continuants may be altering or may be continuing unaltered […] 
Now while we cannot say that a continuant occurs, we can say that a 
state occurs; and anything that may be said to occur will be called an 
‘occurrent’. (1924, pp. xx-xxi, quoted in Stout, 2016, p. 41) 
To the extent that continuants continue in existence (in their entirety) over time 
they exemplify persistence, defined as continuing existence (DefPS). This would 
seem to suggest that continuants, in some guise, should figure as a category in 
the proposed ontology. 
Occurrents, on the other hand, happen or occur, at given times or intervals of 
time, and so are intrinsically temporally bounded. Unlike continuants they 
possess temporal parts124 or successive stages and persist by perduring (e.g. 
Simons, 2000). Events are archetypal occurrents: a flash of light occurs at a 
given time, whereas a conference can take place over two days. Events are also 
intimately connected with change (e.g. Davidson, 2001, Lowe, 2002) but events 
are not themselves subjects of change (unlike continuants), rather they are 
changes (Mellor, 1981, Simons, 1987, Galton and Mizoguchi, 2009). In their 
temporal extreme events are instantaneous, such as a flash of light or the Big 
Bang, and as such represent points at which things come into or go out of 
                                                        
124 Definitions of temporal parts vary, but essential to the notion is existence at a particular time 
e.g. ‘parts which exist solely because of its existing at a certain time’ (Simons, 2000, p. 78). 
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existence. This suggests the potential for a category aligned with occurrents to 
represent real change (DefRC). 
It might be countered that not all occurrents obviously involve creation or 
annihilation, for example, a collision, or a temporally extended event such as a 
battle. Although such examples are not so intuitive, a collision between two cars 
is the point at which dents, for example, are created on both vehicles. Similarly, 
at the sub-atomic level, proton-proton collisions involve the creation of pions 
and other particles. Even purely elastic collisions are points at which something 
new comes into existence, namely a reversal in the direction of motion of each 
participant. I would argue that this also applies to temporally extended events, 
such as the Battle of Hastings and a wedding ceremony. Temporally extended 
events consist of a collection of different phases or temporal parts. As 
occurrents they are also temporally bounded to the extent that, in the limit, 
there is a temporal part, or occurrence, that represents the point at which they 
begin (to exist) and the point at which they end (go out of existence). 
If events are indeed changes and, in the temporal extreme, represent points of 
absolute creation and annihilation they exemplify real, metaphysical change. 
This indicates that occurrents, or events, should also feature as a category 
within a suitable ontology. 
Both occurrents and continuants reflect important elements of our conceptual 
scheme of reality and if the suggestion, that they exemplify the opposing 
features of real change and persistence, is on track, requirement R3 demands an 
ontological framework within which these categories are equally 
metaphysically fundamental. This presents a significant challenge. The problem, 
as Aune (1986, p.115) notes is ‘how such categorially different entities fit 
together in a single world’. Consequently, there has been a tendency in the 
philosophical tradition to reduce one to the other (Aune, 1986, p. 105 and 
Simons, 2000, p. 78). This is unsurprising given that, in exemplifying 
persistence and real change (as defined in § 6.2), they represent opposing 
aspects of reality. 
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There are persuasive arguments on both sides of the debate.125 Those who 
follow in the Aristotelean tradition (such as Descartes, Leibniz, Kant and 
latterly, Strawson, 1959) see substance, or continuants, as ontologically 
fundamental, whereas occurrents (such as events, or processes) are derivative. 
On the other hand, the influence of modern physics has led others (such as 
Russell, 1927, Lewis, 1983 and Sider, 2001) to consider events as fundamental 
and regard substances as reducible to occurrents (e.g., by being a succession of 
temporal parts).  
Nonetheless, the consideration of temporally extended events, in the example 
above, provides a hint of a possible resolution. Temporally extended events, 
such a battles and weddings, (as opposed to instantaneous events) can also be 
regarded as processes: an unfolding series of events, or stages. Although such 
processes comprise a series of changes (events) there is also a unity across a 
temporal interval which permits re-identification as the same process (e.g., a 
wedding, or a battle). To this extent processes exhibit continuity as well as 
change. At first glance this suggests the category of process has the potential to 
model a duality between continuants and occurrents, and so provide a means of 
internalising these two opposing aspects of reality. 
6.4 Processes – a Duality of Continuant and Occurrent? 
Some support for the potential of the category of process to represent the 
duality between occurrents and continuants can be seen in the work of Stout 
(2016) and Steward (2015).  
                                                        
125 Strawson (1959, pp. 15-58) argues that the ability to re-identify particulars requires 
reference to something that continues in existence over time, in other words, continuants. 
Whereas, under Quine’s (1948, p. 32) criterion of ontological commitment, the extensive use of 
singular noun phrases (e.g. ‘the Battle of Hastings’) provides prima facie support for the 
existence of events. In a similar vein, Davidson (2001) argues that events are required as a 
separate ontological category in order to account for the logical form of certain sentences 
involving adverbial expressions (ibid., p.166), such as ‘the sun shone brightly yesterday’, since 
‘brightly’ and ‘yesterday’ appear to describe an event: the sun’s shining. Also, in the case of 
action sentences certain entailments are difficult to explain without positing the existence of 
events. ‘Brutus stabbed Caesar in the back’ (a three-place relation) entails that ‘Brutus stabbed 
Caesar’ (a two-place relation); yet the entailment is difficult to explain without accepting the 
existence of a certain event (the stabbing of Caesar by Brutus) which possesses the property of 
being done to Caesar’s back (ibid., p. 136). Such examples also portray the explanatory role that 
occurrents play in accounting for change and causal relations. 
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Stout (2016) argues the case for a unified category of ‘occurrent continuants’ 
and considers that certain processes are paradigm examples of this category. 
These include processes such as ‘the process of my living my life’ and ‘the pen 
falling off the table’. Specifically, these are occurrences that ‘are, were, or will be 
happening’ (2016, p. 50) and where reference to them involves using the verb 
with a progressive aspect. He argues that such happenings (which are therefore 
occurrents) are also continuants, on the basis that continuants are best 
characterised as ‘things that primarily have their properties at a time’ (Ibid., p. 
44), rather than atemporally. According to Stout, the fight that was happening 
on his street the previous night (an occurrence) is something that continues for 
a period of time and possesses different properties at different times: ‘at first it 
was quite brutal, but after a few minutes it became less ferocious’ (Ibid., p.50). 
Occurrent continuants can also be causal, for example, the currently happening 
destruction of the rainforest is causing an increase in global warming. For this 
reason, Stout argues, they must be a part of the fabric of objective reality, rather 
than merely linguistic peculiarities. 
Steward (2015, p. 120) objects that the type of processes Stout refers to do not 
primarily have their properties at times, rather they are properties that apply 
between times. The continuous dripping of a tap may become irregular, but the 
irregularity of its dripping is a description applicable only over an interval of 
time, rather than being a property had at a given time which is characteristic of 
continuants (for example, being ‘blue at t2’). Nonetheless, the fact that 
properties apply only between times does not mean that they are held 
atemporally, as is the case for occurrents. Steward concludes that processes are 
therefore a unique species of entity that fall between the occurrent-continuant 
divide and share some of the characteristics of each. 
Irrespective of whether processes can truly count as both occurrents and 
continuants, as Stout maintains, or whether they represent a unique category 
between occurrents and continuants, they do appear to exemplify both a 
continuity of existence and various points at which something comes into, or 
goes out of, existence. In the following I assess the extent to which the category 
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of process is able to perform this dual ontological role, with reference to the 
process ontologies of both Rescher (1996) and Seibt (1997). A more detailed 
analysis of the accounts reveals that a single category ontology, despite its 
original promise, is unable to reflect these opposing features of reality. 
6.5 Process Ontology 
Process ontology ostensibly claims a unification of both continuity and real 
change (e.g. Rescher, 1996, Salmon, 1994) and processes are considered to 
internalise both these temporal aspects of reality. Underpinning this claim is the 
close connection between processes and events that is assumed under process-
ontological models, and this has been alluded to above.  Processes are 
temporally extended (i.e., they are never instantaneous), and to this extent they 
exhibit continuity, or an ongoingness, such as the smoothing of a pebble. They 
also involve change, and to this extent encompass more or less instantaneous 
events. At the microscopic level the smoothing of the pebble involves changes, 
such as the detachment of microscopic particles. 
6.5.1 Rescher’s Approach 
Rescher (1996) provides a systematic process metaphysics, within the arena of 
analytical philosophy, which seeks to avoid the atomism of Whitehead’s process 
ontology. For Rescher, processes are continuous entities rather than constituted 
by the discrete ‘actual occasions’ of Whiteheadian process ontology. Rescher 
defines a process as: 
a coordinated group of changes in the complexion of reality, an organised 
family of occurrences that are systematically linked to one another either 
causally or functionally […] A process consists in an integrated series of 
connected developments unfolding in conjoint coordination in line with 
a definite program. (p.38) 
For Rescher, processes persist by maintaining self-identity through the 
functional unity (the ‘unity of a lawful order’, p.39) that connects the 
occurrences that comprise the process. For example, the acorn and the fully 
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grown oak tree are connected by the functional unity represented in their 
genetic coding. 
Processes also exemplify change in the sense that they incorporate changes and, 
in doing so, display an ‘internal complexity’ (p.39): 
A process does not change as such – as the particular overall process at 
issue – but any such process can incorporate change through its unifying 
amalgamation of stages or phases (which may themselves be processes). 
Even as a story can encompass foolishness without itself being foolish, so 
a process can encompass changes without itself changing. (p.39) 
This ostensive unification of continuity and change within the category of 
process is, however, illusory. It fails because a single-category ontology is 
unable to model what are opposing features of reality. The problem is this. The 
entities referred to as changes (which are also variously labelled as events, 
occurrences or developments by Rescher) must also themselves be processes - 
there is no other category within the ontology. As processes, they do not 
themselves change: as Rescher emphasises, their defining feature is continuity 
in the form of a functional unity. Rather changes, as processes, encompass 
further changes, but these further changes are also processes (whose defining 
feature is continuity) that do not themselves change. This analysis proceeds ad 
infinitum. Processes encompass changes, but these changes are merely a matter 
of ‘internal complexity’: in other words, they differ in their functional 
characteristics. The issue here is not that there is a problem with an infinite 
layer of processes126 but, rather, that there is nothing more to change than 
functional variation. As such this is not sufficient to support the real, 
metaphysical change that is indicative of temporal, rather than spatial, 
variation. Rescher himself alludes to precisely this point: 
                                                        
126 For example, Tahko (2018) argues against the necessity for a mereological ‘bottom level’ to 
reality and instead understands the fundamentality of reality in terms of ‘ontologically minimal 
elements’. This allows for monism (a la Shaffer’s priority monism) under which the universe as 
a whole is the fundamental element. It can also allow for metaphysical infinitism, of the sort 
encountered in structuralism, where a structural element (for example, fractal structures) may 
be infinitely repeated. 
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just as the static complexity of a set of (filmstrip-like) photographs of a 
flying arrow does not adequately capture its dynamic nature, so the 
conjunctive complexity of a process’s description does not adequately 
capture its transtemporal dynamics. (p. 38-39) 
In appearing to address this, he proceeds to suggest that the ‘programmatic 
nature’ of the functional signature of a process (i.e., the fact that the different 
stages are causally or lawfully connected) ensures spatiotemporal continuity: ‘it 
is of the very essence of an ongoing process that it combines existence in the 
present with tentacles reaching into the past and the future’ (p. 39). However, 
this merely reinforces the continuity, or persistence, of processes rather than 
indicating how processes incorporate real change that is over and above 
functional variation.  
The problem is in essence this. If process is the sole category in the ontology, 
then the whole of what exists is process, and if a process cannot itself change 
then it follows that the whole of what exists cannot change. This is contrary to 
the thesis of metaphysical change (§ 5.3.2) and indicates that, as defined within 
Rescher’s account, the category of process does not reflect the metaphysically 
primitive nature of real change (R3). Given that real change (DefRC) and 
persistence (DefPS) represent opposing features of reality, this is not that 
surprising; indeed, it is hard to see how they could be reflected within one and 
the same ontological category. 
It is clear that Rescher does see the category of process as sufficient to 
exemplify both persistence and change. Elsewhere he states that ‘processes 
effect changes. They make a difference in the world’s scheme of things in 
actualising a heretofore open, indeterminate future in ways that distinguish it 
from the determinate past’ (1996, p.85). In describing processes in this way 
Rescher implies that changes are connected with ‘actualising’, or a bringing into 
existence, and this is in alignment with the definition of real (metaphysical) 
change (DefRC).  Nonetheless, the entities that Rescher recognises as connected 
with change – namely events, occurrences and developments - do not belong to 
165 
 
any ontological category separate from that of process,127 and this, as suggested 
above, makes it impossible to represent both real change and persistence as 
metaphysically primitive.  
6.5.2 Seibt’s General Process Theory 
Seibt’s (1997) General Process Theory is an axiomatic, process-ontological 
framework that aims to align with the methodological commitments of 
analytical philosophy. Seibt, like Rescher, subscribes to a one-category ontology 
based on what she terms ‘general processes’.  General processes are ‘concrete, 
dynamic, non-particular individuals’ (2009, p. 479) individuated by a ‘specificity 
in functioning’. In assessing the extent to which the category of ‘general process’ 
might offer scope for accommodating both real change and persistence, I refer 
in what follows to Seibt’s account of persistence (2007) and her account of 
emergence (2009). 
For Seibt (2007), the difference between change and persistence is reflected in 
the different extent to which general processes are like-parted (homomerity) 
and self-parted (automerity). These features define their mereological 
signature. Homomerity is the extent to which the spatiotemporal parts of an 
entity of kind K are themselves of kind K. As such, homomerity is common to 
masses or stuffs, for example, sand and water. In contrast, automerity 
represents the degree to which the whole of an entity, S, in a functional sense, is 
included in any of its spatiotemporal parts. ‘Activities’ such as raining and 
snowing possess maximal automerity: their functional activity recurs 
throughout any spatiotemporal region in which they occur, and throughout any 
part of that spatiotemporal region. 
This distinction allows Seibt to differentiate between processes that are 
‘developments’, and those that are ‘activities’. Developments are minimally 
temporally automerous and event-type processes, such as explosions. They 
manifest an internal temporal differentiation by comprising a sequence of 
different dynamical aspects; as such they are the truth-makers for statements 
                                                        




about change. Conversely, activities are relatively generic (though concrete) 
general processes (such as snowing or raining) that are maximally temporally 
automerous, and so are characterised by a continuous recurrence of some 
functionally specified dynamic. They are exemplars of persistence and provide 
the truth-makers for statements concerning persistence.  
In so far as changes are indicated by a sequence of different dynamical aspects 
Seibt’s account appears, prima facie, similar to that of Rescher. Nonetheless, 
Seibt’s account is more nuanced and she reconciles change and persistence, 
within one and the same entity, by taking advantage of a flexibility associated 
with a non-transitive mereology. The account, though complex, deserves further 
analysis to assess how successfully the category of general process 
accommodates both real change and persistence. 
Seibt’s non-transitive mereology employs the ‘is part of’ relation to denote a 
relation of functionally ‘belonging with’, with no implication of spatiotemporal 
containment. This permits the functional whole, , (a complex dynamic) to 
contribute functionally to its own parts. For example, pancreatic enzymes are 
part of the correct functioning of the pancreas, this in turn is a functional part of 
the digestive system, which in turn is part of the day to day functioning of the 
whole individual, . That individual might, however, take the drug Creon and in 
doing so is able to contribute to the correct functioning of their pancreatic 
enzymes. The mereological relations between the different dynamics 
constituting the complex whole, , are specified in terms of functional ‘partition 
levels’; these become more and more fine-grained and specific the lower down 
the hierarchy. The action of specific pancreatic enzymes is an example of 
dynamics at such a lower partition level.  
This model of individuals, as hierarchical complexes of dynamics, provides an 
account of how statements about both persistence and change may apply to one 
and the same entity. Given the Statue of Liberty, statements about its 
persistence denote the relatively coarse-grained, complex dynamics at the 
pinnacle of the partition level. A statement of identity, or comparison of 
sameness, is ‘mereologically shallow’ and masks the fact that it is constituted by 
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many different partition levels of dynamics some of which exemplify change, 
such as those lower down the (functional) hierarchy. The difference between 
change and persistence is therefore a matter of perspective or level of 
granularity. 
In short, statements about persistence and change involve different 
calibrations of the ‘lens of specificity’ that guides our comparisons of 
functionally individuated individuals: persistence statements express the 
transtemporal identity of more generic individuals (dynamics), 
statements about change express the difference between more specific 
individuals (dynamics). (Seibt, 2007, p. 160-161) 
Seibt’s non-transitive mereology certainly succeeds in ameliorating the problem 
of temporary intrinsics, since the persisting entity, , (for example, the Statue of 
Liberty) can be part of the interaction dynamics involved in change, or 
alteration, without contradiction. The account thereby maintains the intuitive 
appeal of endurantism, in that it is the whole entity that participates in change. 
Nonetheless, the approach fails to circumvent the criticism directed at Rescher’s 
account. Change is still simply functional variation (‘a difference between […] 
(dynamics)’), and something that is a matter of perspective: ‘A more “fine-
grained” comparison will reach into “deeper” partition levels and reveal 
difference’ (p.160). Change is neither metaphysically primitive nor intrinsic to 
the category of general process. 
Change, as functional variation, also fails to reflect the real, metaphysical change 
that is sought. Real, metaphysical change (DefRC) involves absolute creation 
and/or annihilation and it is only this rendition of change that can meet the 
requirements of a presentist account (Chapter 5). 
In contrast, Seibt does seem to regard continuous recurrence (i.e. persistence) 
as a defining, or intrinsic, feature of general process (2007, pp. 148-155), rather 
than, as in the case of change, simply a matter of perspective on the 
mereological hierarchy. Indeed, Seibt states that the model for the category of 
general process is ‘subjectless activities’ (p. 147), such as snowing, and her 
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description of them suggests that they exemplify a primitive persistence, in the 
form of an inherent recurrence.  
Subjectless activities are ‘dynamic but they are not changes […] activities do not 
involve internal temporal difference’ (2007, p.148). Further, a subjectless 
activity is both like-parted and self-parted (p.152-153) and in this sense ‘can 
contain itself as part of a part’ (p.155). Such self-containment means that 
activities exist ‘continuously throughout the period at which they exist. 
Temporal continuity is the literal ubiquitous recurrence of one and the same 
feature, down to the smallest conceivable regions or “points in time”’ (p.155). 
This emphasis on persistence in defining the category of general process means 
that, as was seen with endurance (§ 5.4.2), real change is compromised by a 
commitment to the priority of persistence. 
Process theorists clearly wish to see change as internal or intrinsic to processes. 
The recognition that change needs to be internalised, in order to reflect 
adequately an objectively dynamic reality, is well-motivated but the mechanism 
fails. For both Rescher and Seibt, processes incorporate change, by way of 
successive stages or elements that exhibit dynamic variation, but in doing so 
change appears merely as (functional) variation rather than as real, 
metaphysical change. 
6.5.3 The Relevance of Interaction 
Despite the fact that change under Seibt’s account does not represent the real, 
metaphysical change required by the ontology sought here, her account of 
emergence (Seibt, 2009) does provide an important insight into a potential 
mechanism to achieve a duality between change and persistence, at an 
ontological level. This mechanism is the interaction of processes. 
In showing how her process ontology has the tools to account for different 
types of emergence, Seibt proposes a distinction between combinations of 
general processes that involve interactions, and those that are ‘mere collections’ 
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or ‘sums’ of processes.128 Where processes interact they ‘interfere’ and a new 
‘complex dynamics’ results (2009, pp. 492-493). She provides an example of 
two processes, the boiling of water, , and a window pane, , that interfere in 
some spatiotemporal interval, .129 This produces an ‘interference product’, 
condensation (η), which is a new complex dynamics, or general process; it is 
new in the sense that it ‘does not occur anywhere in the partition of  nor of ’ 
(p. 493), the component processes. Seibt illustrates this in the diagram shown 
below (Seibt, 2009, p. 493, Fig. 3). 
 
This description reveals that, under Seibt’s account, the interaction of general 
processes is associated with the production of a new process, in this case, 
condensation. Although this is not how change is formulated within Seibt’s 
ontology, this illustration of novel production is consistent with the proposed 
formulation of metaphysical change (DefRC) and provides the potential to secure 
it within a modified process ontology. 
Consistent with Seibt’s single category ontology, interaction is itself regarded as 
a process (‘interaction dynamics’) and is not metaphysically primitive. 
Interaction requires that the participating processes, x and y, overlap 
                                                        
128 A ‘collection’ or ‘sum’ of processes would occur, for example, where 50ml of water is added 
to a jug containing 500ml of water. 
129 Spacetime, for Seibt, is also a general process. 
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spatiotemporally, and Seibt’s definition accords with our intuitive notion of 
interaction as requiring spatiotemporal coincidence. She defines interaction,130  
for some spatiotemporal region, r, (p.497) as follows: 
(D6: Sequential interaction): An interference of x and y is a sequential 
interaction if x and y spatiotemporally overlap in r, and the interference 
focus [z]r has the temporal homomerity and automerity profile of a 
series of developments, and there are at least two interference products 
that do not exactly overlap temporally (i.e., are not co-occurrent). 
For Seibt, spacetime is also a general process, referred to as R, and it has a 
locating function for all concrete general processes. A specific occurrence of a 
general process, , (for example, snowing) is spatiotemporally located by its 
‘interference’ with R (the spacetime dynamic), and this provides for the specific 
occurrence of, for example, snowing in the Alps in February. This interference 
occurs as an ‘interference focus’ (which defines the spacetime location), and is 
given mereologically by a sum of n-parts of  and R. In order for two general 
processes to overlap spatiotemporally (and so interact) they must therefore 
participate in the same ‘interference focus’.131 
Formulating real change in terms of the interaction of processes therefore 
provides scope for a process ontology to represent real change as something 
ontologically distinct from persistence. It also aligns with the discussions in 
Chapter 5 (§ 5.7.3): in arriving at an appropriate formulation of real change it 
was discussed that qualitative change, as it is in reality, does appear to involve 
some prior causal interaction in addition to a gain or loss of properties. 
However, the role accorded to spacetime dynamics (R) under Seibt’s account 
                                                        
130 Seibt draws a distinction between two types of interaction: sequential and co-occurrent. For 
simplicity, only one definition is provided here. However, both definitions include 
spatiotemporal overlap. 
131 As I read Seibt, novel production requires the ‘interaction’ of processes rather than merely 
their ‘interference’. Interaction requires spatiotemporal overlap (as defined in 2009, pp. 497-
498); it results in the mutual change of the interacting dynamics and is essentially causal. In 
contrast, an interference (p.493) is a ‘mereological structure’ and the resultant ‘interference 
product’ is not a novel creation, though it is a different complex dynamic. Thus, spatiotemporal 
location is an ‘interference’ (rather than an ‘interaction’) between a general process, , (for 
example, snowing) and the spacetime dynamic, R, and the resultant interference product is a 
spatiotemporally bounded ‘amount of ’. As such, it is a different dynamic entity from , though 
they share ‘parts’, functionally construed. 
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presents a problem. As Seibt admits: ‘the GPT-account of location combines 
most straightforwardly with an entitative (commonly called “substantivalist”) 
conception of spacetime’ (Ibid., footnote, p.494). If a process account requires a 
substantival notion of time to model real, metaphysical change this is contrary 
to the model of presentism being pursued (requirement R2).  
An alternative option is to utilise a relational model of spacetime. However, it is 
not now clear how interaction could be defined in the absence of substantival 
time. Under a relational theory of time, spatiotemporal relations supervene on, 
or are derivative of, the relations instantiated by material entities (in this case 
general processes). For example, spacetime could be seen as consisting in an 
abstract ordering of concrete processes that, through their mutual interaction, 
constitute the causal nexus of reality. In this case, though, spatiotemporal 
coincidence would need to be grounded in some relation between processes 
themselves, and the most obvious candidate for this is the overlap, or 
intersection, of those processes, or, in other words, an ‘interaction’. It would 
appear then that under a relationist account the concept of interaction 
(between processes) would have to be primitive. 
In conclusion, as formulated under the process ontologies considered, the 
category of process is able to reflect the primitive nature of persistence through 
the category feature of functional recurrence. The interaction of processes, and 
its association with the production of new processes, also suggests the potential 
to incorporate real, metaphysical change. However, the requirement for the 
ontology under development to facilitate a reductionist model of spacetime 
(requirement R2) suggests that interaction must be primitive. 
I intimated earlier that a single-category process ontology is insufficient to 
capture the primitive nature of real, metaphysical change. Yet if the interaction 
of processes is primitive, and if interaction does provide for real change 
(construed as absolute creation or annihilation) this appears to suggest that a 
purely process ontology is, after all, able to provide what is needed under the 
account. However, in what follows I argue that there is good reason to regard 
the interaction of processes as a distinct ontological category.  
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6.6 Interaction – the Case for a Separate Category 
I make the argument that interaction is a separate, ontological category from 
that of process, and one that aligns with the essential features of occurrents (or 
events). The resulting ontological framework meets the original aim of 
reflecting the primitive nature of both real change and persistence, and will be 
seen to have several benefits. The most significant advantage is that it provides 
an ontology conducive to a compatibilist account of presentism, one that 
regards spacetime as derivative of an objectively dynamic reality. 
For Seibt, interaction is subsumed under the category of ‘general process’ (as 
‘interaction dynamics’) which has, as its model, subjectless activities such as 
snowing, raining and oscillating. As such the category of process exemplifies 
persistence (as continuing existence) in the form of the continuity or recurrence 
of some functionally-specified activity. To this extent activities, as ‘pure’ 
processes, are archetypal continuants.132 They range from the more dynamic 
processes, such as the swinging of a pendulum, or the motion of a brick through 
the air, to what Simons (2000, p. 70) describes as ‘boring continuants’, such as 
rocks and windows. Rocks and windows, in so far as they ‘continue to exist by 
sheer inertia’ (Ibid.) are also pure processes to the extent to which they 
continue on, as they are. Whether dynamic or boring, each is characterised by 
some functional recurrence, and it is to this extent that pure processes continue 
in existence. However, there is good reason to regard the interaction of 
processes as a separate ontological category, and this is because interactions 
possess neither of the two essential category features of processes. 
First, interactions are not a continual recurrence of some functional dynamic. 
An interaction is an overlap, or coincidence, of processes which by its very 
nature is a one-off, it is not something that recurs. This is not to say that two 
processes cannot repeatedly interact, but in that case the interactions would be 
distinct entities, each occupying a defined point, rather than a recurrence of the 
                                                        
132 Galton and Mizoguchi (2009) concur with the view of processes as continuants (the whole 
process happens at each moment at which it is occurring), though it is accepted that a 
commonly accepted view is to regard processes as a series of stages and so derivative of events, 
or occurrents. I address this potential criticism in § 6.8. 
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same interaction. The discrete nature of interactions suggests an ontological 
profile more akin to that of occurrents, or happenings, rather than continuants. 
Second, interactions do not exemplify persistence, as continuing existence. 
Interactions are points at which something comes into existence, or goes out of 
existence, and it is to this extent they exemplify real, metaphysical change 
(DefRC). When processes interact they lead to the creation of something new (a 
new process) or the destruction of something existing. When the flying brick 
interacts with the window something novel is created (shards of glass which fall 
to the floor, pieces of broken brick which fly off at an angle) and something 
ceases to exist (the fully functioning window, the forward motion of the brick). 
An interaction, as the point at which something comes into existence (or goes 
out of existence) has an ontological profile that is discrete and point-like, and 
for this reason it cannot also exemplify continuing existence. Continuing 
existence, by its very nature, has a completely contrary ontological profile, one 
characterised by extension i.e., ‘extending on’. The difference in ontological 
profile between process and an interaction (of processes) is analogous to the 
difference between two-dimensional and one-dimensional entities. It is in this 
sense that real change and persistence are opposing, or orthogonal, features of 
reality – they have contrary, or opposing, ontological profiles. If interactions 
exemplify real, metaphysical change then they cannot also exemplify 
persistence (as defined). For the two reasons outlined above the interactions of 
processes (as exemplars of real change) must be considered as a separate 
category within the proposed ontology. 
As points of creation or annihilation, interactions of processes align with the 
category of occurrents, for which events are the paradigm. Accounts of the 
properties and extension of the concept ‘event’ vary between commentators133 
but in general the defining feature of events is that they occur or happen. They 
are also associated with a definite, or well-defined spatiotemporal location (and 
so are datable, or locatable). Events are associated with changes and in their 
                                                        




temporal extreme (e.g. a flash of light) events are instantaneous points at which 
things come into or go out of existence. 
The arguments above indicate that at least two ontological categories are 
required in order to reflect the metaphysically primitive nature of real change 
(defined in terms of absolute creation and annihilation) and persistence (as 
continuing existence). These two categories characterize each of the objective 
correlates of tense, they also mirror the occurrent-continuant distinction. The 
category of process, suitably defined, provides scope for modelling persistence 
whereas the interaction of processes, formulated as a separate ontological 
category, is able to reflect real change. This ontological framework is developed 
in the following section. 
6.7 The Proposed Ontological Model 
In what follows, I define the two categories required to model the objective 
correlates of tense. I refer to these as ‘pure process’ and ‘interaction event’ to 
distinguish these ontological categories from the terms ‘process’ and ‘event’, as 
used in ordinary language. In § 6.8 I describe how the ontological categories 
described account for the inter-connection of the terms ‘process’ and ‘event’ in 
ordinary discourse. 
 DefPP: x is a pure process =def x exemplifies a continuity, repetition or 
on-goingness, of some functionally specified activity. 
DefIE: x is an interaction event =def x is an interaction between two or 
more pure processes and is a point of novel creation and/or 
annihilation of pure processes. 
In defining the category of pure process I part company with the process 
ontologies of Rescher and Seibt; this is required in order to establish the 
ontological distinction between persistence and real change. For both Rescher 
and Seibt although the defining feature of the category of process is continuity, 
in the form of a functional unity, processes encompass change by manifesting an 
internal functional differentiation or complexity; change is thereby merely 
functional variation and not real, metaphysical change (§ 6.5). 
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The category of pure process is not characterised by internal functional 
differentiation. The category includes, as its models, those processes that Seibt 
would describe as subjectless activities, processes that are maximally 
temporally automerous, such as snowing and raining. It also includes physical 
processes such as oscillating, vibrating and inertial motion. On a fundamental 
level pure processes exhibit a continuity of existence and thereby reflect the 
metaphysically primitive nature of persistence. As such pure processes are 
continuants. 
As argued above, the interaction of pure processes has to be primitive in order 
for the ontology to be compatible with a reductionist theory of spacetime. The 
category of interaction event, as the point at which pure processes come into or 
go out of existence, reflects the primitive nature of real, metaphysical change. 
The model for interaction events are instantaneous events that occur or 
happen, such as a flash of light or the Big Bang; interaction events are therefore 
archetypal occurrents. 
As defined the two categories are mutually interdependent and equally 
primitive. Interaction events depend upon the interaction of pure processes and 
pure processes depend upon interaction events to come into existence. 
Connecting the categories in this way resolves Simons’ (2000) ‘puzzling duality’ 
between continuants and occurrents; it also provides a means of reconciling the 
two opposing aspects of reality represented by persistence and real change. 
This has intuitive appeal. An ontological scheme which regards both 
continuants and occurrents as equally primitive and mutually dependent 
explains why we require both in our conceptual scheme of reality, and why the 
arguments on both sides of the debate are persuasive. The analysis of causal 
statements suggests that events, as occurrents, are required as causal relata 
(Davidson, 2001, p. 166). The logical form of certain sentences also supports a 
prima facie ontological commitment to events (Davidson, 2001, p. 136).134 On 
the other hand, continuants (such as objects and substances) provide a constant 
                                                        
134 The example Davidson provides is that the statement ‘Brutus stabbed Caesar in the back’ (a 
three-place relation) entails that ‘Brutus stabbed Caesar’ (a two-place relation); yet this 
entailment is difficult to explain unless we accept the existence of a certain event (the stabbing 
of Caesar by Brutus) with an associated property of being done to Caesar’s back. 
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frame of reference sufficient to ground the re-identification of particulars over 
time (Strawson, 1959). It also seems difficult to conceive of insubstantial events, 
to this extent events seem to require continuants; complex events (such as a 
wedding) appear to presuppose persisting objects which participate in them 
and which continue to exist before and after the event. The category of 
continuant is also needed to account for those ‘boring’ continuants, mentioned 
previously, that exemplify no change. 
There are three outstanding issues to resolve and these will be addressed in the 
remainder of this chapter: 
1. Further clarification is needed as to how the proposed ontological model 
aligns with the use of the terms ‘process’ and ‘event’ in ordinary 
discourse; in particular, how the term ‘event’ covers both instantaneous 
and temporally extended occurrences. 
2. The mutual dependency between the categories of pure process and 
interaction event, as defined, gives rise to the potential for a vicious 
circularity and infinite regress. 
3. There is a need to demonstrate how the proposed ontological scheme 
gives rise to (B-series) spacetime as the structure of reality (requirement 
R2). This is necessary to show that the proposed presentist model is 
compatible with physical theory (requirement R1). 
The first issue will be considered in the following section (§ 6.7.1) which 
considers an additional feature of events, boundedness. This serves to 
characterise better the difference between process and event, as employed in 
normal parlance, whilst reconciling linguistic usage with the underlying 
ontological reality. The notion of boundedness also provides the route to 
understanding how spacetime arises from a reality structured by categories 
that reflect the primitive nature of persistence and metaphysical change (issue 
3). This will be examined in § 6.8.1 where an argument is made for an alignment 
between the proposed ontological scheme and Belkind’s (2012) Primitive 
Motion Relationalism. The threat raised by the second issue will be ameliorated 
when the full ontological hierarchy is set out in § 6.7.3. 
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6.7.1 The Role of Boundedness in Connecting Processes and Events  
An intimate connection between processes and events is reflected in ordinary 
language use and this is related to the intrinsically temporal nature of both. A 
process such as photosynthesis involves what are described as events - such as 
the interaction that occurs between a photon of light and a molecule of 
chlorophyll. Equally, temporally extended events, such as a wedding, include 
processes, for example, the procession of the bride down the aisle and the 
signing of the register. This intrinsic connection might explain the fact that, as 
Galton and Mizoguchi (2009, p. 79) note, ‘the literature displays a strong 
tendency to gloss over the distinction between processes and events’.  
For process theorists (e.g. Salmon, 1984) the distinction between process and 
event is normally given in terms of temporal duration. Events, such as an 
explosion, are relatively localised and of shorter duration than processes. In the 
limit, events are instantaneous and so can be seen as processes of minimal 
temporal extent. A similar characterisation is made by Seibt (2007), for her 
events are (general) processes with a distinct mereological signature, namely 
minimal temporal automerity. However, a distinction on the basis of temporal 
duration does not accommodate the fact that, in normal language use, events 
can also be temporally extended. In virtue of being so, they can encompass 
sequences of smaller events and processes. 
In the following I introduce the concept of ‘boundedness’ to explicate further 
the category difference between pure process and interaction event and, in 
doing so, understand how the term ‘event’ is used to cover both instantaneous 
and temporally extended occurrences. I borrow the term ‘boundedness’ from 
Galton and Mizoguchi (2009, p. 75), though I employ it in a different way. They 
suggest that, in addition to a distinction in terms of temporal duration, the 
difference between process and event can be given in terms of discreteness, in a 
manner aligned with the count-mass distinction. Events are discrete and can be 
referred to using count nouns (e.g., one explosion) whereas processes are non-
discrete and referred to using mass nouns (e.g., water, running). 
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In line with this distinction, Galton and Mizoguchi regard events as 
characterised by ‘boundedness’, and they emphasise that boundedness is to be 
carefully distinguished from having short temporal duration:  
[…] boundedness is a precondition for the assignment of any definite 
duration: processes endure, but only once we have assigned bounds to 
them can we speak of duration, and the act of assigning bounds means 
that we have switched our attention from the process to an event. (2009, 
p. 75) 
It is important to note that, as with other process theorists, switching between 
‘process’ and ‘event’ is a matter of granularity for Galton and Mizoguchi, related 
to the level of conceptualisation of a given event or process. There is no 
implication of an ontological distinction.  
Nonetheless, the concept of boundedness is a useful one which I will employ to 
indicate an ontological distinction between the categories of pure process and 
interaction event. As I use it, boundedness is an existential, rather than a 
temporal, notion. Interaction events are (existentially) bounded to the extent 
that they represent points at which things come into existence and/or go out of 
existence. Conversely, pure processes (construed as the continuity of some 
functionally-specified activity, for example, harmonic motion) are unbounded, 
to the extent that they continue on in existence or recur. 
Concrete events, particulars to which we assign the term ‘events’ in normal 
discourse, all involve (at the ontological level) the occurrence of interaction 
events. This applies to both instantaneous and temporally extended events. 
Nonetheless, there is an ontologically significant difference between them. In 
the extreme, an instantaneous event, such as a collision or flash of light, involves 
a single interaction event, or one point at which something is brought into, or 
goes out of, existence. Instantaneous events can therefore be described as 
asymmetrically existentially bounded and it is in virtue of this that, in the limit, 
they have no duration. In contrast, a temporally extended event, such as World 
War I, to which we assign a definite temporal interval, consists of two 
interaction events (at the ontological level) and these define the beginning and 
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the end of the temporal interval. Temporally extended events can be described 
as symmetrically bounded and, as such, possess a duration. The interaction 
event that defined the start of WWI was the assassination of Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand of Austria on 28 June, 1914; the interaction event that ended the war 
was the signing of the armistice agreement on 11 November, 1918. Events, 
regardless of their temporal extent, are ontologically distinguished from 
processes in so far as they consist of one or more interaction events (defined as 
points of existential creation and/or annihilation). This accounts for why, in 
normal language usage, the term ‘event’ can refer both to instantaneous and 
temporally extended particulars. 
In everyday language there are occasions where the descriptors ‘process’ and 
‘event’ are applied to one and the same particular, depending upon the 
conceptual focus of the assertion. This can also be explained in terms of the 
underlying ontology using the categories described. For example, the Battle of 
Hastings is described as a ‘process’ to signpost those features of it that 
exemplify a functional continuity, or recurrence – features that represent pure 
processes, ontologically speaking. It is a ‘process’ in so far as each 
spatiotemporal part of it (to a certain level of granularity) exhibits fighting. It 
can also be described as an ‘event’ to the extent that we wish to assign a definite 
temporal interval over which it took place. In assigning it a temporal interval, 
the beginning and end of that interval will consist (at the ontological level) of 
interaction events. It will later be seen that the boundedness of interaction 
events provides for the objective spatiotemporal intervals between events in 
Minkowski spacetime; the argument for this will be given in § 6.8.2.  
In the following section I explain how the two mutually dependent categories of 
pure process and interaction event account for complex, everyday particulars. I 
then address the issue (issue 2, § 6.7) that a potential vicious circularity arises 
from the proposed ontological framework, by introducing a third category into 




6.7.2 Accounting for Complex Entities 
In addition to explaining how the term ‘event’ in normal usage can indicate both 
instantaneous and temporally extended events, I also need to show how the 
proposed ontology accounts for complex, everyday, concrete particulars, 
whether these are described as objects, events or processes. 
Complex entities both persist and change to varying degrees, and a dual 
category ontology, under which occurrents and continuants are equally 
primitive and mutually dependent, accounts for the apparently contradictory 
nature indicated by the problem of temporary intrinsics. It also accounts, as 
seen above, for the intimate connection between processes and events in 
normal language. 
Everyday, macroscopic, concrete particulars are a hierarchical complex, 
involving an interplay of pure processes and interaction events. The life span of 
any concrete object begins with an interaction event and ends with an 
interaction event; however, describing a given life span is relative to any one of 
multiple levels of granularity that corresponds with our conceptual focus and 
linguistic practice. At one level we might consider the beginning of an apple’s 
life to be the interaction event that is the interaction between the sperm 
(present in pollen deposited on a flower) and an ovule in the flower’s ovary. On 
another level of conceptualisation, the apple’s life starts when cell division 
begins and the petals surrounding the nascent fruit have fallen, alternatively it 
could be considered to be the point at which the fully developed apple has 
fallen, or is picked, from the tree. Regardless of the level of our conceptual 
perspective, the point at which a defined temporal period begins and ends 
consists of some interaction event and in each case this is an interaction of pure 
processes and the point at which pure processes are either created or 
annihilated.  
If we take the beginning of the apple’s life to correspond with fertilisation, the 
pure processes involved in the interaction event are the motion of the sperm 
(from the pollen, down the style, and into the ovary) and the continuing 
existence of the ovule. The motion of the sperm is a pure process since motion 
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counts as a continuing, or recurrent, dynamic. The continuing existence of the 
ovule is a pure process as it exemplifies persistence (defined as continuing 
existence). The interaction event is the interaction of these two pure processes 
and is the point at which a new pure process is created, in this case, a fertilised 
seed which continues on in existence. The interaction event is also the point of 
annihilation of the two interacting pure processes – the motion of the sperm 
and the continuant ovule. 
The life of the apple, between its creation and annihilation, is a pure process 
since it is the recurrence (or continuing existence) of a specific functional unity 
of biological processes common to apples and determined by its genetic code. At 
a finer level of complexity its life also consists of a series of defined stages each 
of which is bounded by interaction events. For example, cell division, cell 
expansion, starch accumulation, starch decline, ripening, and ultimately the 
decay of the flesh. The life of an apple may also be terminated by a more clear-
cut interaction event; such as being crushed in a cider press. 
Charlotte’s park run on Monday morning is another example of a complex 
particular which consists of both pure processes and interaction events. 
Charlotte’s running is a pure process as it involves an activity (‘running’) that is 
the repetition of a functionally defined dynamic. It is also temporally bounded 
and so can be described as an event, that took place between 9.00am and 
9.30am, since it is bounded by interaction events. Charlotte’s running comes 
into existence at an interaction event, such as her first step onto the pavement 
as she leaves, and it terminates at an interaction event - the slamming of her 
front door when she returns. 
In the absence of a separate ontological category of interaction event, a purely 
process ontology struggles to account for how it is that concrete processes 
come into, and go out of, existence. Equally, in the absence of a separate 
category of pure process, a purely event-based ontology struggles to account for 
the continuing existence of particulars. This is supported by considering 
extreme examples of both continuants and occurrents. The ideal ‘boring’ 
continuant, a perfectly formed rock that continues on in existence without ever 
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undergoing any change, cannot be adequately modelled under a purely event-
based ontology. Even if it is conceded that, in reality, such a continuant requires 
a creation event to bring it into existence, it does not seem possible to account 
for its continuing existence as a series of happenings, or events. Similarly, at the 
other extreme, the possibility of subjectless events, such as a flash of light 
(Strawson, 1959, p. 46), shows that not all events require the existence of 
continuants (e.g., one that flashes). In this case, it is difficult to accommodate 
such archetypal occurrents, which simply come into and go out of existence, 
under a purely process ontology.                                
In conclusion, the mutual dependency between the two ontological categories, 
of pure process and interaction event, under the proposed model provides a 
better explanation of complex entities, and the fact that they can both persist 
and change. It also accounts for the intimate connection between processes and 
events that is reflected in ordinary discourse.  
6.7.3 A Third Ontological Category – Concrete Substance 
The mutual ontological dependency between the two categories of pure process 
and interaction event raises the spectre of a vicious circularity and a potential 
infinite regress, as noted in § 6.7. This is addressed by the introduction of a 
third ontological category - the category of concrete substance - that sits above 
the categories of pure process and interaction event in the proposed ontological 
hierarchy. 
The need to posit an additional ontological category is not only indicated by the 
potential threat of circularity. In the absence of some underlying material 
substance it is difficult to conceive of either a pure process or an interaction 
event. In the case of a pure process, there has to be something that continues on 
or recurs. Motion, previously cited as a category model for pure process, has to 
be the motion of some thing or material entity. It is equally difficult to conceive 
of an insubstantial interaction event; even a subjectless instantaneous event, 
such as a flash, has to consist of something, such as a flash of light or photons. 
Aside from this argument, the requirement for an additional ontological 
category is also informed by Quantum Field Theory. 
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Quantum Field Theory (QFT) is established as the predominant conceptual 
framework for describing matter at the fundamental level as it represents the 
empirically successful unification of Quantum Mechanics with the Special 
Theory of Relativity. As such, it is the best theory to date of the underlying 
structure of the physical universe. However, the extent to which QFT indicates 
an underlying ontology has been the subject of much debate; the central issue is 
whether a wave or a particle ontology is the better supported.  
Physical theories are divided into those that are mathematically described in 
terms of particles (such as Newtonian mechanics) and those modelled by fields 
using wave equations (such as electromagnetism). Particles are discrete entities 
whereas fields are continua. However, the quantum field of QFT can be arrived 
at using two different routes, either through the quantisation of classical fields 
(this supports a wave interpretation) or by the quantisation of classical 
mechanics (which supports the particle interpretation). Added to this is the 
empirically verified observation that quantum phenomena can exhibit both 
wave and particle aspects (so-called ‘wave-particle duality’), depending upon 
the experimental set-up. Kuhlmann (2002, 2018) provides a comprehensive 
discussion of the arguments on both sides of the field versus particle debate, 
and their contrasting ontological implications. 
The quantum nature of the quantum field ostensibly supports a particle 
interpretation to the extent that a particle is essentially discrete. The quanta of 
the quantum field are quantised (or discrete) excitations of the field and 
possess quantised units of energy and momentum. However, the 
indistinguishability of quantum particles means that they are not re-identifiable 
individuals (Redhead, 1982) and the non-locality135 of quanta also counts 
against a particle interpretation; unlike a field a particle cannot be found in two 
separate spatial areas.  
The debate over the ontology of quantum field theory highlights that the 
quantum field, as peculiarly quantum in nature, is not adequately characterised 
under either a classical particle or a classical field ontology, but it exhibits 
                                                        
135 Non-locality is described in more detail in § 1.4.3. 
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aspects of both. Nonetheless, what may be concluded is that there is a 
substantial something at the fundamental level that is characterised by positive 
values of energy and momentum even in the absence of matter, irrespective of 
how we may describe it within the theory. This substantial something reflects 
the sum total of energy-momentum from which the concrete universe is 
constituted. As such, the existence of an underlying substantial something 
indicates the need to posit a third ontological category, that of concrete 
substance, on which to ground the categories of pure process and interaction 
event. This ontological hierarchy is illustrated in Figure 6.1. 
 
 
Positing a third ontological category of concrete substance addresses the issue 
(raised in § 6.7) that the mutual dependency between pure process and 
interaction event could generate a vicious circularity, and an infinite regress. 
The hierarchy proposed indicates that both pure process and interaction event 
are two categories, or modes, of an underlying concrete substance. At the 
fundamental level this substance exists as the quantum field which possesses 
energy-momentum and exhibits a wave–particle duality. The wave-particle 
duality of concrete substance is reflected in the mutual dependence, and equally 
primitive status, of the categories in the second tier of the ontological 
framework – pure process and interaction event. The wave-like aspects of the 
quantum field are modelled as fluctuations or excitations in energy density of 
an underlying continuum. In this manner the quantum field reflects the 
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continuant nature of pure process and its characterisation in terms of a 
recurrent, functionally specified dynamic. The discrete, particle nature of the 
quantum field is revealed when there are interactions between quantum fields 
and these are associated with the creation and annihilation of particles at the 
fundamental level (Redhead, 1982, pp. 86-88). To this extent the quantum field 
is also occurrent in nature and aligns with the category of interaction event: as 
defined (§6.7), interaction events are (primitive) interactions between pure 
processes that result in novel creation and/or annihilation. 
6.7.4 The Complete Ontological Model 
The ontological hierarchy described is proposed as compatible with both 
presentism and our best theories of physics. In the following section I show that 
the intrinsically spatiotemporal nature of concrete substance arises in virtue of 
this inter-dependence between the distinct categories of pure process and 
interaction event. This mechanism has been alluded to previously in accounting 
for temporal duration. 
Before proceeding further there is a need to complete the ontological model 
with the addition of a fourth category, that of ‘powerful property’. The category 
of powerful property will be seen to have an important role to play in 
accounting for causation. In particular, within Chapter 7 I recommend a realist, 
productive account of causation, compatible with the ontology proposed here, 
as a method that allows the presentist to avoid the problems encountered when 
causation is seen as an existence-entailing relation. Under this account, 
properties are regarded in a dispositional manner, as ‘powerful’ properties, 
whose causal role (as dispositions-to-do) is essential to them. Powerful 
properties may additionally have a qualitative aspect to them, such as the 
property ‘redness’. The apple’s redness is an intrinsic quality (associated with 
the presence of carotenoids), nonetheless it is also dispositional: it has the 
disposition to reflect light in the red wavelength.136   
                                                        
136 This is similar to Heil’s characterisation of properties as ‘powerful qualities’ (2012, p.61); 
such an approach blurs the distinction between the categorical and the dispositional. 
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The addition of powerful properties, dispositionally construed, completes the 
ontological model and this is shown in Figure 6.2, which illustrates the relations 
between the different categories employed. This is not implied to be an 
exhaustive ontological scheme, and it remains neutral on the status of, for 
example, propositions and other abstract entities. Nonetheless, it provides an 
ontological schema sufficient to explain the spatiotemporal nature of concrete 













The arrows in Figure 6.2 describe the relationships that exist between the 
different categories. Concrete substance exemplifies powerful properties and 
the latter depend upon the former in the sense described by Tahko and Lowe’s 
(2016, §1) notion of ‘rigid existential dependence’. Pure process and interaction 
event are categories that represent modes of (propertied) concrete substance, 
or the dynamic ways that concrete substance is. Concrete substance enacts, or 
participates in, both pure processes and interaction events and, in doing so, it 
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In the remainder of this chapter I use the mechanism of Belkind’s (2012) 
Primitive Motion Relationalism to argue that this proposed ontology for 
presentism is compatible with a reductionist account of B-theory relativistic 
spacetime. In § 6.8 I first outline Belkind’s theory, I then argue that the core 
elements of Belkind’s model structurally align with the categories of the 
presentist ontology I have proposed (§ 6.8.1). Though Belkind’s model is 
equally compatible with an eternalist ontology, I argue (§ 6.8.2) that the 
boundedness of interaction events secures a uniquely presentist model of the 
structure of spacetime. I also provide an illustration, on the basis of a simple 
light clock, of how temporal duration can be understood as arising from the 
ontological categories proposed. 
6.8 Deriving Spacetime – Primitive Motion Relationism 
Belkind’s (2012) Primitive Motion Relationalism is a relational theory of 
spacetime that derives both Galilean and flat137 relativistic spacetime from an 
axiomatic system under which both uniform, unidirectional motion and the 
intersection of such motions are primitive.138 The key definitions and axioms 
comprising Belkind’s system, together with a summary of his argument, are set 
out in Appendix 2.  
Belkind’s theory is constructed from ‘Paradigms of Uniform Motion’ (PUMs); 
these are primitive entities exemplified by the motions of free particles, isolated 
systems and light signals. The model takes uniform, unidirectional motion as 
the fundamental state of physical reality. Belkind’s reasoning is based on the 
‘criterion of isolation’ which, he argues, is central to scientific practice. In order 
to investigate the properties of a system it needs to be isolated from its 
environment. Within Newtonian systems, the criterion of isolation provides that 
a system is isolated if and only if it moves with uniform, unidirectional motion 
(this applies to both free particles and composite systems). Given that the 
criterion of isolation occupies an a priori place in scientific practice, Belkind 
                                                        
137 The term ‘flat’ refers to four-dimensional, Minkowski spacetime in the absence of matter. 
This is the spacetime of STR. The presence of matter leads to a curvature of spacetime, which is 
described by the Einstein Field Equations of GTR. 
138 Although Belkind derives both Galilean and relativistic spacetimes from his axiomatic system 
he has yet to extend this to the general relativistic case. 
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argues, ‘it seems logical to take uniform unidirectional motion as a basic, 
fundamental state of physical systems’ (p.60). 
Events, or spacetime points (2012, p. 63), are the intersections of such motions 
(PUMs) and are also primitive. The spatiotemporal metrics139 of flat, relativistic 
spacetime are then derived from the geometrical relations between events. In 
Chapter 2 (§ 2.5.1) I argue that time, as it functions within physical theory, is 
defined in terms of physical clocks, and such systems always involve motion, of 
one form or another. Temporal duration is therefore derivative of motion. This 
aligns with Belkind’s theory which implies that any measured duration, or 
interval, between events is inseparable from the motion (PUM) that constitutes 
the process by which clocks are calibrated. Space and time are dependent on 
motion. As Belkind notes:  
The abstraction of duration and length from the process by which clocks 
and rods are implicitly calibrated generates the impression that duration 
and length exist independently of one another and independently of the 
motion of bodies. However, if the geometry of PUMs describes spacetime 
reality, the concept of duration and length should always be assessed as 
the duration and length that elapse between events generated by 
uniformly moving objects. (2012, p.76) 
The spatiotemporal interval (ds2) between events in spacetime is therefore 
given by the possible paths, or motions, of the light rays able to connect those 
events. The velocity (in other words, the motion) of light is invariant for all 
observers (regardless of their state of relative motion) and, as such, light 
provides an absolute standard of motion intervals.  It is because of this that the 
spatiotemporal interval between any two events (or spacetime points) is the 
same for all observers, even though they may decompose this interval (motion) 
into different spatial and temporal components (it is this that gives rise to the 
                                                        
139 A spatiotemporal metric is a measure of the (spatial and temporal) distance between points 
in spacetime. For Minkowski spacetime this is given by the Minkowski metric, ds2, where ds2 = 
c2Δt2 - Δx2 - Δy2 - Δz2, where c is the velocity of light. 
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relativistic kinematic effects of time dilation and length contraction described in 
Chapter 3). 
In championing a relational model of spacetime, Belkind (similarly, Brown, 
2005) argues against the position that the reification of spacetime is needed in 
order to explain and determine (in a causal sense) the inertial motion of bodies. 
The latter is the view that regards spacetime as ‘directing’ bodies to move along 
its geodesics. For Belkind inertial motion requires no such explanation, in line 
with Newton’s First Law of Motion inertial motion is a default state of matter.140  
In postulating inertial motion as primitive, Belkind’s model differs from other 
relational accounts of spacetime (e.g. Teller, 1987 and Dieks, 2001) that regard 
spacetime coordinates as physical quantities that are realised by objects. 
Belkind regards such an approach as laden with interpretive problems.141 Aside 
from the success Belkind’s model demonstrates in deriving both Galilean and 
Minkowski spacetime, its principal benefit is that Einstein’s Principle of 
Relativity142 is generated as a natural consequence of his model under which 
uniform motion (including light-waves) is considered primitive. This is not the 
case with other relational models (such as ‘dynamical relationism’143), and even 
under the STR the derivation of the structure of flat relativistic spacetime 
requires that the Principle of Relativity is assumed as an axiom of the theory. In 
accepting the shortcomings of his version of dynamical relationism, Brown 
admits that under his theory it is just an ‘unexplained, brute fact’ (2005, p.143) 
that all the fundamental laws of physics happen to obey the Principle of 
Relativity. Yet, as Belkind suggests, ‘the Principle of Relativity seems to beg an 
independent explanation since it would be a miraculous accident if it just 
                                                        
140 Further arguments in support of a relational, over a substantival, view of spacetime are 
presented in Chapter 2 (in relation to the ‘problem of time’ within quantum gravity) and will not 
be further considered here. 
141 For example, position appears inherently relational in a way in which mass, as an exemplary 
physical quantity, is not. 
142 The Principle of Relativity asserts the equivalence of the laws of physics in all inertial 
reference frames. 
143 Dynamical Relationism reduces spacetime to the structure of dynamic laws; the latter serve 
to determine potential spacetime positions and velocities of bodies.  Kinematic relativistic 
effects therefore arise from the underlying dynamics of physical processes. Such approaches are 
advocated by Brown and Pooley (2006), Brown (2005), Dieks (2001) and Teller (1987). 
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happened that all dynamic laws are Lorentz-covariant’ (p. 56),144 and it is only 
Belkind’s theory that appears to offer such an independent explanation. 
Additional support for an approach which sees motion as primitive is implied in 
a point made by Dorato (2007, p. 98). Dorato, in reviewing Brown’s (2005) 
theory, notes that scientific revolutions often involve reclassifying, as ‘natural’, 
phenomena that were previously felt to require a causal explanation. He gives 
the example of the transition from Newtonian gravitational theory (which 
describes ‘causal’ gravitational forces) to the General Theory of Relativity. 
Within the latter a causal explanation is redundant since free-fall is considered 
the ‘natural’ state of bodies. But if free-fall is a ‘natural’ state of matter, then why 
should we not also consider inertial motion to be a natural state of matter, as 
indicated by Newton’s First Law? Although Belkind has yet to extend his model 
to a derivation of the spacetime of GTR, it seems reasonable to conjecture that 
such an extension is possible and, if so, it seems likely to be arrived at by 
employing entities in free-fall as the primitive elements in the model. 
In the following section I argue that the categories of pure process and 
interaction event, defined within the ontological model developed in this thesis, 
possess category features that structurally align with the axiomatic elements of 
Belkind’s model. If the argument for alignment can be successfully made, this 
suggests that a presentist ontology can at least be shown to be compatible with 
relativistic spacetime of STR and its predicted kinematic effects, namely, length 
contraction and time dilation. 
6.8.1 Alignment Between Belkind’s Model and the Proposed 
Ontology for Presentism 
Belkind’s model is constructed solely on the basis of two, primitive, structural 
elements: uniform, unidirectional motions (PUMs) and events (the intersections 
of these motions). From these two principal elements, together with certain 
                                                        
144 Lorentz-covariance is a property of dynamical equations such that if the equations in which 
it is written hold true in one inertial reference frame, then they hold true in all inertial frames. 
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supplementary definitions and axioms (set out in Appendix 2), both Galilean 
and flat relativistic spacetime are derived. 
The first fundamental element of Belkind’s model is uniform, unidirectional 
motions (PUMs). These are exemplified by free particles, isolated systems and 
light signals, all of which exemplify inertial motion. Inertia is a property such 
that an object in motion remains in motion, whilst an object at rest remains at 
rest, unless acted upon by an external force. Inertial motions (and so PUMs) 
exhibit a continuity, or recurrence of an activity, namely, continuing to move 
with a uniform velocity. Consequently, PUMs have a functional alignment with 
the category of pure process under the proposed ontology, as defined in § 6.7. 
PUMs, as pure processes, are also unbounded. Inertial motions continue on in 
existence unless, and until, they intersect with other motions; they thereby 
exemplify persistence (defined as continuing existence) – a defining feature of 
the category of pure process. 
The second primitive element within Belkind’s model is that of ‘event’. He 
defines events as intersections between motions (2012, p. 64).  Though Belkind 
states that ‘since an event is a relation between PUMs, it is not a primitive 
entity’ (p.63), in correspondence I have had with him (21/09/2016) Belkind 
clarifies as follows: ‘the notion of intersection comes out to be a primitive 
relation between two motions. So an intersection is not an entity like a point or 
a particle, but a relation that holds or does not hold between two motions.’ 
Thus, for Belkind, events as intersections are primitive, though they are not 
primitive entities. This aligns structurally with the category definition of 
interaction event under the proposed ontology: interaction events are defined 
as interactions of pure processes (§ 6.7) and interaction, as with Belkind’s 
concept of intersection, is primitive. 
Belkind’s derivation of the structure of relativistic spacetime is built upon these 
two fundamental elements - motions (PUMs) and intersections (events): ‘The 
approach here therefore constructs spacetime from geometric relations 
between motions, first defining events as intersections between motions, and 
then defining geometric relations between those events’ (p.63). The functionally 
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relevant feature of events, in Belkind’s derivation of a relativistic spacetime, is 
that events are intersections of primitive motions and this feature (described as 
‘interaction’) is present within the category definition of interaction event 
under the proposed ontology. Interaction events are thereby spacetime points. 
Similarly, the functionally relevant property of PUMs in Belkind’s derivation is 
continuing, uniform motion. As the continuity of some functionally specified 
dynamic (in this case, motion), PUMs fall under the category of pure process. 
Pure processes, as is the case with PUMs, define the intervals between 
spacetime points. 
I have argued for a functional alignment between the structural elements of 
Belkind’s model and the proposed ontological categories for presentism and, to 
this extent, the ontological model is compatible with a reductionist view of the 
structure of relativistic spacetime. Nonetheless, Belkind’s model is equally 
compatible with an eternalist ontology that also adopts a reductionist account 
of spacetime. Belkind himself is neutral between presentism and eternalism, 
though he does suggest that neither provides an adequate ontological account 
of the spacetime of STR (p. 115), and that a different ontological interpretation 
is required.145 I therefore need to show how a uniquely presentist model is 
achieved; I explain this in the following section in terms of the boundedness of 
interaction events. I then illustrate how temporal duration arises from the 
ontological categories proposed. 
6.8.2 A Presentist Version of Belkind’s Model 
As it stands Belkind’s Primitive Motion Relationism is equally compatible with 
an eternalist ontology, one which regards all motions (PUMs) and all 
intersections of motions (spacetime events) as equally real. Belkind’s theory is 
concerned with deriving the structure of relativistic spacetime, within a 
paradigm aligned with the philosophical commitments of relationism, rather 
than representing the underlying ontology of the corresponding reality. 
                                                        
145 Belkind takes the presentist to be committed to absolute simultaneity or the existence of a 




Nonetheless, a uniquely presentist model of the structure of spacetime may be 
secured using the feature of the boundedness of interaction events, introduced 
in § 6.7.1. Boundedness, it will be recalled, is an existential notion which reflects 
that interaction events (in addition to being interactions of pure processes) are 
points at which entities come into and go out of existence. The incorporation of 
absolute creation and annihilation within the category of interaction event has 
the result that interaction events (which, in alignment with Belkind’s model, are 
intersections of PUMs and so spacetime points) do not exist eternally. An 
ontological framework that aligns in a structurally relevant manner with 
Belkind’s model allows both a presentist and an eternalist schema to derive the 
structure of relativistic spacetime; both schema would describe the same 
structure given by the Minkowski metric, ds2. However, in the case of the 
eternalist ontology the intersections of PUMs are not points of absolute creation 
and annihilation. For the eternalist all intersections (and so events, or 
spacetime points) exist eternally, and on an ontological par with one another. 
This contrasts with the proposed presentist model, under which the 
intersections of PUMs (interaction events) are points of absolute creation and 
annihilation, in this way spacetime events reflect real, metaphysical change.  
At this point it might be questioned how a presentist reality could be structured 
in the manner described by the Minkowski metric, ds2 when the only spacetime 
events that exist are those that exist presently. In particular, how can there be 
an interval (ds2) between events when one of those events is no longer present? 
I address this question in the following section. 
6.8.3 Accounting for Duration 
I use the example of a simple light clock to illustrate how the proposed, 
presentist ontology can give rise to spatiotemporal intervals (or duration), and 
a spatiotemporally structured reality, in the absence of an eternally existing 
framework of spacetime points, or events. This explanation also provides a 
sense in which the present is temporally extended. 
Under Belkind’s model events, or spacetime points, are intersections between 
primitive uniform motions and the spatiotemporal interval (ds2), or duration, 
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between events is given by the primitive motion that connects them. In the 
illustration below, motion, , intersects with motion, , and this defines event, 
A. Motion, , subsequently intersects with motion, , and this defines event, B. 
Events, A and B, are connected by (have in common) motion, , which defines 




Under the presentist version of this model a spacetime event is not only a point 
of interaction (or ‘intersection’) between pure processes (e.g., primitive uniform 
motions) it is also the point at which a pure process comes into existence 
and/or goes out of existence (§ 6.7). A notion of duration (spatiotemporal 
interval) is illustrated using a simple light clock (Figure 6.3) in which light rays 
are reflected between two opposing mirrors.  In this example the pure 
processes that interact are the motions of light rays and the mirrors (as 
persisting entities). 
 
Under the ontology proposed here, event A is an interaction event (defined in § 
6.7): an interaction between two pure processes (motion  and the persisting 
mirror) that creates a new pure process, , (the motion of the reflected light 
signal). In alignment with Belkind’s model, event A is also a spacetime point (§ 
















(between the newly created motion  and the opposing mirror) at which  is 
annihilated. Event A and event B are separated by a spatiotemporal interval 
(ds2) which is given by the motion of  between A and B. This interval is a 
duration, in particular it is the lifespan of the motion between the point of its 
creation and the point of its annihilation. It is important to emphasise that 
motion is defined in terms of a change in distance over time, and so any interval 
of motion (dx/dt) is a spatiotemporal interval (rather than an interval of 
temporal duration). 
Imagine a two-event universe that consists solely of events A and B, and the 
motion of the light signal, , between them. Since there are only two events in 
this universe (the events that are the creation and annihilation of ) there are 
only two spacetime points (A and B), and these equate with the beginning and 
end of this universe. Spacetime points A and B are also spatiotemporally 
related, and their spatiotemporal relation is given by the interval (ds2) provided 
by the motion of . Such a two-event universe is the simplest universe that can 
exhibit a spatiotemporal structure. 
What is it that can be said to be present in this universe? Under Existence 
Presentism (§ 4.8) presence is existence. This universe comes into existence at 
the creation event, A, and so spacetime point A is the ‘beginning’ of what exists 
and so is the ‘beginning’ of what is present. Conversely, the annihilation event, 
spacetime point B, is the ‘end’ of what is present. This means that what is 
present (what exists) in this universe is the continuing motion of the light 
signal, , between A and B. What is present is what continues in existence. The 
motion of  between points A and B therefore gives rise to the spatiotemporal 
extent, or duration, of the present. Since there is nothing, in this simple 
universe, that comes into or goes out of existence other than at A and B, the 
spacetime points A and B represent the boundaries of the present (as existence) 
and the interval between these, given by the motion of the light signal, is the 
spatiotemporal extent, or duration, of the present. 
It will be recalled from § 6.7 that the two ontological categories of pure process 
and interaction event reflect persistence and real, metaphysical change 
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respectively. Thus a present that contains both creation and annihilation (real, 
metaphysical change) and continuing motion (persistence) can exemplify 
objective spatiotemporal structure, compatible with the structure of relativistic 
(B-series) spacetime. This structure is defined by the interval (ds2) that arises 
from the continuing motion of  between its points of creation and annihilation. 
It is in virtue of the inter-dependence of real change and persistence (and the 
ontological categories reflecting them) that the present unfolds and is 
spatiotemporally structured – it both moves on and continually changes. 
A final point to note is that the spatiotemporal relation between spacetime 
points A and B (the interval, ds2, given by the motion, ) is not a cross-time 
relation, in the sense of implying the existence of times (or spacetime points) 
beyond the present. The interval relates spacetime points A and B, but A and B 
are not beyond the present, rather they are creation and annihilation events 
that define the boundaries of what is present. In this simple universe a 
spacetime relation can obtain between two spacetime points without implying 
the existence of anything that is non-present. This, admittedly simple, example 
shows that the presentist can, by adopting Belkind’s relational model of 
spacetime together with the ontology proposed in Chapter 6, explicate some 
notion of a present that is extended and spatiotemporally structured. 
6.9 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have proposed an ontology for presentism which reflects the 
presentist’s commitment to real, metaphysical change. I also hope to have 
shown that it is an ontology that is compatible with a reductionist approach to 
relativistic (B-series) spacetime. 
The interplay between pure process and interaction event gives rise to a 
present that continues on, and in doing so reflects the primitive nature of 
persistence. To this extent the present has ‘duration’ and is ‘extended’. The 
occurrence of interaction events, within the present, reflect real (metaphysical) 
change. As such the present, as that which exists, is continually changing. The 
present continues on through continually changing and it is in this way that 
reality is objectively tensed. 
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The present is also spatiotemporally structured. Interaction events (spacetime 
points) are the boundaries that define the objective and measurable 
spatiotemporal intervals (ds2) of relativistic, Minkowski spacetime. Since, under 
the presentist ontology, interaction events are also points of objective creation 
and annihilation, Minkowski spacetime emerges as the structure of an 
objectively dynamic reality. In this way the compatibilist presentist is 
distinguished from the eternalist, for whom Minkowski spacetime is the 
structure of an objectively static reality (§ 4.7). 
The compatibility of the proposed ontology with the spacetime of STR does not, 
as such, indicate its potential for alignment with either GTR or emerging 
theories of quantum gravity. Nonetheless, the discussions within Chapter 2, of 
the problem of time within quantum gravity, indicate a growing perception that 
there is a need for a new ontology of spacetime.  It is also argued (§ 2.5.1) that 
the concept of time within physical theory is derivative of objective change, and 
therefore that physics can countenance an objectively dynamic reality. It is 
tentatively suggested, therefore, that an alternative ontology for spacetime, one 
that sees time as derivative of an objectively dynamic reality, might be the 
appropriate way towards resolving some of these conceptual issues. 
In the remainder of this thesis I show how the proposed approach to 
presentism can help to ameliorate two particular issues that arise for the 
presentist: cross-time relations and the asymmetry of fixity.  
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CHAPTER 7 – CROSS-TIME RELATIONS & CAUSATION 
7.1 Introduction 
Normal language usage and scientific modelling both make extensive reference 
to what are ostensibly cross-time relations (CTR), such as causal relations. For 
example, yesterday’s storm is described as causing today’s flood.  Comparative 
relations can also be suggestive of a relation that is cross-time. We might 
consider the man next door to be as tall as Socrates. Even simple reference to 
past events and individuals assumes that relations between those entities hold. 
Most presentists would wish to be able to subscribe to the truth of the 
propositions that contain these references. After all, one of the principal 
attractions of presentism is that it reflects a common-sense viewpoint.  
CTR are problematic for presentists. At the core of the issue lies the assumption 
that, in general, for a relation to hold its relata must exist. Inman (2012) refers 
to this as the ‘principle of relations’: in the case of the two-place relation, it is 
the principle that ‘necessarily, if an entity a stands in a relation R to an entity b, 
then a and b exist’ (p. 55). This, in turn, suggests that, contrary to presentism, 
non-present things, such as yesterday’s storm, must exist.  
In this chapter I attempt to address the problem of CTR using the model of 
presentism developed so far. In the first two sections I discuss the main 
approaches presentists employ in dealing with CTR and I highlight their 
shortcomings. I then set out an alternative approach, in line with the ontology 
for presentism outlined in Chapter 6. The first step is to argue, on the basis of a 
distinction between internal and external relations, that the only relations of 
real concern are the paradigmatically external relations: these are 
spatiotemporal and causal relations. The strategy I then follow is to formulate a 
presentist account of causation under which causation, at the level of 
metaphysical analysis, is not a relation. Consequently, cross-time causal claims 
are not relational claims and so do not imply the existence of non-present 
entities. Nonetheless, I concede that under the model proposed cross-time 
spatiotemporal relations remain problematic, and refer to other presentist 
strategies for dealing with these. 
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7.2 Presentist Accounts of Cross-Time Relations 
Presentists have employed a variety of approaches to meet the problem 
presented by CTR and these have been widely discussed.146 These approaches 
generally fall under one of two main strategies. The presentist can accept that 
true CTR claims are made true by cross-time relations but deny that such 
relations are, in a manner that defeats the presentist, existence-entailing. The 
‘principle of relations’ is rejected because the relevant claims do not imply the 
present existence of both relata. 
Under the second strategy, the presentist accepts that relations are existence-
entailing but posits presently existing entities to stand as the relata. Ciuni and 
Torrengo (2013) describe the former strategy as ‘eliminativist’ and the latter as 
‘reductionist’ stances. I consider each of these strategies in turn and highlight 
their limitations. I argue that a productive account of causation offers a route to 
circumventing the problems raised by causal CTR claims, and is better aligned 
with the presentist ontology developed thus far. 
7.2.1 Eliminativist Approaches 
The eliminativist strategy asserts that true CTR claims are made true by CT 
relations. However, since the principle of relations is rejected, cross-time 
relations do not imply the existence of both relata (only the presently existing 
relatum exists). 
For example, Chisholm’s (1990) ‘overlapper’ approach considers any CTR as a 
sequence of overlapping relations. This allows a present entity (e3) to stand in a 
relation to a past entity (e1) in virtue of standing in some other relation with 
another present entity (e2). For example, Emily (e3) stands in the relation being 
the grand-daughter of to the now deceased Edna (e1), in virtue of standing in the 
relation being the daughter of to her currently living mother, Elisabeth (e2). The 
cross-time relational claims made do not, when translated correctly, predicate 
relations between non-present entities. ‘Emily is the grand-daughter of Edna’ is 
                                                        
146 For example, in Adams (1986), Bigelow (1996), Zimmerman (1998), Sider (2001), Crisp 
(2003), and Markosian (2004), De Clercq (2006), Ciuni and Torrengo (2013), Tallant (2018), 
Ingram and Tallant (2018). 
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translated, in tensed terms, as ‘Emily is the daughter of Elisabeth and WAS 
(Elisabeth is the daughter of Edna)’. Tensed operators permit the existence of 
entities to overlap and so bear relations in a manner that is not existence-
entailing. This allows the existence of Elisabeth to overlap the existence of both 
Edna and Emily.   
In criticism, Crisp (2005) denies that the overlapper mechanism provides 
equivalent translations of the given propositions. The original proposition 
describes Emily as bearing a direct relation to her deceased grandmother, 
whereas the translation describes her as bearing a direct relation only to her 
mother. In a similar vein, Davidson (2003) argues that the relation e3Re1 (being 
the grand-daughter of) is not the same relation as the relation e3Re2 (being the 
daughter of) yet it is in virtue of the latter that the former is said to hold. If the 
‘in virtue of’ is not grounded in a similarity of relation, then surely any relation 
should be sufficient. Yet this would render ‘in virtue of’ devoid of any 
explanatory force. Restricting the overlapper mechanism to operate only on 
identical relations (e.g. being the daughter of) fails to help. The correct CTR is 
not generated since Emily is not the daughter of Edna. Nonetheless, a defender 
of Chisholm’s account might retort that the relation being the grand-daughter of 
is the ancestral147 of the relation being the daughter of and it is this that grounds 
the ‘in virtue of’. 
Ciuni and Torrengo (2013) make a similar point to Davidson, though in this case 
they refer to relations between properties: 
For one of the explanatory strategies which overlapping admits is that – 
for instance – in the past the dinosaurs were related to the property of 
being blue and that that property is now related to me […] If the abstract 
properties that do the work can be any abstract property, then there 
would be properties that ground past truths while not being “about” the 
same as the true claims are about. (pp. 224-225) 
                                                        
147 Frege was the first to propose ‘ancestral relations’ in his Begriffsschrift of 1879, as described 
in Zalta (2020). 
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Underlying the eliminativist stance, that cross-time relations are not existence-
entailing on both relata, is an implicit rejection of Quine’s conception of 
ontological commitment. Hinchliff (2010) credits Crisp (2005) with highlighting 
the underlying assumption of an intimate connection between predication, 
quantification and existence. Hinchliff refers to this as the ‘triangle argument’: 
true predication implies that there is an entity to which the predicate applies 
and, since quantification requires existence, the entity in question must exist. In 
rejecting the ‘triangle argument’, Hinchliff offers an alternative, ‘non-committal’ 
quantification based on the notion of a ‘particular’ quantifier (Px). This ranges 
over past, present and future objects without existential implication and is to be 
distinguished from the, more restricted, ‘existential’ quantifier that ranges only 
over existing objects. This rejection of a classical-logical account of 
quantification allows the presentist to quantify over non-existing objects which 
can thereby presently exemplify properties and stand in relations. Undoubtedly 
this is a revisionary solution but, as Inman (2012) argues, such an approach 
cannot be defeated by arguments (such as those of Davidson, 2003) that simply 
beg the question against the presentist’s rejection of the ‘principle of relations’ 
and the consequent denial that CTR are existence entailing. That may be, but of 
equal weight is the criticism that Hinchliff’s invocation of the notion of 
particular quantification appears to be a rather ad hoc move. 
Crisp (2005) attempts to undermine the foundations of the ‘triangle argument’ 
by arguing that the success of the objector’s case rests on a conjunction of two 
claims. The first is the claim that the sentences concerned express Moorean 
facts. The second is that they predicate non-present entities. Crisp argues that if 
the first claim is true then the second is false.  
Moorean facts are ‘something like: a true proposition only a fool could fail to 
believe and believe firmly’ (Crisp, 2005, p. 11). For example, the fact that there 
are material objects or, as Armstrong (1999, p.79) suggests, the fact that ‘things 
move’. Lewis (1999, p.418) describes this type of ‘everyday knowledge’ as that 
which ‘we know better than we know the premises of any philosophical 
argument to the contrary’. 
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Crisp maintains that if claims such as ‘Caroline is the daughter of JFK and Jackie’ 
are true iff, quantifying unrestrictedly, there is something that is JFK, then they 
cannot also express Moorean facts. Although Moorean evidence might be 
available (e.g. medical records, newspaper reports, etc.) to support a tensed 
rendition of the claim (i.e. WAS: Caroline is born to JFK and Jackie) they do not 
suffice as Moorean evidence for sentences such as ‘Caroline bears the daughter 
of relation to JFK and Jackie’. This is because the latter entails ‘quantifying 
unrestrictedly there is something that is identical with JFK’ and no amount of 
evidence available could support the truth of that claim. The objector cannot 
have it both ways. If true CTR claims have existential commitments then they 
cannot also express Moorean facts, since there can be no evidence sufficient to 
support them. Conversely, if the claims do express Moorean facts they cannot be 
predicative of non-present entities, on the same grounds.  
Nonetheless, Crisp (2005, p.14) notes that he faces a difficulty presented by 
cross-time causal relations. It certainly seems to be the case that a Moorean fact 
grounds the truth of ‘yesterday’s downpour (e1) caused today’s flood (e2)’. Yet 
we also wish to assert the existence of a causal relation between the two which 
implies the predication of non-present entities. 
In denying the existence-entailing nature of relations, the eliminativist strategy 
appears to require a revisionary approach to quantification. Though this is not, 
in itself, sufficient reason to reject the strategy, as Crisp notes causal relations 
appear to present particular problems that are not easily remedied. This point 
is reinforced by Sider (1999) who acknowledges that his own eliminativist 
approach148 struggles with causation where this is seen as a relation between 
temporally distinct entities. 
7.2.2 Reductionist Approaches 
For the reductionist, true CTR claims are made true by relations, but in this case 
they are not cross-time relations. The reductionist holds to the principle of 
                                                        
148 Sider’s approach provides that CTR supervene on currently possessed intrinsic properties 
and properties that were possessed by past entities described in tensed terms. However, this 
proves difficult for certain spatiotemporal and causal claims that require spatiotemporal 
individuation of entities no longer in existence (1999, pp. 335-338). 
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relations and so maintains that all relations are existence entailing on both 
relata. In order to avoid the problematic ontological commitments presented by 
cross-time relations, the reductionist strategy involves positing presently 
existing entities as the truthmakers for the relational sentences involved. 
Ostensibly cross-time relations in fact relate presently existing relata. The 
thought here is that, as De Clercq (2006, p.400) suggests, ‘the ontological 
commitments of common sense attributions do not always lie at the 
(grammatical) surface’. The presently existing surrogate entities may be either 
concrete or abstract. Concrete surrogates include present traces of the past, 
such as Lucretian properties (Bigelow, 1996). Abstract entities include ersatz 
times (e.g., Crisp, 2007 and Bourne, 2006), facts (De Clercq, 2006), or properties 
such as thisnesses (Adams, 1986, Ingram, 2016). I describe each of these in 
what follows. 
An influential proponent of the reductionist approach is Bigelow (1996). 
Bigelow considers that the principle of relations is defensible and should be 
accepted by the presentist. He sees it as defensible because it is underpinned by 
the truthmaker principle (every truth requires a truthmaker or ‘truth 
supervenes on being’ (1996, p.38)).149 If a proposition that attributes a two-
place relation is true then there must exist relevant relata.150 Bigelow therefore 
posits ‘Lucretian properties’ to stand as presently existing truthmakers for past 
tensed propositions. Lucretian properties are concrete ‘world properties’ 
possessed either locally or globally as a result of events having occurred. For 
example, a property such as being where Richard III died. 
One criticism of Bigelow’s approach is that it fails the ‘aboutness’ criterion 
(Ingram, 2019, p.110). The proposition <Boudica was fierce> does not appear to 
be about the world yet, under Lucretian Presentism, it is made true by a 
property that is a property of the world. 
                                                        
149 It should be noted that the truthmaker principle is not universally accepted. Beebee and 
Dodd (2005) provide an overview of the contemporary debate, which includes the question of 
how well-motivated the principle is, and its explanatory merit. 
150 However, Bigelow concedes that relations that involve intentionality (e.g., those of desiring, 
seeking and admiring) could conceivably be considered exempt from this; Cuini and Torrengo 
(2013, p.214) concur. 
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Other accounts make use of abstract entities to stand as the relata for CTR. 
Abstract entities (whether types, properties or propositions) can be employed 
to re-describe ostensibly cross-time relations and so avoid the inclusion of non-
present times or entities. In the case of causal relations, De Clercq (2006) 
maintains that facts constitute the primary relata: ‘the fact that the world was a 
certain way is a current fact about the world, and one which may be invoked to 
explain why the world now is a certain way’ (p.389). Causal relations thereby do 
not require any temporal distance to be bridged. Aside from facts, abstract 
properties, such as individual essences, haecceities or thisnesses (e.g. Adams, 
1986, Ingram, 2016) can be employed in a similar manner to represent past 
entities. Once they come into existence such properties are eternal and, unlike 
standard properties, do not require bearers (or at least do not require the 
continuing existence of their bearers). Ingram’s account will be considered in 
more detail in § 7.6 where I deal with spatiotemporal relations. 
The use of abstract entities, as surrogates in the present, might be criticised for 
being ontologically extravagant and so at odds with the ontological parsimony 
that advantages presentism. This is mitigated, to some extent, within ersatz 
presentism (e.g. Crisp, 2007 and Bourne, 2006).  
Ersatz presentism avoids ontological extravagance to a certain extent since it 
posits an abstract set of propositions to represent all past and future times, 
instead of having abstract entities that represent individual concrete 
particulars. These propositions stand as a maximal description of reality at a 
given time. This particular strategy, however, presents a risk of incompatibility 
with relativistic physics in so far as it appears to rely upon reality being sliced 
into unique temporal portions, each with its own maximal set of propositions. 
This contravenes relativity theory (Chapter 3), which denies the existence of 
unique, universal hyperplanes of simultaneity. Ingthorsson (2019, p. 58) and 
Mozersky (2015, p.44) also point to the dangers that this mechanism poses to 
the ontological priority of the present, if ersatz times are seen as truthmakers. 
This is not so serious in the case of past times since the corresponding ersatz 
times could have the same (ontological) status as present traces of past events. 
However, this cannot work for future ersatz times. Unlike Lucretian properties 
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(qua concrete), the epistemic status of ersatz times is also unclear: ‘It is still the 
case that we learn about dinosaurs from fossils in the ground and not by 
accessing a realm of abstract propositions’ (Ingthorsson, 2019, p.58). Abstract 
entities do not justify our beliefs about the past but physical records can. 
One problem that appears to the fore is that if the presently existing surrogate 
entities (such as ersatz times) represent previously existing states of affairs, and 
if representation is itself an external relation, then the problem remains. The 
reductionist who concedes the existence-entailing nature of relations seems still 
to be committed to the existence of those past states of affairs. A more 
significant concern against the use of abstract entities is that paradigmatically 
external relations (namely spatiotemporal and causal relations) seem 
inextricably bound up with the nature of concrete reality and, to this extent, 
must in some manner relate concrete (rather than abstract) entities. This seems 
true irrespective of the particular model of spacetime or causation to which one 
subscribes. 
There is a more general point to be made here too: any account that depends 
upon presently existing surrogates for CTR (whether concrete or abstract) 
appears to fall foul of Tallant and Ingram’s (2015) ‘nefarious argument’. As 
referred to previously (§ 5.4.4), Tallant and Ingram deny that the presentist 
requires presently existing truthmakers for CTR, or indeed for any true claim, p, 
about the past. The argument proceeds as follows. Any presently existing 
truthmaker, E, the presentist might adopt must exist in virtue of some other 
entity, e, having existed. This has to be the case in order that E does its job in 
providing sufficient ontological grounds for the truth of p. And if the presentist 
concedes that such an in virtue of relation does obtain151 between e and E (and 
this seems unavoidable) then E is redundant. If the in virtue of relation does hold 
then it is a sufficiently strong modal relation, in and of itself, to provide the right 
ontological grounds for the truth of p.  They therefore recommend that the 
presentist subscribes to a ‘nefarious strategy of cheating’: there is no 
requirement for presently existing truthmakers since facts about the past (and, 
                                                        




similarly, singular propositions) are simply constituted by entities that used to 
exist, but do not exist now. 
7.2.3 Conclusions 
Despite the various strategies employed, cross-time relations do present 
problems for the presentist. Reductionist strategies have limitations associated 
with their requirement for presently existing surrogates. Viewed as concrete 
properties they need to pass the ‘aboutness’ test. Regarded as abstract 
properties, they fall foul of the sense that both spatiotemporal and causal 
relations essentially relate concrete entities. However, more generally, the 
employment of presently existing surrogates in any guise is undermined by 
Tallant and Ingram’s (2015) ‘nefarious argument’. Eliminativist approaches, on 
the other hand, require a revisionary approach to quantification. Although the 
eliminativist denies the existence-entailing nature of relations, cross-time 
causal relations, nonetheless, present particular problems, and this is because 
causation is seen as a relation between temporally distinct entities. In what 
follows I utilise the ontology proposed in Chapter 6 to develop an alternative 
position to the eliminativist and the reductionist accounts of causal CTR; this 
position hinges on regarding causation as production rather than as a relation 
between temporally separated entities.  
7.3 Dealing with CTR under the Proposed Account 
The approach I take is, firstly, to draw a distinction between internal and 
external relations and, then, to adopt the position that, where they occur, all 
genuine concrete relations are external. Given this, the strategy that follows is 
to adopt an account of causation under which causation is not a relation. I then 
describe why the account does not seem to offer a mechanism to deal with 
problematic cross-time spatiotemporal relations. 
7.3.1 Internal Versus External Relations 
Simons (2010) draws a distinction between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ relations, 
for a true relational claim aRb, as follows: 
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If it is possible that a and b both exist and it not be the case that aRb, 
then if aRb we say the relational predication is true externally. If it is not 
possible that a and b both exist and it not be the case that aRb, then 
where aRb we say the relational predication is true internally. (2010, p. 
203) 
The position that follows from this is that internal relational predications do not 
require relational truthmakers: the existence of a and b suffices to ground the 
truth of the relevant relational claim. Suppose Simmias bears the is taller than 
relation to Socrates. The truthmaker for this relational claim can simply be 
provided by Simmias, together with his property of being 6ft tall, and Socrates, 
with his property of being 5ft 8 inches tall, without recourse to an additional 
ontological entity: the relation being-taller-than. Such internal relations involve 
‘no addition of being’ (Heil, 2012, p. 145); they are not genuine, concrete 
relations in the ontic sense. Bourne (2006) describes these as ‘determinables’ 
(p.96), rather than ‘relations’ for this reason. 
Heil (2012, Ch 7) traces to Russell (1903, §214) the notion that relations are 
ontologically fundamental and, consequently, the idea that all relations require 
relational truthmakers. For Heil, there is an implied epistemic fallacy at work 
here. There is no necessity for an exact, or one-to-one, isomorphic ‘mapping’ 
between our conceptual frameworks and the ontological structure of the 
universe. This means that the truth of any conceptual representation of the 
world (whether in language or scientific theory) does not guarantee that it tells 
us what the universe must be like (ontologically) if that theory is true; hence, 
for example, the divergent philosophical interpretations of quantum theory. 
Analogously, although true relational claims are ineliminable in our 
representations of the universe, they need not be made true by relations, and 
claims involving internal relations provide such examples.  
This distinction between internal and external relations provides the presentist 
with a means of dealing with CTR in a presentist-friendly fashion. By construing 
cross-time relations, as far as possible, as internal relations they can be handled 
without the associated existence-entailing commitments. Sider (1999, pp. 332-
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336), though not a presentist himself, advocates dealing with ostensive cross-
time claims, such as ‘Tim is as tall as Socrates’, as predicating internal relations. 
Their truth supervenes on currently possessed intrinsic properties (the 
property that Tim possesses of being 5ft 8in tall) and properties that were 
possessed by past entities, the latter being described in tensed terms (WAS: 
Socrates is 5ft 8in tall).  
The problem, as Sider himself concedes, is that this mechanism does not work 
for paradigmatically external relations, such as spatiotemporal and causal 
relations. External relations, as defined, are ontically significant and involve an 
‘addition of being’ over and above the entities so related. This means that an 
additional strategy is required, and this is proposed in what follows. 
7.3.2 Spatiotemporal and Causal Relations – Paradigmatically 
External Relations? 
As Heil (2012, p.146) notes, spatiotemporal and causal relations, as 
paradigmatically external, appear ‘ineliminably relational’. As such, if a and b 
exist and aRb (where R is a given spatiotemporal relation) then it is also 
possible that a and b exist but not the case that aRb. The spatiotemporal 
relation between a and b is something over and above the existence of the 
entities themselves. It is possible that the pear tree in the garden, at the time of 
writing, and the flood on an adjacent road, two weeks ago, exist exactly as they 
are (or were) and yet stand in a slightly different spatiotemporal relation. God 
might have created the universe exactly as it is (qualitatively speaking) yet 
altered the relative spatiotemporal location between these two events. 
The same appears true of causation. Standardly, causation is considered a 
relation between distinct entities such that causes temporally precede and are 
contiguous with their effects. The relations between causes and effects are also 
characterised by regularities governed by contingent causal laws. As such, the 
causal relation is explicated in terms of features external to the entities so 
related, and this suggests that causation is an exemplary external relation. In 
the example where yesterday’s downpour caused today’s flood, the contingent 
causal laws in play might involve the presence of unseasonably dry ground that 
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permits an accumulation (rather than the absorption) of water. Equally, there is 
a possible world in which both events occur but are not causally related, in this 
world yesterday’s downpour also precedes today’s flood but the latter was 
caused by a burst water main at the top of the road. 
Nonetheless, the argument that causal relations, in particular, are genuine 
external relations does rely upon certain conceptual assumptions. For example, 
under a Humean model of causation, causation is an external relation between 
temporally distinct entities formulated in terms of constant conjunction. It 
remains an option, therefore, for the presentist to provide an alternative, more 
presentist-friendly conceptual model under which an ostensibly external 
relation either comes out as internal, or is revealed not to be a relation after all. 
In what follows, I provide an account of causation, compatible with the ontology 
developed in Chapter 6, that denies that causation is a relation. If causation is 
not a relation it does not follow that the entities referred to in causal claims 
stand in cross-time relations. 
7.4 A Metaphysical Analysis of Causation 
Hall (2004, p.225) highlights that our everyday understanding of causation, qua 
relation, involves two separate concepts: ‘counterfactual dependence’ and 
‘production’. In this section I argue that only one of these, production, provides 
an adequate analysis of causation at the metaphysical level. A productive 
account of causation also has advantages for a presentist model. I disagree with 
Hall that causal production is a relation, and this allows the problems associated 
with CTR to be avoided. In section 7.5, I propose a productive account of 
causation that combines elements from both causal process theories and 
dispositional accounts of causation. 
The first concept described by Hall is counterfactual dependence: if the cause-
event had not occurred, the effect-event would not have occurred. 
Counterfactual dependence represents causation as a relation between 
temporally distinct entities (generally events). As such, a counterfactual account 
brings with it ostensive implications that causation is a CTR. The second 
concept Hall describes as a relation of production: this is the sense in which the 
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cause ‘generates’ or ‘brings about’ the effect. These distinct concepts of 
causation align with two opposing approaches in the literature to an analysis of 
causation. Reductive analyses of causation explain causation in terms of non-
causal features of reality (such as regularities or counterfactual dependence). In 
opposition, productive accounts of causation tend to be associated with a 
realism about causation, under which causation reflects a fundamental feature 
of the world that is not reducible to anything non-causal. Nonetheless, any 
successful analysis of causation needs to be able to provide an explanation of 
how both these features are a part of our everyday concept of causation. 
7.4.1 Counterfactual Theories Versus a Productive Account 
Counterfactual theories of causation hold sway as the dominant model for 
causation within the philosophical literature.152 The idea that there is nothing 
more to causation than counterfactual dependence is generally considered to 
have originated from Hume’s (1739) now famous quotation in which he 
combines both a regularity and a counterfactual analysis of causation: 
[…] we may define a cause to be an object followed by another, and where 
all the objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the 
second. Or, in other words, where, if the first object had not been, the 
second never had existed (1739, sect VII, §60) 
However, the rigorous development of counterfactual theories relied upon the 
elaboration of possible world semantics by Lewis (1973, 1986b). 
Despite the implications of cross-time relations, there are presentist-friendly 
counterfactual accounts of causation.153 Nonetheless, counterfactual accounts 
                                                        
152 For an overview of counterfactual theories of causation see Paul (2009). 
153 For example, Crisp (2005) describes a Humean account which allows the presentist to 
reduce a causal relation between e1 and e2 to a counterfactual relation between tensed 
propositions concerning e1 and e2. Similarly, a regularity theory approach might reduce causal 
relations to relations concerning the constant conjunction of events, formulated in terms of 
tensed propositions about event-types. Non-reductive approaches are also available. Adams 
(1986) and Bigelow (1996) argue for a primitive relation of causation, but not one that obtains 
between events, rather, it obtains between propositions concerning the occurrence of the 
relevant events, e1 and e2. 
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do suffer well-discussed difficulties,154 though the primary argument to be 
advanced here is that counterfactual dependence is merely symptomatic of 
causation going on, rather than constitutive of causation. In doing so I adopt a 
realist view of causation. 
In a realist vein, Ingthorsson (2019) argues that it is causation that explains 
counterfactual dependence (rather than the converse), since the acceptance of 
counterfactual claims as true presupposes causal knowledge. The 
counterfactual claim ‘if there hadn’t been lightning there wouldn’t have been 
thunder’ can be asserted as true only by someone who understands that 
thunder is the sound caused by lightning. Further, this belief only became 
justified following the scientific discovery connecting atmospheric electrical 
discharges (lightning) with the production of a subsequent sound wave 
(thunder). Ingthorsson concludes ‘it is our understanding of the causal 
connection that determines whether we accept or reject the counterfactual, and, 
as far as I can tell, the same is true for every causal counterfactual’ (2019, p.8). 
In the following section I argue the case that counterfactual dependence is 
merely symptomatic of productive causation, at the level of a metaphysical 
analysis. In addition to the potential problem that arises from the cross-time 
nature of the counterfactual relation, this provides further good reason for the 
presentist to reject a counterfactual account of causation. I then suggest positive 
reasons for the presentist to adopt a productive account of causation instead, 
since this aligns well with the ontology presented within Chapter 6.  
7.4.2 Counterfactual Dependence as Symptomatic of Productive 
Causation 
Hall (2004) argues that counterfactual dependence and production should be 
regarded as two ‘distinct concepts of causation’ (p. 226) because neither is 
sufficient to account for all features of causation. Specifically, over-
                                                        
154 For example, there are difficulties in handling cases of pre-emption (Schaffer, 2000), double 
prevention (Hall, 2004, p.241), and over-determination (Collins, Hall, & Paul, 2004; Moore,2009, 
ch.17). Counterfactual accounts can also lead to cases of spurious causation (Collins, 2000) and 
(Kvart, 2001). These counter-examples seem to suggest that, at most, counterfactual 
dependence may, in many cases, be sufficient for causation, however it is not necessary. 
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determination examples reveal production without counterfactual dependence, 
whereas omission and double-prevention examples reveal counterfactual 
dependence without production. In what follows, I argue that examples of 
omission and double-prevention are underpinned by causation as production 
and that counterfactual dependence is only symptomatic and not constitutive of 
causation, at the level of a metaphysical analysis. Nonetheless, it remains the 
case that a counterfactual analysis of true causal claims has a practical role to 
play in explanation and normative claims. 
A potential case of causation by omission is provided by the claim: ‘Amelia’s 
failure to water the plant caused it to die’. This seems a clear case of causation. 
If it is then Amelia’s failure gives rise to an effect, namely the plant’s dying. 
Under a counterfactual analysis, the truthmaker for the claim is the 
counterfactual state of affairs, or possible world, in which Amelia does not fail 
to water the plant and the plant does not die. Conversely, a productive analysis 
appears to struggle to provide an account of how it is that an omission (as the 
lack of something), in standing as a cause, can generate or bring about 
something else. 
In subscribing to a productive account of causation I would deny that omissions 
are causes. However, this is not to say that omissions are not causally relevant; 
they are relevant because they are explanatory. Omissions may appear to be 
causes, but this is only on the assumption that causal claims wear their 
ontological implications on their sleeves. In other words, that they indicate 
what it is about reality that makes a causal claim true. Since ‘Amelia’s failure’ is 
quantified over in the causal claim, an assumption can be made that ‘Amelia’s 
failure’ is an existent particular and, as such, has the potential to be causally 
effective. In the case of causal claims, I think there is good reason to reject the 
assumption that the grammatical structure of those claims mirrors the 
metaphysical reality. On the grounds of ontological parsimony, we should avoid 
positing omissions, as an addition to our ontology, if an alternative explanation 




Causation is a feature of concrete existence, or existence in spacetime; it is not 
something that obtains between abstract entities. Under a productive account a 
cause brings its effect into (concrete) existence and so both cause and effect are 
spatiotemporally locatable. Incidentally, this is equally true in the case of 
thoughts, beliefs and intentions. Laura’s belief (at 12 noon on 15th July) that the 
train would leave at 12:05 caused her to run to the station. In contrast, Amelia’s 
failure (the ostensive cause identified in the causal claim) is not something that 
exists concretely, and so cannot be causally efficacious in bringing about the 
death of the plant. For the productivist, the truthmakers for the state of affairs 
that brought about the death of the plant include a variety of physiological 
factors connected with the plant, such as the evaporation of water from the soil 
and the leaves of the plant (Mumford and Anjum, 2011, p. 148). The causal 
claim, where true, is not made true by the causal efficacy of Amelia’s failure. 
Nonetheless, there is a true counterfactual: if Amelia had not failed to water the 
plant, the plant would not have died. The truth of the counterfactual is 
symptomatic of causation occurring in the actual world, but it is not constitutive 
of the causation. It is not constitutive because it is not necessary, as cases of 
over-determination reveal. Forgetful Amelia might have an evil twin, Lily, who 
poisons the plant and in this case the counterfactual is untrue and the plant dies 
anyway. 
As Hall (2004) intimates, cases of double-prevention also appear to provide 
difficulties for a productive account, whereas a counterfactual analysis seems 
more intuitive. The case discussed by Hall involves two fighter pilots, Suzy and 
Billy, on a bombing mission. Billy acts as Suzy’s escort and he intercepts, and 
shoots down, an enemy plane, such that Suzy’s mission can continue on 
uninterrupted, with the consequence that she successfully bombs her target. 
Billy’s firing prevents the occurrence of another event (the destruction of Suzy’s 
plane) which, had it occurred, would have prevented Suzy’s bombing of the 
target. The true counterfactual claim (if Billy had not fired then Suzy’s target 
would not have been bombed) supports the intuition that Billy’s firing is a cause 
of the target being successfully bombed. Hall considers that such an example 
presents difficulties for a production account since there is no direct physical 
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(spatiotemporally continuous) connection between the cause (considered as 
Billy’s firing) and the effect (the bombing of the target). 
I disagree. In this case, there is a good reason to think that Billy’s action is not a 
cause, despite the true counterfactual claim, and this is suggested by a further 
example that Hall himself provides. In this slightly altered example, Hall (2004, 
p.12) describes a scenario in which the event structure is causally identical to 
the previous example yet Billy’s firing turns out not to be a cause, under a 
counterfactual analysis. Hall’s assertion that the two situations are causally 
identical is based on what he refers to as the ‘Intrinsicness’ thesis: ‘The causal 
structure of a process is determined by its intrinsic, non-causal character 
(together with the laws)’ (p. 1). Any two sets of events which share a causal 
structure, S, result in the generation of the same effect, e (p. 12). 
In this modified example the enemy plane is present but is under no 
instructions to shoot anyone and, had Billy not fired, it would have received 
instructions to return to base immediately. In this case, under a counterfactual 
analysis, since the enemy plane would not have shot Suzy’s plane, Billy’s action 
turns out not to be a cause of the bombing. In situations where a causally 
identical event structure obtains, a counterfactual analysis can provide a 
conflicting account of the cause. In contrast, under both these (double-
prevention) scenarios, a production account does assign the same cause. 
Namely, it is Suzy’s bombing that brings about the destruction of the target, and 
so it is Suzy’s bombing that stands as the cause. 
Contra Hall, in the case of double prevention, a production account is able to 
provide an account of the cause and, furthermore, one that is consistent across 
scenarios that are structured in a causally identical manner. It is just that it 
allocates a different cause, in the first scenario, to that suggested by the true 
counterfactual claim. If two situations are structured as to be causally identical, 
in the manner proposed by Hall, then what is designated as the cause should 
always come out as the same under an adequate account of causation; but this is 
not the case under a counterfactual account.  
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This highlights something important about the difference between 
counterfactual and productive analyses of causal situations. In the following 
section I argue that the difference is this: a productive analysis of causation 
addresses the metaphysics of causation, whereas a counterfactual analysis 
concerns the epistemology of causation. 
7.4.3 Metaphysics Versus the Epistemology of Causation 
As argued above, counterfactual analysis is certainly symptomatic of causation 
going on. This is reflected in the fact that causal situations can be described in 
terms of, or represented by, counterfactual causal claims of the form ‘If C had 
not occurred, then E would not have obtained’, where C and E stand in a relation 
of cause and effect. Counterfactual causal claims have an important role to play 
in our accounting for, and representing, the causal nature of reality and this 
accounts for the intuitive force of a counterfactual analysis of causation. 
Counterfactual causal claims can be distinguished into ‘token-level’ and ‘type-
level’ claims. Token-level claims have an important role to play in description, 
explanation, grounds for decisions, and general normative claims (such as the 
assignment of responsibility or blame). In the first double-prevention scenario, 
where Billy’s actions in taking down the enemy plane facilitated the ultimate 
success of Suzy’s bombing mission, Billy’s firing is designated a cause because it 
is explanatorily relevant to the successful bombing of the target (the effect). 
There is an intuitive sense in which Billy contributed to the success of the 
outcome and so should be accorded some recognition. In the second case, 
although the events that occur are causally related in the same way, Billy’s firing 
is not explanatorily relevant (Suzy’s mission would have been successful 
anyway) and so the same action is not designated as a cause, even though the 
two scenarios share the same causal structure.  
This is not the case under a productive analysis. Within both scenarios what 
counts as the cause is the same since the cause is that which brings the effect 
into being. A productive account allocates the descriptor ‘cause’ to that which is 
metaphysically relevant to the effect, rather than that which is simply 
explanatorily relevant. Causes are metaphysically relevant to their effects in 
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that they bring their effects into existence. Any adequate metaphysical account 
of causation should be able to identify the same event as the cause in all 
situations that possess an identical causal structure; yet it is only the productive 
analysis of causation that is able to do this. The difference between a productive 
and a counterfactual analysis of causation is that a productive analysis targets 
the metaphysical core of causation, rather than its epistemological aspects. 
The fact that the same action is not designated as a cause under a counterfactual 
analysis reflects that the assignment of causes in token-level causal claims is 
often not entirely objective, but can reflect subjective concerns and motivations. 
This also explains the motivation, under a counterfactual account, to designate 
omissions as causes in token causal claims. Our assignment of responsibility for 
the death of the plant to Amelia’s omission underpins the sense in which the 
counterfactual (had Amelia watered the plant, it would not have died) is true. 
Although omissions are not causally efficacious, they are causally relevant 
because they are explanatory.  
The subjectivity in the assignment of causes in token-level causal claims is 
brought out in Hüttemann’s (2013) example of a drunken individual driving in 
muddy, slippery conditions. Depending upon the motivation of the individual 
making the claim, the effect (the collision with a bollard) can be attributed to 
alternative causes (the drunkenness of the driver or the mud on the road). A 
token-level causal claim can highlight one of many contributory causes 
depending upon the social, moral or cultural context. Different people may 
make different causal attributions, for example, attributing situational or 
contextual factors rather than personality traits, in the same situation. At the 
level of a metaphysical analysis, however, there is a single (complex) cause of 
the accident, and this is the resultant sum of all contributing factors that bring 
about the effect, for example, the location of the bollard, the angle of the front 
wheels, the speed of the vehicle and the increased inertia from the slippery 
road. These may or may not be identified within a given causal claim due to 
their lack of utility, or even our ignorance as to their role (such as the increased 
inertia contributed by worn tyres). 
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Counterfactual analysis, as symptomatic of causation, also has a role to play in 
the generation of type-level causal claims. These relate properties or kinds, and 
include claims such as ‘smoking causes cancer’, or ‘the over-consumption of 
calories causes obesity’. Type-level counterfactual claims (such as, ‘If no-one 
smoked then incidences of lung cancer would be lower’) have an important role 
to play in both prediction and the formulation of causal laws, or laws of nature. 
In conclusion, cases of over-determination and pre-emption reveal that there 
can be cases of causation in the absence of counterfactual dependence. In these 
cases, a productive account is sufficient to account for the causal situation. In 
cases involving omission and double-prevention, that reveal counterfactual 
dependence, the counterfactual claims are true because there is causation going 
on for which an account in terms of production can be given. This supports a 
view under which counterfactual dependence is symptomatic, but not 
constitutive, of causation going on in the world. Counterfactual analysis 
concerns the epistemology of causation. It is employed in our representation, 
modelling or description of causal situations and this accounts for its greater 
intuitive appeal in certain situations, as well as the vital role that it plays in our 
concept of causation. However, it is only a productive account of causation that 
gets to the metaphysical root of causation, as it is, objectively, in the world. 
7.4.4 The Benefits of a Productive Account of Causation 
In this section I first argue that a realist, productive account of causation aligns 
naturally with the ontology for presentism being offered within this thesis. I 
also argue that, under a productive account, causation is not fundamentally a 
relation. This provides a further benefit for a presentist account in view of the 
existence-entailing nature of external relations. 
Causation is closely connected with change. If something changes its intrinsic 
properties, we normally wish to identify a cause for the change. Under the 
proposed ontology for presentism, real, metaphysical change is primitive (§ 
5.9.2)155 and, along with persistence, is exemplified in the present as one of the 
                                                        
155 By describing real, metaphysical change as primitive I mean that it is explicable only in terms 
of existence, and is reflected in the nature of the present. 
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two objective correlates of tense. Since real change (DefRC) is defined in terms of 
objective creation and annihilation (§ 5.8), the close connection between 
causation and change suggests that a compatible model of causation is one that 
sees causation as involving production, as a bringing into existence. 
Hall (2004, §1) describes the production concept of causation as a ‘relation’ 
between events; however, I deny that this is the case. Under a production view 
of causation, causation is not fundamentally a relation between distinct entities. 
Under a production account, a cause brings its effect into being, consequently a 
cause is existentially prior to its effect. There is therefore no necessary relation 
between cause and effect, in the sense of a co-existence; rather there is, what 
Ingthorssen describes as, a ‘one-sided existential dependence between cause and 
effect’ (Ingthorsson, 2002, p.8). 
If causation were fundamentally a relation between events then, on the grounds 
that relations imply the existence of their relata, cause and effect would always 
coexist, and this is not necessarily the case. There are certainly cases where 
causes and effects do coexist and these are generally situations where the cause 
not only brings the effect into being but it also sustains, or maintains, it. Kant’s 
cushion is a paradigmatic example of this. For as long as the ball remains on the 
cushion the gravitational mass of the ball (the cause) coexists with the 
indentation in the cushion (the effect). Similarly, the rotation of the fan blades 
(the cause) and the movement of the surrounding air (the effect) coexist. The 
coexistence of cause and effect in these examples is not a cross-time relation 
and so presents no difficulties for the presentist. 
However, in other situations this is not the case, rather the cause ceases to exist 
at the point the effect comes into being. In the example of the kicking of a ball 
and its flight towards the goal, the cause (the kick) ceases at the point at which 
the effect (the flight of the ball) comes into existence. Similarly, the pressing of 
the trigger (cause) and the firing of the bullet (effect), the burning of the fuse 
(cause) and the explosion of the bomb (effect), and so on. In these, and many 
other, cases the cause and the effect do not coexist and so do not stand in a 
relation. What is fundamental to causation under a productive account, and in 
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each of the examples given, is that the cause produces the effect, or brings the 
effect into being. That cause and effect may, or may not, coexist is non-essential 
to causation. 
The idea that causation is a relation garners support from the fact that causal 
situations can be described, or represented, in the form of a causal claim in 
which two events stand in the relation of cause and effect. Drawing a 
metaphysical conclusion from this as to the existence of a relation between the 
entities confounds the epistemological aspects of causation with a metaphysical 
analysis. Under a productive account of causation, causation is not 
(metaphysically speaking) a relation and, if it is not a relation, cross-time causal 
claims do not imply the existence of previously existent relata. 
For these reasons a productive account of causation appears best suited to the 
model of presentism proposed. In developing a productive account there are, 
however, two approaches that one might take. The first, which has achieved 
increasing popularity in recent years, is to ground causation in dispositional 
properties, construed as real (causally effective) powers to bring about certain 
effects (e.g. Ellis, 2001; Molnar, 2003; Groff, 2008; Mumford and Anjum, 2011; 
Heil, 2012). The second approach is to view causation as a process as do, for 
example, Salmon (1984, 1994, 1997), Dowe (1992, 2000) and Ingthorsson 
(2002, p.14).  There is an overlap between the two, though, in that those 
advocating causal dispositionalism tend to talk in terms of causal processes, 
despite not being committed to a process ontology.156 As productive accounts, 
both approaches also have in common the Aristotelian view that connects 
causation with a coming into being: ‘everything that comes to be comes to be by 
the agency of something and from something and comes to be something’ 
(Metaphysics, Book 7, Part 7, 1032a).  
                                                        
156 Here I cite some examples. ‘The most fundamental kinds of things in nature all seem to be 
both active and reactive. They have powers both to act and to interact with things of other 
kinds, and to be agents in a variety of causal processes’ (Ellis 1999 p. 19). ‘Ball a first meets b at 
time tα, let us say, and they go their separate ways, after some interval, at time tω. For as long as 
they are together, squashing into each other and then springing apart, causation is going on, 
according to our account. There is a process, which takes time, but this causal process has not 
begun until tα and has not ended until tω.’ (Mumford & Anjum 2011, p. 109). 
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Since the ontology proposed within this thesis includes the category of pure 
process, it might be considered that a process account of causation should be 
the more compatible approach. In the following section I review certain 
problems that arise with process accounts of causation and conclude that a 
suitable account combines elements from both causal process theories and 
dispositional accounts of causation. I outline such an account in § 7.5. 
7.4.5 Process Accounts of Causation 
Causal process theories originate in the approach of Salmon’s (1984) ‘Mark 
Transmission’ theory, under which causal processes are ontologically 
distinguished from ‘pseudo-processes’ in that the former transmit their own 
structure (‘mark transmission’). Following criticism (Kitcher, 1989 and Dowe, 
1992) that his mark transmission theory collapses into mere counterfactual 
dependence, Salmon (1994, 1997) subsequently adopted a modified form of 
Dowe’s (1992, 2000) Conserved Quantity Theory. 
Central to the accounts of both Salmon and Dowe are the concepts of ‘causal 
process’ and ‘casual interaction’, defined by Dowe (2000, p.90) as follows: 
CQ1: A causal process is a world line of an object that possesses a 
conserved quantity 
CQ2: A causal interaction is an interaction of world lines that involves an 
exchange of a conserved quantity157 
Froeyman (2012)158 argues that process theories of causation, as principally 
developed by Salmon and Dowe, fail to provide an original account of causation 
that offers anything, ontologically, over and above a reductive, physicalist 
account, such as that proposed by Fair (1979). Fair argues that any instance of 
causation reduces to a transfer of energy-momentum from the entities that 
comprise the cause to those that constitute the effect: ‘the causal connection is a 
physical relation of energy-momentum transference’ (p. 229). 
                                                        
157 Conserved quantities include, for example, momentum or mass-energy. 
158 Kitcher (1989) also argues along similar lines. 
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Given that causal processes are defined, by both Salmon and Dowe, as the 
world-lines of objects, Froeyman argues that it is surely objects that are 
exchanging the conserved quantities. The concept of causal process is thereby 
ontologically redundant (p. 538), and this leaves the concept of ‘causal 
interaction’ to do the ontological work within the theory. Since interaction is 
cashed out in terms of the exchange of a conserved quantity, for Froeyman, 
there is nothing of ontological merit to causal process theory that is not already 
available within Fair’s transference theory. 
Froeyman garners support by noting that both Salmon and Dowe were heavily 
influenced by Russell’s concept of ‘causal lines’ in formulating their notion of a 
causal process. Froeyman regards this as a methodological error since, for 
Russell, causal line is an epistemological device and not an ontological concept. 
Russell employs the concept of a ‘causal line’ to connect the basic entities in his 
ontology: discrete events, time and regularities. In particular, causal lines 
provide Russell with a means of accounting for the persistence of ordinary 
objects in time: ‘A “causal line”, as I wish to define the term, is a temporal series 
of events so related that, given some of them, something can be inferred about 
the others’ (Russell, 1948, p.477). 
Further support for Froeyman’s claim comes from Dowe’s employment of 
causal process to account for ‘immanent causation’, which Dowe sees as an 
additional benefit of his process theory of causation. For Dowe, immanent 
causation is the sense of causation implied by stating that an object’s inertia 
causes its continuing motion, and he sees this as an aspect of causation that has 
not been properly addressed (2000, p. 52). According to Froeyman there are 
two possible ways of unpacking Dowe’s notion of immanent causation. First, it 
might mean that the movement of an object at time t is the cause of its 
movement at a later time, t’; if so, then immanent causation seems simply to be 
a restatement of Russell’s causal theory of identity over time, which connects an 
object at one time to the same object at a later time. If Dowe’s concept of causal 
process explains immanent causation, in this sense, it is merely a disguised 
version of Russell’s causal line mechanism. Since the latter is merely an 
epistemological device, then the true (ontological) nature of causation remains 
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obscure and the explanation of immanent causation, under Dowe’s theory, 
provides no additional benefit.  
Alternatively, Froeyman suggests, immanent causation might be understood as 
stating that the inertia of the spaceship at t is the cause of its movement at t. In 
this case, Froeyman argues, immanent causation is ‘more tautological than 
causal. Inertia is just another (scientific) term for movement’ (p. 535). The 
inertia of an object at t just is, by definition, its continuing motion at t and so 
there can be no external (and so causal) relation between inertia at t and 
continuing motion at t. For this reason, Froeyman describes immanent 
causation as an ‘empty notion’ (p. 535). If the notion of immanent causation is 
empty, then the concept of causal process does no additional ontological work 
under Dowe’s account. 
I agree with Froeyman that the concept of causal process is ontologically 
redundant in both Salmon’s and Dowe’s accounts, but there is a further reason 
why this is the case. Under Salmon’s and Dowe’s accounts the concept of causal 
process (like that of Russell’s causal line) is a mechanism to secure the 
persistence over time of discrete entities (namely objects). This implies that 
processes, rather than being ontologically fundamental, are derivative of more 
fundamental entities, namely objects and time. Under a more rigorously 
process-ontological account (such as that of Seibt, and the account presented 
here), processes are considered to be ontologically fundamental and, as such, 
are intrinsically persistent (Chapter 6, § 6.3.3). Processes exemplify continuity 
and an essential on-going-ness. Consequently, the persistence of processes 
requires no reference to an external time, under the ontology proposed within 
this thesis. This means the notion of world-lines, employed to provide for 
continuing identity through time, is redundant and consequently so is the 
concept of causal process, as it is defined within causal process theories.  
A further indication that the ontology underlying causal process theory is not 
sufficiently processual is provided by the fact that Dowe’s theory is motivated 
by a need to account for inertia (through ‘immanent causation’). In line with 
Newton’s First Law, inertial motion, as continuing motion, is a default mode of 
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matter and, as such, requires no causal explanation. Equally, remaining at rest 
over time (or persistence) is also prescribed by Newton’s First Law as a default 
state of matter. These default states of matter are represented as defining 
features of the category of pure process within the ontology proposed in 
Chapter 6.  Since pure processes are ontologically primitive, under a rigorous 
process account neither inertial motion nor persistence require further 
explanation. 
Froeyman’s conclusion, that the ontological core of causation, under causal 
process theories, is provided solely by the interaction of processes appears 
justified. There is no doubt that causal situations involve processes (the motion 
of the brick towards the window, the movement of one billiard ball towards 
another) but this does not mean that accounting for causation requires 
reference to a unique species of process, a ‘causal process’. Nonetheless, 
Froeyman’s arguments do expose the key feature of causal process theories that 
is correct. This is that causation requires interaction. The brick has to interact 
with the window by hitting it, thereby causing it to break, in order that the 
situation counts as causal. If it merely passes it by there is no cause-effect 
dependence. 
Under causal process theories causal interaction is defined as an intersection of 
world-lines involving the exchange of a conserved quantity. This concept of 
causal interaction is not adequate for the account to be provided here, for three 
reasons. First, causal interaction, so defined, has an implicit dependence on a 
substantival account of time in order to individuate the point of intersection of 
the relevant world-lines. This makes it unsuitable for a successful presentist 
account, which requires a reductionist account of spacetime. The reasons for 
this have been given in previous chapters.159  
Second, seeing causation simply in terms of the transference of conserved, 
physical quantities appears insufficient to account for the emergence of general 
                                                        
159 To summarise, it is argued (§ 5.5) that a successful presentist account requires an 
internalisation of the objective correlates of tense; this commits the presentist to a reductionist, 
or relational, account of B-series time. In Chapter 2, I argue, from the problem of time in 




causal laws. A reductionist account is not nuanced enough to explicate the 
difference between ‘throwing a brick at the vase causes it to smash’ and 
‘smoking causes lung cancer’. In the former case, a physical transference 
account of causation is explanatorily sufficient to explain the shattering of the 
glass vase. Kinetic energy from the motion of the brick is transferred to the vase 
and is sufficient to break the bonds comprising the crystal structure. Individual 
pieces of the glass subsequently fly through the air as a consequence of the 
transferred energy-momentum. However, this explanatory sufficiency does not 
extend to the case of a causal law such as ‘smoking causes lung cancer’. 
That smoking causes lung cancer is explained by the ability of certain chemicals 
in cigarette smoke (e.g., benzopyrene) to facilitate gene mutations. Gene 
mutations involve the substitution of base pairs in segments of DNA in cells 
(e.g., cytosine for adenine). Such substitutions can, at the level of molecular 
interactions, be explained in terms of the exchange of energy between 
molecules, through the breaking and creation of chemical bonds. However, a 
causal explanation of gene mutations at the level of energy transference is 
unable to account for the fact that mutations can be beneficial or malignant, 
depending upon where in the genetic code the mutation occurs. The same 
physical transference mechanism can cause both beneficial mutations (such as 
HIV resistance) and harmful ones (such as lung cancer). In the case of complex 
physical, biological, economic and social systems, to which general causal laws 
apply, a theory of causation sufficient to account for such laws has to provide a 
unified explanation of causation for both emergent and fundamental 
phenomena. 
There is a third reason why causal interaction has to be more than an exchange 
of conserved quantities. Although the transfer, or exchange, of conserved 
quantities is indicative of causation going on at the fundamental physical level, 
reducing causation to this fails to account for the sense in which causation 
involves novel production. The exchange, or passing around, of energy-
momentum appears to suggest that both cause and effect are already in 
existence. This is at odds with the productive account of causation that is being 
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sought, an account under which causes generate, or bring into being, their 
effects. 
7.5 A Process-Dispositional Account of Causation 
Causal process theories highlight the importance of both processes and the 
interaction of processes in accounting for causation. It is noted, however, that 
several aspects of causal process theory render it unsuitable for modelling 
causation under the proposed presentist account. In this section, I propose an 
account that combines elements from both causal process theories and 
dispositional accounts of causation. Prior to describing the account, I provide an 
overview of the nature and role of dispositions in accounts of causation. 
7.5.1 The Nature and Role of Dispositions 
Recent neo-Aristotelian developments in analytical metaphysics have seen a 
trend towards realism about causal powers through the employment of 
dispositional properties. Such causal-dispositionalist models consider 
dispositional properties as real properties of objects (e.g. Ellis, 2001) that 
reference the active, or dynamic, nature of their bearers: they are dispositions-
to-do and can exist unmanifested. The causal role of dispositional properties is 
essential to them: the identity of a property is constituted by its exercising a 
certain causal (and so nomological) role. The power of salt to melt ice, for 
example, is a dispositional property. There are, though, differences within the 
accounts as to the extension of the concept dispositional property.160 Despite 
this, what the various accounts have in common is that dispositional properties, 
however conceived, are real to the extent that they are causally efficacious. 
There are two advantages to utilising dispositional properties within a 
presentist account of causation. Firstly, dispositional properties are dynamic: 
they imply potentiality and, in doing so, suggest that the future is open and yet 
to occur. They can thereby provide a ground for objective becoming and real, 
                                                        
160 Some, such as Ellis (2001), Bird (2007), Mumford and Anjum (2011) and Heil (2012, pp. 59-
62), deny that there are any truly categorical properties and take a pan-dispositionalist stance 
under which all properties are construed dispositionally, as clusters of causal powers. For 
example, charge is the power to create an electromagnetic field. 
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metaphysical change. The second is that powers are not necessarily reducible to 
forces or conserved quantities. They can be macroscopic. This permits a unified 
ontological basis across the sciences operating at different levels of reality 
(from physical, chemical and biological to social and economic). This also means 
that, unlike under causal process theory, there is scope for accounting for the 
emergence of general laws and the differences between them. 
In the account that follows, I adopt the view that dispositional properties (e.g. 
fragility, brittleness, solubility) are intrinsic, causally efficacious powers 
possessed by concrete entities. These powers can include both simple powers 
(in the case of charge, the power to repel) and complex, or macroscopic, powers 
(in the case of financial markets, the power to create wealth) where the latter 
are not necessarily reducible to the former. 
There is also a need to distinguish dispositional properties from their 
associated manifestations. Motivated by Ryle’s (1949) notion of multi-track 
dispositions, Kistler (2012) notes that a given power can be the causal basis for 
more than one manifestation. For example, elasticity is a single, intrinsic, 
physically grounded power that can be associated with several manifestations, 
such as ‘contracting after being stretched’, ‘expand after being compressed’ or 
having ‘bounced on sudden impact’ (Ryle, 1949, p.113). Whereas powerful 
properties are intrinsic their manifestations are relational (and depend upon 
external circumstances).   
The terminology I shall adopt is to refer to the intrinsic causal power, or 
disposition, as a powerful property and the various expressions of that powerful 
property as manifestations. In the next section, I outline the main elements of a 
process-dispositional account of causation. 
7.5.2 Accounting for Causation 
Dispositional accounts of causation standardly assume a substance-based 
metaphysics. The ontology proposed in the previous chapter comprises a 
hierarchy with concrete substance and powerful properties occupying the top 
tier, and the mutually inter-dependent categories of pure process and 
interaction event comprising the second tier. As described in § 6.7.2, everyday, 
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substantial objects are modelled as a hierarchical complex of pure processes 
and interaction events (at the ontological level); their exact constitution 
depends upon the extent to which they manifest a more continuant-like nature 
(such as an unchanging rock) or are more occurrent-like (e.g., explosions). Such 
complexes may also be conceived of as possessing powerful properties.161  
Rivers, consist of material substance (the energy-momentum of the water 
molecules that comprise it) and this material substance exists as both pure 
processes (such as its flow, or continual motion) and as interaction events (e.g., 
interactions between water molecules give rise to frictional drag and turbulent 
flow, interactions between the water and the river bank give rise to erosion). 
Rivers, as pure process-interaction complexes, also possess powerful 
properties, such as a capacity to erode their banks. Similarly, typhoons have the 
ability to flatten buildings and financial markets reveal a disposition to collapse. 
In the case of complex entities (such as financial markets) their powerful 
properties are not necessarily reducible to a physical basis. 
Powerful properties can also be associated with material substance at the 
fundamental, physical level. Light, is an archetypal pure process, and has the 
power to transmit energy-momentum. When light interacts with the surface of 
a metal plate it can transmit a photon of energy which is captured by an 
electron at the surface and this results in the electron being emitted (the 
‘photoelectric effect’). 
Under the account proposed, causation occurs when pure processes 
(characterised by their powerful properties) interact and novel production 
results. It will be recalled, from § 6.7, that the interaction of pure processes is an 
interaction event. Interaction events are also defined as points at which new 
pure processes are created or annihilated. This account is thereby a production 
account of causation: any causal situation requires interaction (where 
interaction is necessary and sufficient for causation to occur) and involves novel 
production. In this manner causation is connected with real, metaphysical 
                                                        
161 It should be noted that, although we predicate (powerful) properties of both processes and 
events, it is the underlying concrete substance that is the possessor of such powerful properties, 
and the truthmaker for true claims about propertied process and event complexes. 
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change - the ontological category of interaction event reflects the primitive 
nature of real, metaphysical change (§ 6.7). 
Consider the example of the thrown brick that causes the window to shatter. 
The brick in motion is a pure process (inertial motion, in exemplifying the 
continuation of some functional dynamic, is a model example of the category of 
pure process, § 6.7). The brick in motion also possesses momentum, in virtue of 
which it has a powerful property: the power to fracture glass. The window, as a 
complex entity, is a macroscopic pure process (it exemplifies the category 
feature of persistence, as continuing existence). The interaction of the brick in 
motion (pure process) with the window (pure process) is a causal situation that 
leads to the shattering of the window. The glass window has a powerful 
property, fragility, a disposition that manifests in shattering, upon the transfer 
of momentum from the flying brick. This interaction event is also the point at 
which a new pure processes are created and existing processes are annihilated. 
The scattering of pieces of shattered glass are new pure processes with their 
own powerful properties, some of which are different from those of the 
window; their sharp edges have a disposition to cut, for example. A further pure 
process may also be created if, for example, a small piece of brick had broken off 
during impact. Pure processes are also annihilated in the interaction event. In 
this case the original, participating pure processes: the persisting window and 
the inertial, forward motion of the brick. The situation, as causal, may also 
described by a true counterfactual: had the brick not interacted with the 
window, the window would not have shattered. 
I share the view of Mumford and Anjum (2011, Chapter 2) that in a given 
interaction situation all causally relevant powerful properties (those relevant to 
the given manifestation-type, both contributory and counter-vailing powers) 
combine in an additive, and lawful, fashion to produce a manifestation-type 
once a threshold level is reached; it is at this point that the effect is triggered. In 
cases where a single powerful property dominates or in artificial (laboratory-
style) situations, where background conditions and minor contributory causal 
powers are screened out, the connection that exists between a powerful 
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property and its manifestation-type(s) permits the derivation of general causal 
laws. 
The cause (metaphysically speaking), in any given token situation, is that which 
brings the effect into being. A cause therefore comprises the interacting pure 
processes, together with all their causally relevant powerful properties. This 
reflects Mill’s (1843, pp. 398-399) conception of a ‘real’ or total cause. 
Consequently, no (ontological) distinction is to be made between causally 
relevant powerful properties that dispose towards the effect-type produced and 
countervailing powerful properties (those that dispose against the effect-type), 
such as interfering factors. All causally relevant powers (including background 
conditions) count as part of the metaphysical cause. Nonetheless, our 
explanations or representations of the situation, through token-level claims, 
might focus on only certain of the contributory powers, for the reasons 
discussed in § 7.4.3. For example, the major causal contributor to lung cancer is 
smoking, however, exposure to both radon and diesel exhaust fumes can also 
contribute. Conversely, a diet rich in antioxidants and regular exercise are 
counter-vailing powers that can contribute to preventing lung cancer. 
Nonetheless, all the causally relevant powers, positive and negative, contribute 
to the resultant effect though it may only be smoking, as the predominant 
powerful property, that is referred to in any token causal claim. 
This view of the cause (as ‘total cause’) is not shared by all dispositional 
accounts. For Mumford and Anjum (2011, pp. 33-34), a cause is the sum total of 
just those powers that dispose towards the given effect, E. Countervailing 
powers (those that dispose away from given effect) are not the cause of E, 
though Mumford and Anjum accept that they could still be ‘a cause of E 
happening in a certain way’ (p. 34). They illustrate this with the example of a 
life-support machine that postpones the death of a fatally wounded person. 
Since the life-support machine disposes towards continuing life it cannot, for 
them, count as part of the cause of the individual’s eventual demise.  
I am not sure that this example justifies the exclusion of countervailing powers 
from a metaphysical account of cause. The life-support machine has similar 
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causally relevant powers to those of a fully-functioning heart and lungs, which 
also dispose towards maintaining the life of an individual. In a situation where 
an individual is shot, it is the continued pumping of the heart that causally 
contributes towards the person bleeding to death. As such it counts as part of 
the cause, construed as the sum of all contributory powerful properties, even 
though it disposes towards continued existence. The stance taken by Mumford 
and Anjum also appears at odds with their vector model of causal situations 
(pp. 28-39).  Under this all interacting causal powers present (both contributory 
and countervailing) are represented as vectors, with the resultant vector used 
to explain the nature of the effect obtained. As such it seems difficult to 
understand why the resultant vector, as the sum total of all powerful properties 
present, should not be equated with the cause, as that which produces the 
effect. Nonetheless, elsewhere (p. 32) they accept that there can be no 
ontological distinction between causes and background conditions since, 
metaphysically, they all contribute. 
7.5.3 Conclusion 
In this section I have described a productive account of causation that aligns 
with an ontology, proposed in Chapter 6, suitable for an account of presentism 
that is compatible with our best theories of physics. Under the productive 
account of causation proposed, causation is not fundamentally a relation (§ 
7.4.4). Consequently, cross-time causal claims do not imply the existence of 
previously existing relata. Yesterday’s storm does not stand in an existence-
entailing relation with today’s flood: it is the cause of ‘today’s flood’ in that it 
brought the flood into being. Progenitive cross-time relations, such as is the 
grand-daughter of (encountered in the case of Emily and Edna, § 7.2.1), can also 
be reduced to causal production (as suggested by Bourne, 2006, p.96) in order 
to remove their existence-entailing implications. The truthmakers for claims 
that involve progenitive relations are facts about the causal origin of the 
presently existing entity (e.g. Emily). 
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In the remaining section I discuss the issue of spatiotemporal CTR claims and 
concede that the ontological model proposed in this thesis provides no 
advantage over existing presentist strategies. 
7.6 Dealing with Spatiotemporal CTR 
Dealing with cross-time spatiotemporal relations within the scope of the 
proposed model presents particular problems. I first explain why two of the 
strategies discussed in the previous sections do not work, before considering 
two remaining options that are available. 
As noted in § 7.3.1, Sider (1999) suggests, on behalf of the presentist, that cross-
time relations should be construed as internal relations as far as possible. This 
option, however, does not seem possible for spatiotemporal relations under the 
account proposed here. In § 6.8.2 I argue for a presentist-compatible version of 
Belkind’s Primitive Motion Relationism which replaces events (and so 
spacetime points) under Belkind’s model with the interaction events of the 
proposed presentist ontology (§ 6.7). As with Belkind’s model, the 
spatiotemporal relation (or interval, ds2) between interaction events is given by 
the primitive inertial motion (PUM) that connects the two events. In the case of 
the simple light clock (Figure 6.3, § 6.8.2) this is the motion of light between the 
two opposing mirrors. In general, for a spatiotemporal relation to obtain 
between any two events there must be some common motion that connects 
them. Spatiotemporal intervals are therefore unit intervals of the motion that 
connects events, or spacetime points. This means that under the proposed 
presentist account spatiotemporal relations are genuine, external relations 
between events that cannot be erased away. There is, ontologically, something 
over and above the events themselves that relates them, namely, the inertial 
motion that connects them. 
A second possibility presents itself. I have argued (§ 7.4.4) that causation, rather 
than being a relation between events, is, under a production account of 
causation, a matter of existential dependence. This suggests that a potential 
strategy is to reduce spatiotemporal relations to a causal dependence between 
spacetime points. Ostensive support for such a strategy comes from the fact 
232 
 
that, under the proposed ontology, spacetime points are necessarily causal. This 
is because spacetime points are ‘interaction events’162 and an interaction event 
(as defined in §6.7) is ‘an interaction between two or more pure processes and 
is a point of novel creation or annihilation of pure processes’. Under the 
productive model of causation developed in §7.5.2, ‘causation occurs when pure 
processes (characterised by their powerful properties) interact and novel 
production results’. Since causation requires interaction and involves 
production, interaction events are essentially causal in nature. 
Despite this, the (spatiotemporal) relation between spacetime points cannot be 
reduced to a matter of causal dependence, for two reasons. The first reason is 
that the spatiotemporal relation between two events has a quantitative aspect 
to it that is not captured simply by causal dependence. Suppose event A is the 
emission of light from a distant star, five light-years away. As an interaction 
event this is a spacetime point. Event B is the interaction of the light signal with 
a telescope on earth, and is a second spacetime point. Event A causes event B (in 
the sense of bringing it about) and the two events are spatiotemporally related 
(the temporal component of which equates to 5 years). However, the causal 
dependence of B on A is insufficient to account for this spatiotemporal relation. 
In particular, it cannot account for the possible world where the causal 
dependence between the events is identical but the spatiotemporal relation 
between them has a temporal component of 4 years. This is not surprising given 
the explanation above for why spatiotemporal relations are not internal 
relations. The spatiotemporal interval is provided by the inertial motion that 
connects the two events and this is something over and above their causal 
dependence. In the first case the motion is characterised by 5 unit intervals of 
motion, in the second case it is only 4 unit intervals. 
The second reason why spatiotemporal relations cannot be reduced to a matter 
of causal dependence is that events can be spatiotemporally related without 
                                                        
162 Events, under Belkind’s (2012) model, are spacetime points and in § 6.8.1 I argue for a 
structural alignment between Belkind’s ‘events’ (defined as intersections between primitive 
uniform motions, PUMs) and ‘interaction events’, under the proposed ontology. On the basis 




there being any causal dependence between them. For example, there is a 
spatiotemporal relation between the starting of a fire on 2 September 1666 in 
the baker's shop on Pudding Lane and the publication of Newton’s Principia 
Mathematica on 5 July 1687, yet there is no (obvious) causal dependence. It is 
useful to clarify, at this point, how the proposed model does account for the 
spatiotemporal interval between these two events. 
The spatiotemporal interval between the fire event and the publication event is 
given by the primitive motion that connected them. In this case, that primitive 
motion is a combination of the rotation of the earth and its orbit around the 
sun.163 Under the ontology proposed, the interaction event that is the fire in 
Pudding Lane consists in the interaction of a number of pure processes – the 
falling embers from the oven, an adjacent pile of timber (which, as an enduring 
continuant, is also a pure process § 6.7.2) and the prevailing easterly wind. An 
additional, contributory process is the motion of the earth and this gives rise to 
the datable nature of the event. As noted in § 2.5, assigning a time (and equally a 
date) to an event requires reference to the motion of a standard physical 
system, or clock, and the motion of the earth provides the mechanism for doing 
this. The second event, the publication of Newton’s Principia, is also an 
interaction event that involves a number of pure processes, one of which 
includes the relative motion of the earth. The motion that connects both events, 
and so provides the spatiotemporal interval between them, is the continuing 
motion of the earth in its path around the sun.164 
The problem for the presentist is that these two events, the fire event and the 
publication event, no longer exist and neither does the spatiotemporal relation 
between them, i.e., the primitive motion that connected them. In the case of 
                                                        
163 It might be objected here that the motions to which I appeal are not inertial. The rotational 
motion of the earth is not inertial, and the orbital motion of the earth around the sun is only 
partially inertial. The primitive motions (PUMs), upon which Belkind’s derivation of Minkowski 
spacetime are based, are primitive inertial motions, and it is these that constitute the 
spatiotemporal interval between events. However, Minkowski spacetime is devoid of matter 
and so represents a limiting case of the spacetime of our substantial universe. As discussed in § 
6.8, I believe that Belkind’s model can ultimately be extended to the spacetime of GTR (mass-
containing spacetimes) if so, it seems likely that the primitive motions required to underpin the 
model would be gravitational / accelerated motions. 
164 I refer the reader back to the diagram in § 6.8.3 which illustrates how duration (the 
spatiotemporal interval) arises between two events. 
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events that were previously present this means that problematic spatiotemporal 
CTR remain, they cannot be eliminated away in the manner in which ostensibly 
causal CTR are. This suggests that the only recourse for the presentist is to 
adopt one of the strategies described previously. On the assumption that the 
principle of relations is accepted, a reductionist approach that posits presently 
existing entities as the truthmakers for cross-time relational claims is available. 
One such account that is able to account for the quantitative aspect of 
spatiotemporal relations is Ingram’s (2016) Thisness Presentism (after Adams, 
1986). 
A thisness is a ‘particular, primitive, purely non-qualitative property of an 
entity’ (2016, p. 2869) that comes into being with an entity and continues to 
exist (although uninstantiated) following the entity’s demise. Ingram describes 
thisness as the property ‘being x’ (e.g. ‘the property being Anna’, p. 2869), in 
order to convey a sense in which it is an ‘individual essence’ tied to a unique 
individual. 
Ingram utilises Diekemper’s (2015) notion of non-rigid ontological dependence 
in order to allow that an entity’s thisness is ontologically dependent only upon 
its initial existence (and not its continuing existence) in the following way:  
Necessarily, for any x, x’s thisness T exists only if x has existed; the fact 
that the connection between x and T doesn’t always obtain, doesn’t 
undermine the fact that T cannot exist without the initial existence of x 
[…] If there are uninstantiated thisnesses of past entities, then there 
must have been past entities. (Ingram, 2016, p. 2886) 
Non-rigid ontological dependence allows Ingram to avoid the problematic 
existence-entailing relations that such dependencies normally engender and, 
thereby, to circumvent problems encountered by other versions of Thisness 
Presentism. An important feature of thisnesses is that they (presently) 
instantiate primitive past-tensed properties directly associated with their 
respective entities. For example, Boudica’s thisness exists (uninstantiated) in 
the present and possesses the higher-order, tensed property having been the 
thisness of a fierce woman. Ingram’s commitment to primitive tensed properties 
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reflects Bigelow’s (1996) Lucretian Presentism but side-steps the criticism that 
Lucretian truthmakers fail the ‘aboutness’ criterion. 
One of the additional utilities of the Ingram’s Thisness account is that thisnesses 
also possess metric-tensed properties, and it is this that can be used to account 
for the quantitative nature of spatiotemporal relations. The property having 
been the thisness of a fierce woman is an example of a property that, once gained, 
a thisness can never lose, and this reflects the fixed nature of the past. 
Nevertheless, the metric-tensed properties possessed by thisnesses can be 
gained and lost over time. Ingram (2019, p. 125) provides the example of a 
property possessed by Marie Curie’s thisness: having been the thisness of the 
woman that discovered Polonium 119 years ago. This property has (at the time of 
writing) already been lost by Marie Curie’s thisness and replaced with the 
property having been the thisness of the woman that discovered Polonium 122 
years ago. Ingram’s version of Thisness Presentism is thereby able to provide 
the truthmakers for the claim that the publication of Newton’s Principia 
Mathematica took place 20 years and 10 months after the start of the fire in a 
baker's shop on Pudding Lane. 
Despite the utility of Ingram’s account, the ‘nefarious’ objection (Tallant and 
Ingram, 2015) remains: if non-rigid ontological dependence provides sufficient 
grounds for the truth of any true CTR claim then there is no need for any 
presently existing surrogate. If the ontological price of presently existing 
surrogates outweighs the utility to be gained from thisnesses then the only 
remaining strategy for the presentist is to eschew the need to be ontologically 
upstanding and deny the requirement to provide truthmakers for true CTR 
claims. 
7.7 Concluding Comments 
The aim of this chapter has been to show that the proposed ontology (set out in 
Chapter 6) can defuse some of the threats to presentism implied by claims 
involving cross-time relations, if a realist and productive account of causation is 
adopted. The key role played by an appropriate model of causation is 
highlighted by the fact that both the standard presentist approaches to CTR 
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(eliminativist and reductionist) struggle to provide a satisfactory account of 
cross-time causal relations. Nonetheless, it is conceded that spatiotemporal CTR 
are difficult to accommodate, and this rests in part on their quantitative nature. 
In the remaining chapter I make the case that the account proposed in this 
thesis provides scope for accounting for an additional problem that faces the 
presentist, namely the asymmetry of fixity.   
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CHAPTER 8 – THE ASYMMETRY OF FIXITY 
8.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I described how a productive, realist account of 
causation might provide the means for the presentist to circumvent problems 
associated with cross-time causal relations.  Equally problematic is the 
ostensive symmetry that obtains between past and future: to the extent that 
neither exist, they are both unreal. This picture is at odds with the intrinsic 
asymmetry we encounter in the universe and this is where the Growing Block 
theorist appears to have a significant advantage. A presentist account therefore 
needs to provide some form of connection between the present and the past, 
but one that reflects the asymmetry between past and future without 
engendering undesirable ontological consequences. The aim of this chapter is to 
show how the proposed, compatibilist, model of presentism is able to account 
for the asymmetry of fixity in a manner that maintains the presentist 
commitment that only present entities exist.  
In what follows I concur with Diekemper’s (2005) argument that the 
asymmetry of fixity demands an ontological basis. I pursue Craig’s (2001b) 
suggestion that this needs to be grounded in the nature of objective becoming. I 
describe how objective becoming arises from the nature of the present in virtue 
of its exemplification of the opposing features of real, metaphysical change and 
persistence. Although both past and future are unreal, an asymmetry of fixity 
arises from an ontological dependence between what has been (‘the past’) and 
the present, one that does not obtain between the present and what has yet to 
be (‘the future’). This reflects the fact that what no longer exists is fixed and 
settled. This ontological dependence is asymmetrical. 
8.2 Diekemper’s Arguments 
Diekemper (2005) argues that, as an A-theorist, the presentist maintains a 
belief in an ‘asymmetry of fixity’ (p. 223) in that the past is fixed but the future 
is open and has yet to be determined. This, however, is inconsistent with the 
ontological symmetry implied by presentism which accords an equal 
ontological status to both past and future; both are unreal or non-existent: 
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But, given the presentist’s denial of past existence, she is unable to 
provide an account of the difference between past and future that also 
accounts for the difference between present and future. The only ground 
the presentist can offer for the latter is an ontological one, but then she 
must withdraw this ground in trying to account for the former 
difference. Thus she is unable to fully capture the asymmetry. (p. 238) 
This issue, he notes, has been inadequately addressed under presentist models, 
other than that provided by Craig (1991, 2001b) whose arguments he targets. 
For Craig the asymmetry of fixity is expressed in the notion that ‘the past is 
actualised while the future is merely potential’ (1991, p.152); yet, for Craig, this 
cannot be an ontological asymmetry given the equal ontological status of the 
past and the future. Instead the asymmetry is provided in terms of a causal-
temporal asymmetry grounded in an objective temporal becoming: 
The asymmetry between past and future lies not in their ontological 
status, but in the fact that in the present there are traces only of the past, 
and this fact is rooted in the impossibility of backwards causation, which 
is founded, in turn, upon the objective reality of temporal becoming. 
(Craig, 2001b, p. 34, footnote 10) 
After dismissing various strategies, one option that Diekemper considers, on 
behalf of the presentist, is that present traces (as real) determine the past and, 
as determined, it is thereby fixed. Diekemper’s objection here is to reject 
determinism (both forwards and backwards) on quantum mechanical grounds. 
He also notes that the presentist cannot allow determinism to work both ways 
(forward and backwards) since then the potential asymmetry is lost. 
In advancing this criticism Diekemper appears to confound fixity and 
determinism and there is a vital distinction to be made here. Determinism, as 
Diekemper states, implies that ‘given the present state of the universe S and a 
past time tp, there is only one possible state of the universe at tp compatible 
both with the laws of nature and S’s being the present state’ (p. 229). This he 
rules out on quantum mechanical grounds because the state of the universe at tp 
could be given by two different wavefunctions, either of which might collapse to 
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provide for the present state of the universe; in which case, the present state, S, 
cannot determine the past state of the universe (viz. which wavefunction 
obtained at tp).  
This argument seems misplaced. For the presentist, the past is fixed not in that 
it is determined, rather the past is fixed in that it has occurred. An example 
highlights this difference. A radon-222 atom decays by alpha particle emission 
to a polonium-218 atom. Assume that the present state of the universe, S, is 
given by the present existence of the polonium-218 atom and the alpha particle. 
A past state of the universe, the one that features the undecayed atom (radon-
222), might be described by two different wavefunctions, one of which 
collapses to give the present state of the universe, S. This past state was 
therefore not determinate. Nonetheless, the undecayed atom is past in the sense 
that it has occurred and was previously a present state of the universe. The 
sense in which this past state is fixed and settled is that it has previously existed 
and this state of its having been is something separate from its having been a 
determinate state. Quantum mechanics might well be an argument against 
determinism but it is not an argument against the fixity of the past, as compared 
with the future. 
Diekemper then considers Craig’s appeal to the impossibility of backwards 
causation, in lieu of any alternative account, to provide potential grounds for 
the asymmetry of fixity. This he also rejects, on the grounds that Craig’s 
favoured account of causation (that of Waterlow, 1974) grounds the 
unidirectionality of causation on the asymmetry between past and future. 
Consequently, such arguments cannot be appealed to on pain of circularity.  
Diekemper reviews other options open to the presentist but to no avail. This 
suggests that the underlying problem for the presentist, as an A-theorist, is that: 
‘any account of temporal continuing and causation that coheres with an A-
Theory of time is going to have to presuppose the asymmetry of fixity; in which 
case, the former cannot ground the latter’ (2005, p. 231). Any presentist project 
to ground the asymmetry of fixity in temporal or causal asymmetries (as Craig 
attempts) is therefore bound to fail. Against Craig’s initial premise, Diekemper 
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concludes that the asymmetry of fixity must in some way be ontologically 
grounded.  
Diekemper’s arguments have force, in so far as they highlight the apparent 
impossibility the presentist faces in reconciling the asymmetry of fixity with the 
equal ontological status of the past and future. The underlying problem appears 
to be a fundamental conflict between two pillars of (serious) presentism: the 
commitment to objective becoming (which implies some form of existential 
asymmetry) and the commitment to the privileged ontological status of the 
present (which implies that past and future are unreal, and so have the same 
ontological status). Both Diekemper and Craig concur that the asymmetry of 
fixity must, in some way, be grounded in the nature of objective becoming. 
However, Diekemper’s arguments suggest that the latter must, in addition, be 
prior to any temporal and causal asymmetries. 
8.3 Sorabji’s Circular Time 
The need for the asymmetry of objective becoming to be (metaphysically) prior 
to temporal or causal asymmetries is reinforced by Sorabji’s Circular Time 
scenario (Sorabji, 1988, p. 165), which Diekemper (2005) also discusses. 
Sorabji describes a closed-loop temporal world in which time repeats in an 
endless circle and there is no first nor last event. In this scenario it is equally 
true that all events are past, and so fixed, and all events are future, and so 
unfixed. There is a symmetry of both fixity and non-fixity, each direction of time 
can be seen as both past and future. Diekemper describes such a scenario as 
follows: 
The planting of a seed leads to the growing of a tree which leads to the 
shading of the house; events causally related continue in the same way 
they do in linear time. Of course, since the sequence of events is circular, 
and there is no detectable first and last event, one could plant a tree 




The sequence of events is closed and finite in number, this means that it is the 
same seed that is planted and the same tree that subsequently grows on each 
circuit of the loop. Despite there being no global asymmetry in fixity I suggest 
that the presentist would, nonetheless, wish to maintain that there is an 
objectively moving present. Further, the presentist would maintain that it is this 
moving present that serves as the ontological ground for the direction of 
causation or temporal continuing, albeit one that circles round endlessly, as the 
various events on the circle come into and go out of existence. 
A modified example of Sorabji’s scenario brings the problem of directionality to 
the fore even more acutely. Imagine that Sorabji’s Circular Time universe is also 
a perfectly causally symmetrical Gold universe.165 In this case, we have an acorn 
(representing the Big Bang-Big Crunch point), indicated by point A in Figure 8.1, 
which grows into a young tree (point B) and then develops into the fully mature 
tree (point C, the point of maximal entropy). From this point an identical set of 
events obtains to reverse the growth of the tree until it assumes the form of a 










                                                        
165 After Thomas Gold, a physicist working in the 1960s, who proposed the possibility of ‘Big 
Bang-Big Crunch’ cosmological models. These are highly symmetrical universes with a 











Apart from the points A and C (the minimal and maximal entropy states, 
respectively), for every other point on the evolving cycle it is not possible to tell, 
from within the given instantaneous state, whether it is evolving from A to C or 
evolving from C to A. Yet for the presentist, who believes that reality is 
objectively tensed, there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether the 
universe at point B is heading towards C (BA→C) or shrinking back towards A 
(BC→A). Newton’s God (Chapter 4, § 4.6) could pass judgement on the direction 
in which the continually evolving present is heading, and so should the 
presentist. Despite the fact that any event in the universe can be considered 
equally past or future, there is, for the presentist, an intrinsic directionality in 
the movement of the present around the circle and it would seem that a 
presentist model should accommodate this truth. 
8.4 Interim Conclusions 
I concur with Diekemper that the asymmetry of fixity has to have an ontological 
basis. The only alternative option would appear to be the causal-temporal 
asymmetry, proposed by Craig. However, as Diekemper’s arguments show, this 
strategy results in circularity where the causal-temporal asymmetry is not 
independently grounded, but relies instead upon the asymmetry between past 
and future. 
Nonetheless, with Craig, I consider that the only option for an ontological basis 
of the asymmetry of fixity is to ground this, in some manner, in the nature of 
objective becoming; more specifically, in the movement of the present. It is the 
dynamic nature of the present that secures the asymmetry of fixity: the fact that 
the past has occurred and the future has yet to be. For the presentist, an 
asymmetry exists under Sorabji’s scenario despite the absence of a global 
asymmetry of fixity. This asymmetry arises from an intrinsic directionality 
within the moving present, and is the sense in which those events immediately 
‘ahead’ of the present are about to occur whereas those immediately ‘behind’ 
the present have just occurred. Objective becoming therefore requires an 
independent ontological ground and one under which the asymmetry is 
achieved without compromising the equal ontological status of past and future. 
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This brings a potential problem into focus. Asymmetry is a property of relations 
and under the standard Quinean conception of quantification and ontological 
commitment, relations imply the existence of their relata. Consequently, the 
asymmetry required also needs to be expressed in a manner that does not incur 
problematic existence-entailing relations. This is where a process account of 
presentism can assist in accounting for the asymmetry of fixity. Processes have 
an unfolding, or developmental aspect to them. Consequently, a process account 
offers the potential for the movement of the present (and so objective 
becoming) to be seen in developmental terms as an unfolding of reality in a 
future-focused direction.  
In the following section I provide an account of objective becoming based upon 
the model for a compatibilist presentism outlined in this thesis. As such, it does 
not presuppose the asymmetry of fixity, contra Diekemper’s criticism of Craig’s 
account. In § 8.6, I use this to explain the ontological basis of the asymmetry of 
fixity. 
8.5 An Explication of Objective Becoming 
For the presentist, who is also an A-theorist, reality is objectively tensed. This 
has two aspects to it: the present is continually changing but the present also 
flows, or moves, with a directionality that points away from what has existed 
and towards what has yet to come about. These aspects of an objectively 
dynamic reality are what is referred to by the term ‘objective becoming’. In § 5.5 
I discussed how it is that tense represents something fundamental about reality. 
This led to an identification of the objective correlates of tense with both 
transience and continuity, and these features of reality were used to inform 
appropriate formulations of persistence (§ 5.6) and real, metaphysical change 
(§ 5.8), for the presentist.  The present is such that it exemplifies both these two 
opposing features of reality (§ 5.9.1) and, in what follows, I explain that it is in 
virtue of these two, opposing, but intimately connected, aspects that the present 




As explained in § 6.7.2, everyday, propertied substances (such as apples) are 
hierarchical complexes of the two ontological categories of pure processes and 
interaction events. These categories reflect the primitive nature of persistence 
and real change, respectively. Such entities are able both to persist and change 
in virtue of the mutually dependent nature of these categories (§ 6.7), and so 
the problem of temporary intrinsics is avoided. The apple, as pure process, is a 
recurrence of some, apple-generic, functional unity of biological processes and 
this accounts for its persistence, or continuing existence. The apple complex 
also consists of interaction events that occur at various points in its continuing 
existence, such as being picked from a tree. Such interaction events account for 
real change in the apple. The apple’s life unfolds from beginning to end through 
the interplay of pure processes and interaction events, persistence and real 
change.  
It is this interplay of pure processes (exemplifying persistence) and interaction 
events (exemplifying real change) within the present that grounds objective 
becoming. Under Existence Presentism, presence is existence and so the present 
just is that which exists. That which exists, exists as pure processes, and pure 
processes continue in existence and so persist. It is the persisting nature of 
existing entities, therefore, that accounts for the continuity, or flow, of the 
present. The present continues on in so far as that which exists continues on in 
existence. Presently existing entities (as pure processes) also interact and such 
interaction events are points at which new entities (as pure processes) come 
into existence and existent entities go out of existence, in the present. The 
occurrence of interaction events accounts for the way in which the present, as 
that which exists, changes, and this is the extent to which the present 
exemplifies real, metaphysical change. Thus the present both continually 
changes and moves forward (or continues on) through the interplay, and 
mutual dependence, of persistence and real, metaphysical change. It is the 
combination of these two aspects of the present, to continually change and 
move forward, that is referred to as objective becoming.  
An analogy is helpful to explain how a flow or movement can arise through an 
interplay of both continuity (persistence) and creation / annihilation (real 
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change). Consider a pixelated worm which consists of a line of 8 individual 
lights on an LED screen. The forward motion of the worm across the screen is 
simulated by individual lights sequentially coming on at the front end of the 
worm and going off in sequence at the rear end.  The continuing existence of the 
worm (its persistence) obtains in virtue of a generic, pixelated-worm functional 
continuity namely, that there continues to be a line of 8 adjacent pixels that are 
lit up. Real change occurs with the sequential turning on (a coming into 
existence) and turning off (a going out of existence) of lights at either end of the 
worm. It is in virtue of an interplay of persistence and real change that the 
worm moves in a forward direction across the screen.   
Formulating the present in terms of the opposing features of metaphysical 
change and persistence allows the presentist to internalise the objectively 
dynamic aspects of reality, represented by tense, and avoid the problems of 
contradiction and infinite regress (discussed in § 1.4) that are engendered by 
modelling the movement, or flow, of the present with respect to B-series 
temporal indices. The ‘movement’ of the present is self-generated (or 
internalised) rather than externalised and rendered relative to B-series time. It 
moves forward through the generation of new entities and the destruction of 
existing entities. Consequently, the present is not dynamic by being a movement 
in, or of, time. The present is dynamic in so far as that which exists continues on 
(persists) through a process of constant creation and annihilation (real change). 
In this manner an independent ontological ground for objective becoming is 
thereby secured, and one that is metaphysically prior to both causal and 
temporal asymmetries. 
The explanation of objective becoming given reveals the inadequacy of the term 
‘objective becoming’. As described, the present both continually changes and 
moves forward and it is this process that is referred to as objective becoming. 
But, as Diekemper notes, the latter is to some extent a misnomer: 
I agree with Craig that the ultimate ground of temporal asymmetry must 
lie in the nature of objective temporal becoming, but surely the 
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presentist’s rendering of this concept is not the most intuitive one. The 
term ‘becoming’ implies only creation, not annihilation. (2005, p. 239) 
As advanced above, central to the notion of objective becoming is real change 
and this includes both creation and annihilation. Entities both come into and go 
out of existence, in the present, and it is by going out of existence that they have 
existed and are now no longer present. Objective becoming is more accurately 
seen as a process of dynamic unfolding, rather than simply a becoming. 
8.5.1 The Asymmetry of Fixity as an Asymmetry of Ontological 
Dependence 
The asymmetry of fixity reflects the fact that what has occurred is fixed, and 
settled, whereas what has yet to be is unfixed and open. Entities described as 
‘past’ do not exist but they have previously existed, and, in having existed, they 
have been annihilated, or have gone out of existence. Entities described as 
‘future’ also do not exist and, in this respect, there is an equivalence in the 
ontological status of the past and future. Nonetheless, there is an obvious 
asymmetry: entities described as ‘future’ have not existed, unlike those 
described as ‘past’. This asymmetry of fixity is, I suggest below, an asymmetry of 
ontological dependence, and one that has its origin in the nature of objective 
becoming, in line with the account given above. 
Entities described as past have gone out of existence, and something can only 
later go out of existence if it is, now, present. More formally, it is necessarily the 
case that in order for x to go out of existence, x must exist. This truth engenders 
a dependence between absolute annihilation and existence, and so between 
what has existed (the ‘past’) and the present. Since annihilation and existence 
are ontological concepts, I describe this as an ‘ontological dependence’. There is, 
therefore, an asymmetry in ontological dependence between past and present, 
since what has existed must have been present. There is, however, no reciprocal 
ontological dependence between the present and the past; what exists may 
continue in existence (and so persist). This asymmetry in ontological 
dependence between past and present is an asymmetry that reflects the fact 
that the past is fixed and settled. 
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In contrast to the ontological dependence that holds between past and present, 
there is no analogous dependency between what will be (the future) and the 
present. This represents the fact that the future is open and has yet to be. 
Although neither past nor future exist (their ontological status is equivalent) 
there is, nonetheless, an asymmetrical ontological dependency between the past 
and the present, that does not obtain between the future and the present. This 
asymmetry in ontological dependency grounds the asymmetry of fixity between 
past and future, and it arises because the present, in exemplifying real, 
metaphysical change (which is one component of objective becoming), features 
absolute annihilation in addition to absolute creation. 
It is conceded that this represents a non-standard use of the term ‘ontological 
dependence’, however, it is proposed as a variety of ontological dependence 
that relates specifically to the nature of concrete existence. Tahko and Lowe 
(2016, §.1) describe three varieties of ‘ontological dependence’: ‘rigid 
existential dependence’166, ‘generic existential dependence’167 and ‘essential 
dependence’.168 What is described here, however, does not align with any of 
these senses of ontological dependence, and this is because those identified by 
Tahko and Lowe concern dependence relations that obtain between different, 
existent entities. This leaves a void in the description of existential dependence 
relations that involve creation and annihilation. The dependence at issue here is 
that which obtains between absolute annihilation and concrete existence. In a 
similar vein, Ingram (2016) utilises a non-standard notion of ontological 
dependence which he terms ‘non-rigid ontological dependence’ (as discussed in 
§ 7.6) to describe the dependence between thisnesses and their corresponding 
entities: ‘x’s thisness T exists only if x has existed’ (2016, p. 2886). 
                                                        
166 ‘Rigid existential dependence’ refers to the existential dependence of one object or entity on 
the existence of another. For example, ‘Sets ontologically depend on their members’. 
167 ‘Generic existential dependence’ is a ‘more general kind of dependence’ as illustrated by 
‘electricity ontologically depends on electrons’. This is more general in the sense that the 
existence of electricity depends upon the existence of a certain kind of particle, with its 
associated properties. 
168 ‘Essential dependence’ is a non-modal variety of ontological dependence related to the 
identity or essence of an entity, defined as follows: ‘x dependsE for its existence upon y =df It is 
part of the essence of x that x exists only if y exists’ (Tahko and Lowe, 2016, § 4.3). 
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A further potential objection may arise, which was mentioned previously. 
Standardly, ontological dependency is a relation between elements in a domain 
and, as such, is existence-entailing. The dependence I have described here is 
ontological, in that it concerns the nature of, specifically, concrete being, but it is 
not a relation. Rather, it is more akin to the ‘one-sided existential dependence’ 
(Ingthorsson, 2002, p.8) that was referred to as obtaining between cause and 
effect, under a productive account of causation (§ 7.4.4). Accounts of both 
objective becoming and productive causation rely on ontological notions of 
absolute creation and annihilation for their explication. Yet the tools required to 
represent existential creation and annihilation are not available within the 
standard classical-logical account of quantification, and this presents difficulties 
in providing adequate accounts that depend on these concepts. Mulder (2016, p. 
36-41) and Hinchliff (2010) make similar points concerning the way in which 
standard logic disadvantages the presentist position. Although not coming at 
the issue from a presentist perspective, Crane (2011) highlights that the 
mainstream semantic approach to existence and quantification does not permit 
sentences such as ‘some things we think about do not exist’ to be true (2011, p. 
46). Crane’s solution is to regard quantification as a way of ‘talking about’ things 
(p. 58), where aboutness is meant as representation, rather than reference. In 
line with this a domain of quantification should be conceived of as a ‘collection 
of objects of thought’ (p. 64), rather than a set of existent entities. 
I have no rebuttal for the objection above, other than to appeal as follows. The 
arguments within this thesis represent an attempt to formulate an account of 
presentism compatible with physical theory. The approach taken assumes the 
metaphysical priority of an objectively dynamic reality and regards the 
spacetime of relativistic physics as representing the structure of this reality. 
This has required that the concepts to which presentists avail themselves (such 
as the present, change, objective becoming, causation and persistence) are 
formulated purely as existential concepts that make no reference to B-series 
time. The formulation of presence as existence (Tallant, 2014) achieves this. 
Nonetheless, the presentist, who is also an A-theorist, requires recourse to the 
existential concepts of absolute creation and annihilation, to account 
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successfully for real change and objective becoming, and until these find formal 
expression within a temporal logic the difficulties encountered in formulating 




POSTSCRIPT - MCTAGGART REVISITED 
I have argued in this thesis that, to be compatible with physical theory, ‘serious’ 
presentism169 requires a suitable ontological foundation. This is one that 
permits the objectively dynamic aspects of reality, indicated by tense, to be 
internalised in the present, and this is achieved by formulating those aspects 
independently of B-series time. This requires a revisionary ontological 
approach that is based upon the categories of concrete substance, powerful 
property, pure process and interaction event. In pursuing this path, I have taken 
serious presentism to be primarily a thesis about existence (in particular, a 
thesis that existence is objectively dynamic), rather than a thesis about time per 
se. My starting point is Existence Presentism (Tallant, 2014) and I have argued 
that compatibility with physical theory requires that this model is combined 
with a reductionist position on spacetime that regards spacetime as the 
structure of an objectively dynamic reality. 
In closing, I draw attention to the enduring relevance of McTaggart’s argument 
and his distinction between the A-series and the B-series. As Thomson (2001, p. 
229) notes there are many who ‘see things in it that they regard as true and 
important, or if not true, then anyway important’. 
For McTaggart, any reflection on our concept of time sees that it necessarily 
involves change. This assumption, together with the fact that B-series relations 
are permanent, leads him to conclude that the A-series must be the more 
fundamental. Events cannot be objectively temporally ordered, as earlier-than 
or later-than, unless those events can alter their A-series determinations. The 
existence of the B-series therefore depends upon there being real (tensed) 
change. The second part of his argument is to conclude that the A-series is 
contradictory and that, therefore, time is unreal. 
Although McTaggart regards change as playing a central role in time, he rejects 
seeing change in terms of events coming into, or going out of, existence. The 
reason for this is that B-series relations are permanent relations. This fact, 
                                                        
169 A ‘serious’ presentist is one who subscribes to the additional thesis that tense indicates 
something objective and fundamental about reality. 
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combined with the assumption that relations imply the existence of their relata, 
means that it just cannot be the case that where an event, x, stands in the 
relation of earlier than to another event, y, it is also the case that x does not exist 
(Ingthorsson, 2016, p. 36). Ingthorsson (2016) also highlights the significance 
of McTaggart’s prior metaphysical commitments in interpreting his arguments. 
In particular, his Hegelian notion of reality (including time) as an absolute and 
perfect ‘whole’ counts against regarding change in terms of absolute creation or 
annihilation. Change, for McTaggart, can therefore only be the gain or loss of A-
series determinations (pastness, presentness and futurity). 
The approach taken within this thesis rejects the standard definition of change, 
as different properties at different times, on the grounds that this disadvantages 
the presentist because the ‘different times’ underpinning the standard models 
of both change and persistence are B-series times (§ 5.4.3 and 5.5). Change is 
instead reformulated as ‘something coming into existence and/or something 
going out of existence’ (§ 5.7.2). In the case of qualitative change this is the gain 
or loss of properties simpliciter; in the case of substantial change this is a gain or 
loss of entities. Pace McTaggart, the essence of change for the serious presentist 
is absolute creation or annihilation. It is this formulation of (real, metaphysical) 
change, together with a reformulation of persistence (as ‘continuing existence’, 
§ 5.4.5) that characterises what it is for reality to be objectively tensed, and 
allows the fundamentality of the A-series to be asserted.  
The present moves on, or objectively flows, not with respect to B-series time 
but by characterising the opposing features of real, metaphysical change and 
persistence (§ 5.8.1). It is this dual nature of the present that provides the 
mechanism to internalise the dynamic aspects of reality and render them 
independent of B-series time. This objective flow, characterised by the present, 
underpins the changing A-series determinations of objects and events. The 
fundamentality of the A-series therefore arises from the nature of the present: 
the present, in exemplifying both real, metaphysical change and persistence, is 
objectively dynamic. As McTaggart suggested, the A-series is both fundamental 
and is required for there to be ‘real’ change. 
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McTaggart also maintains that the B-series must, in some manner, be dependent 
upon the A-series. This has also been argued for in this thesis. I concluded in 
Chapter 2 is that it is beneficial for the presentist, who seeks a model 
compatible with physical theory, to adopt a reductionist account of B-series 
time that equates time with the structure of an objectively dynamic reality. 
Achieving this goal requires a suitable ontological model for presentism, which 
was developed in Chapter 6. The second tier categories of the model - pure 
process and interaction event - reflect the primitive nature of persistence and 
real, metaphysical change, respectively, and provide the mechanism for the 
internalisation of the dynamic aspects of reality. At the fundamental, physical 
level that which exists (propertied substance), and so is present, consists of 
pure processes and their interactions (interaction events). 
I have also argued that the categories of pure process and interaction event 
align, in a functionally relevant manner, with the primitive elements in 
Belkind’s (2012) Primitive Motion Relationism from which the structure of 
(flat) relativistic spacetime can be derived. If the argument for a functional 
alignment can be supported, then spacetime intervals (and so the fixed B-series 
relations between events) arise as the structure of an objectively dynamic 
reality. 
The conclusions of this thesis, therefore, align with these two strands of 
McTaggart’s argument: the fundamentality of the A-series and the dependence 
of the B-series upon the A-series. However, McTaggart’s conclusion that the A-
series leads to contradiction can be avoided if his assumptions concerning 
change are rejected. The fundamentality of the A-series requires that change is 
formulated independently of (B-series) time, and this means that change, at the 
metaphysical level, is provided by absolute creation and annihilation. 
This thesis has outlined an approach towards establishing a model of serious 
presentism compatible with physical theory. Under this model serious 
presentism is a theory of (dynamic) existence, rather than a theory of time. 
Consequently, the presentist can happily cede that the B-theory provides an 
adequate theory of ‘time’, an adequacy that is demonstrated by the predictive 
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success of our best scientific theories. This ‘time’ just is the structure of, and 
proceeds from, an objectively dynamic existence. Similarly, the serious 
presentist has no reason to fear the ‘disappearance of time’ at the fundamental 
level, as is indicated by developing theories of quantum gravity. The ‘time’ that 
disappears is simply B-series time, the time that emerges (at supra-Planck 




APPENDIX 1 – REFERENCE FRAMES IN MINKOWSKI SPACETIME 
The Concept of a Frame of Reference 
In general terms a frame of reference in physics is a set of spatial and temporal 
coordinates (a coordinate system) together with a set of physical reference 
points (e.g., events) that serve to anchor or locate the abstract coordinate 
system in physical reality. It is with respect to the physical reference points that 
measurements of spatial and temporal intervals can be standardised.  
For observers in relative motion a reference frame is defined with respect to 
each observer and is one in which they are at rest. Transformation equations 
are defined which allow the coordinate descriptions (or measurements) 
applicable to events in one reference frame to be translated (or transformed) 
into those which describe the event in another reference frame (from the point 
of view of the observer at rest in that frame). Inertial reference frames are 
reference frames moving with a uniform, relative velocity with respect to each 
other; they are frames in which Newton’s first law, the Law of Inertia holds. 
Reference Frames in Minkowski Spacetime 
Reference frames for observers in relative motion are described within 
Minkowski spacetime in the following way. 
For an observer (A) at rest relative to an object being measured the spatial (xA) 
and temporal (tA) axes are shown as perpendicular to the origin. The velocity of 
light, in that reference frame, is shown by convention as having a unit velocity 
of 1 (indicated by the red line in Figure A(i). It therefore bisects the two, 
orthogonal coordinate axes. 
 
Figure A(i) – Reference frame, S, for an 
observer, A, at (relative) rest. 
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Since velocity is defined as Δx/Δt, in order that the velocity of light is constant 
for all observers in all reference frames (as required by the STR), reference 
frames moving with relative velocity with respect to the rest frame (shown as 
primed frames) are tilted at equal angles to the path of light (also referred to as 
a ‘light cone’). The greater the relative velocity of the observer, the more acute 
the angle, thus C’s reference frame is moving with greater velocity, relative to A, 
than B’s frame in Figure A(ii). 
 
It is the relative tilting of the coordinate axes of observers in relative motion 
(due to the invariance of the velocity of light) that leads to the result that any 
measurement of length (a spatial interval) made by observers in relative motion 
at the same time will differ. This is indicated by the projections of the length of 
the rod onto the different coordinate axes (x´B and xA) in Chapter 3, figure 3.4. 
Similarly, any measurement of duration (a temporal interval) made by 
observers in relative motion at the same place will also differ. It is the 
invariance of the velocity of light that determines the spatiotemporal structure 
of reality and the existence of relativistic kinematic effects (length contraction 
and time dilation). 
  
Figure A(ii) – Reference frames, S´ 
and S´´, for observers, B and C, in 
relative motion with respect to A. 
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APPENDIX 2 - SUMMARY, KEY DEFINITIONS & AXIOMS OF BELKIND’S 
MODEL 
In this Appendix I set out the key definitions and axioms of Belkind’s Primitive 
Motion Relationalism (Belkind, 2012, pp. 59-91) of relevance to Chapter 6, and 
summarise the main arguments underpinning his derivation of both Galilean 
and Minkowski spacetime. 
Primitive Motion Relationalism takes uniform, unidirectional motions (PUMs) 
as the basic entities of spacetime. These are undefined primitives. Illustrative 
examples of PUMs are the motions of free particles, isolated systems and light 
signals. 
Definition 1 (Event): For primitive motions, α and β, an event is defined as an 
intersection between PUMs (Eαβ). Eαβ is a two place relation between PUMs 
and is true if the motions intersect and false if they do not. For flat spacetimes 
an event, p, is identical with a true relation Eαβ (for curved spacetimes there 
will be more than one coincidence point). Coincidence relations are irreflexive 
( Eαα) and symmetric (Eαβ ↔ Eβα). 
Once events are defined, the spacetime is constructed from the geometric 
relations between events. Relations between pairs of events (such as the 
determinateness relation below) are therefore four-place relations between 
PUMs. 
Definition 2 (Parallelism): This comprises two conditions on motions, α and β, 
being parallel (Pαβ):  
1. The motions do not intersect Pαβ   Eαβ  
2. Parallelism is a transitive relation [Pαβ  Pβ]  Pα 
PUMs are parallel where motions have the same velocity and direction. 
Axioms of Incidence: A set of four incidence axioms guarantees that events 
(coincidences) arise for motions: 
I 1. Every PUM is intersected by at least one other 
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I 2. For every motion, α, there is an intersection between two motions which is 
not on α 
I 3. For every motion, α, intersected by another motion, β1, there is another 
motion, β2, parallel to β1 and which intersects α 
I 4. If a motion, α, intersects another motion, β1, it intersects all other motions 
parallel to β1 
Axioms of Determinateness: A relation of determinateness (Dpq) is defined as 
a two-place relation between events170 on a particular motion, where event, p, 
determines event, q. The determinateness relation describes an asymmetrical 
causal relation between events along motions. There are two axioms of 
determinateness: 
1. Any pair of events p and q belonging to a given motion α stand in an anti-
symmetric causal relation – either p determines q or q determines p, but 
not both. 
2. Transitivity of determinateness relations – if p determines q and q 
determines r then p determines r. (Note: this does not require that the 3 
events belong to same motion). 
Further axioms of ‘betweenness’, ‘congruence’ and ‘continuity’ are also 
articulated, which establish relations between events. 
The generation of events in this manner allows for the decomposition of motion 
intervals into spatial and temporal components. Motion intervals and relative 
velocities (i.e. the ‘angle’ between PUMs) provide the basic metrics allowing a 
Galilean spacetime to be constructed.  
The addition of Einstein’s Light Postulate (considered as a Relativistic Paradigm 
of Uniform Motion, or RPUM) allows Belkind to derive the flat, relativistic, 
spacetime of STR in a similar manner. The latter starts with presupposition of 
two privileged sets of parallel motions, one (1) represents light waves going in 
                                                        
170 Equivalently, this is a four-place relation between PUMs. 
258 
 
one direction, the other (2) light waves going in the opposite direction. The 
reconstruction of the Light Postulate amounts to the assumption that the 
motions, 1, and, 2, have equivalent motion intervals, regardless of the set of 
parallel motions used as a reference. In other words, light-waves, as a privileged 
class of motions, provide an absolute standard of motion intervals. As Belkind 
states, the derivation of flat relativistic spacetime from Einstein’s light postulate 
(employing RPUM as a basic entity) shows that Einstein’s restricted Principle of 
Relativity arises as a natural consequence from the assumption of the 
fundamentality of uniform motion, and its priority over spatiotemporal 
relations. This is an important benefit of Primitive Motion Relationism. Under 
Einstein’s STR this principle has to be assumed as a fundamental axiom in order 
to derive the structure of spacetime. The successful derivations of both Galilean 
and STR spacetimes by Belkind’s theory grounds an explanation for the 
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